Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 22STCV02073, Date: 2024-07-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV02073 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 76
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants,
including her husband whom she is divorcing and his attorney, have conspired to
defame, stalk, eavesdrop and threaten/harass Plaintiff.
The Court granted Defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion.
Defendants Seyed M. Khoddami and
Sean Collinson move for relief from the deadline to file the motion for
attorney fees incurred on appeal.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants Seyed M. Khoddami and
Sean Collinson’s motion for relief from the deadline to file the motion for
attorney fees incurred on appeal is GRANTED. The attorney’s fees motion filed
on May 30, 2024 is deemed to have been timely filed.
ANALYSIS
Motion For Relief
From Deadline
Defendants Seyed M. Khoddami and
Sean Collinson move for relief from the deadline to file the motion for
attorney fees incurred on appeal.
Specifically, in the event this
Court deems Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees accrued in Plaintiff Neda
Heidari’s (“Plaintiff”) second appeal, the Fee Appeal (B334160), as requested
in the pending Appellate Fees Motion to be an untimely request, then Defendants
(1) hereby move for relief under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(d) to
extend their time to bring a motion to seek appellate fees accrued in the Fee
Appeal, and (2) request this Court deem their pending Appellate Fees Motion
timely to the extent it seeks those fees.
The grounds for this request is that there is good cause to grant
Defendants’ an extension of time to seek fees on the Fee Appeal and good cause
to deem their Appellate Fees Motion as timely filed to the extent it seeks
those fees.
A court may extend the time for filing an attorney’s fees motion
for good cause, even after the 60-day period has expired. (Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium
Owners Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128, 134-135)
But the late filing of the motion for attorney fees does not mean
that Association is precluded from recovering its reasonable attorney fees.
Rule [*135] 3.1702(d) provides: “For good cause, the trial
judge may extend the time for filing a motion for attorney's fees …
.” Rule 3.1702(d) is “remedial” and is to be given a liberal, rather than
strict interpretation. (E.g., Barragan
v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
1373, 1382 [109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501] [relief to be granted unless absolutely
forbidden].)
We reject
appellant's contention that a rule 3.1702(d) extension of time must be granted
before the expiration of the 60-day period. “The ordinary principles of
statutory construction govern our interpretation of the California Rules of
Court. [Citations.] Our objective is to determine the drafter's intent.” (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902 [55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 152 P.3d
1109].) If the drafters of rule 3.1702(d) intended that the
extension be granted before the expiration of the 60-day period, they would
have said so as they did in rule 3.1702(b)(2), which provides: “The parties
may, by stipulation filed
before the expiration of the time allowed under (b)(1) [(the 60-day period)], extend the time for filing a motion
for attorney's fees … .” (Italics added.) Rule 3.1702(d) contains no such
limitation: “For good cause, the trial judge may extend the time for filing a
motion for attorney's fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer
period than allowed by stipulation.” “[I]f a statute on a particular
subject omits a particular provision, inclusion of that provision in another
related statute indicates an intent the provision is not applicable to the
statute from which it was omitted. [Citation.]” (In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1827 [46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198].)
Accordingly,
for good cause the trial court had the power to extend the time for filing
Association's motion for attorney fees. The good cause would have been
counsel's mistake of law in believing that the bankruptcy stay tolled the
statutory 60-day period. “ ‘ “The issue of which mistakes of law
constitute excusable neglect presents a fact question; the determining factors
are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of
determination of the correct law. [Citation.] Although an honest mistake of
law is a valid ground for relief where a problem is complex and debatable,
ignorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly
sustain a finding denying relief.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus … a mistaken
but reasonable decision by [Association's] counsel that [the 60-day period was
tolled by the bankruptcy stay] constitutes good cause for the trial court to
permit belated [filing of the motion]. Counsel are not expected to be
omniscient, as the [drafters] plainly recognized by writing the ‘good cause’
exception into [rule 3.1702(d)].” (City
of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335, 346
[85 Cal. Rptr. 149, 466 P.2d 693].)
(Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners
Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128, 134-135)
Here, Defendants seek a one-day
extension of the deadline on the ground that counsel miscalendared the due
date by one day. (Motion, Page 9:10-14.) The Court finds that counsel’s
calendaring error constitutes good cause for the requested one day extension. (See
Declaration of Ryan Gordon, ¶¶ 29 – 34.)
Plaintiff’s opposition is
inapposite in focusing on the memorandum of costs, not the attorney’s fees
motion.
The motion for relief is GRANTED.
The attorney’s fees motion filed on May 30, 2024 is deemed to have been timely
filed.