Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 22STCV22914, Date: 2023-05-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV22914 Hearing Date: May 4, 2023 Dept: 76
Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1), the Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein. Counsel must contact the staff in Department 76 to inform the Court whether they wish to submit on the tentative, or to argue the matter. As required by Rule 3.1308(a)(2), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 of their intent to appear and argue.
Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776.
Per Rule of Court 3.1308, if notice of intention
to appear is not given, the Court may adopt the tentative ruling as the final
ruling.
Plaintiff leased production studio space from Defendant, with an option to purchase the property. Defendant allegedly interfered with Plaintiff’s business from prospective clients who wished to rent studio space from Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant was allegedly responsible for a flood to the building, which Plaintiff paid to have the resulting damages repaired.
Defendant Castaic Studios, LLC filed a Cross-Complaint alleging that Plaintiff ceased making payments as required under the License Agreement, yet continued to occupy the premises and improperly maintained possession and control despite Cross-Complainant’s objections.
Cross-Complainant/Defendant Castaic Studios, LLC and Defendant Fred Faramarzi move for an order bifurcating trial on the cause of action for ejectment in the Cross-Complaint and setting a trial date.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants Castaic Studios, LLC and Fred Faramarzi’s motion to bifurcate the ejectment cause of action and to set a trial date is DENIED.
ANALYSIS
Motion To Bifurcate
Cross-Complainant/Defendant Castaic Studios, LLC and Defendant Fred Faramarzi move for an order bifurcating trial on the cause of action for ejectment in the Cross-Complaint and setting a trial date.
Moving parties argue that Cross-Defendant is a hold-over tenant which causes daily damages to Cross-Complainant due to loss of use and also activities being conducted which result in liens on the property. Moving parties seek to bifurcate the issue of ejectment to curtail these damages.
Defendant argues as follows: The cause of action for ejectment is based on the expiration of a month to month license agreement, which expires by its own terms absent the effective exercise of an option. In dispute is whether the option was in fact exercised, a question which is a necessary prerequisite to both adjudication and resolution of the remaining causes of action: cross-complainant alleges the lease and all rights to possession terminated as of July 31, 2022. Adjudication of this one issue would substantially limit the scope of the issues, arguments and damages relevant to all the other the causes of action in both the Complaint and Cross-Complainant. Adjudication of this issue would also substantially accommodate ultimate resolution of the disputes between the parties by providing guidance regarding their obligations under the lease. Even a ruling adverse to Cross-Complainant would permit Cross-Complainant to act to enforce rights under the lease currently unavailable, such as serve new notices of default and demands for compliance. Without rapid adjudication of the ejectment cause of action, Cross-Complainant lacks guidance as to its own legal rights.
The opposition disputes that bifurcation will convenience witnesses, serve the ends of justice, or promote the economy and efficiency of handling of this litigation. The opposition argues that bifurcation will not substantially narrow the issues for trial and will result in two trials involving the same witnesses, same testimony, same evidence, and largely the same fact issues. For instance, Wonderland is asserting Castaic’s bad faith conduct and breaches of the parties’ License Agreement as defenses to Castaic’s ejectment claim.
Further, Wonderland argues, Castaic has filed an appeal of the dismissal of its related unlawful detainer action against Wonderland, such that bifurcation and advancement of Castaic’s ejectment claim in this case will interfere with the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction to decide Castaic’s appeal. Wonderland argues that it has the right a jury trial on the ejectment claim, so two separate juries would have to be empaneled.
The Court has the discretion to order bifurcation in furtherance of convenience, the ends of justice, the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation, or to avoid prejudice. (Civ. Proc. Code, §§ 598, 1048(b).)
Ejectment is a remedy at law. (Monolith etc. Cement Co. v. Gillbergh (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 413, 419.) “The essential elements of an ejectment action are (1) the plaintiff's valid interest in the property and (2) the defendant's wrongful possession and withholding thereof. (Citations omitted.)” (2710 Sutter Ventures, LLC v. Millis (2022) 82 Cal. App. 5th 842, 866.)
As Wonderland points out, Civ. Proc. Code, § 592 provides:
In actions for the recovery of specific, real, or personal property,
with or without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract, or as
damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact must be tried
by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived, or a reference is ordered, as
provided in this code. Where in these cases there are issues both of law and
fact, the issue of law must be first disposed of. In other cases, issues of
fact must be tried by the court, subject to its power to order any such issue
to be tried by a jury, or to be referred to a referee, as provided in this
code.
(Civ. Proc. Code § 592.)
The Court agrees with Wonderland that Castaic has not made a sufficient showing as to why bifurcation of the ejectment issue is justified. Basically, Castaic argues that it wants to cut off the accrual of damages. However, continuing damages will, if proven by Castaic, be added to any judgment it recovers. Castaic’s arguments in reply would perhaps justify some type of interim injunctive relief, but Castaic has not properly sought such relief.
On the other hand, because Wonderland’s defense to ejectment includes the
claim that Wonderland does not have the contractual right to eject Wonderland
due to Castaic’s breach of the License Agreement, such issue will have to be
tried to a jury. (Civ. Proc. Code, § 592.) In this regard, a single jury should
hear all evidence presented in this action, so that all witnesses need only
testify once.
As for unclean hands,
this equitable defense is not available against a cause of action for
ejectment. (See, e.g.,
Brownrigg v. De Frees
(1925) 196 Cal. 534, 539 [unclean hands not available defense against
ejectment].)
The Court does not find
the appellate court jurisdiction argument to be persuasive. The ejectment cause
of action is distinct from the summary remedy of unlawful detainer.
Subject to certain exceptions not relevant
here, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon
the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or
affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any
other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.”
n5 (§ 916, subd. (a).) The purpose of the automatic stay provision of section
916, subdivision (a) “is to protect the appellate court's jurisdiction by
preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided. The [automatic stay]
prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the
appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it.”
( Elsea v. Saberi (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 625, 629 [5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 742] (Elsea).)
. . .
To accomplish this purpose, section 916,
subdivision (a) stays all further trial court proceedings “upon the matters
embraced” in or “affected” by the appeal. In determining whether a proceeding
is embraced in or affected by the appeal, we must consider the appeal and its
possible outcomes in relation to the proceeding and its possible results.
“[W]hether a matter is ‘embraced’ in or ‘affected’ by a judgment [or order]
within the meaning of [section 916] depends on whether postjudgment [or postorder] proceedings on the matter would
have any effect on the ‘effectiveness’ of the appeal.” ( In re Marriage of
Horowitz (1984) 159 Cal. App. 3d 377, 381 [205 Cal. Rptr. 880] (Horowitz).) “If
so, the proceedings are stayed; if not, the proceedings are permitted.” ( Betz
v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 938 [20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841] (Betz).)
The fact that the postjudgment or postorder
proceeding may render the appeal moot is not, by itself, enough to establish that the proceeding affects the effectiveness of
the appeal and should be stayed under section 916. Rather, something
more is needed. For example, the
trial court proceeding must directly or indirectly seek to “enforce, vacate
or modify [the] appealed judgment or order.” n6 (Elsea, supra, 4 Cal.
App.4th at p. 629 [“The trial court's power to enforce, vacate or modify an
appealed judgment or order is [*190] suspended while the appeal is
pending”].) Or the proceeding must
substantially interfere with the appellate court's ability to conduct the
appeal. (See, e.g., Hollaway v. Scripps Memorial Hosp. (1980) 111 Cal. App.
3d 719, 723–724 [168 Cal. Rptr. 782] [holding that a pending appeal precludes
the trial court from issuing an order relieving the parents as plaintiff's
guardians and appointing new counsel for plaintiff because the order interferes
with the conduct of the appeal].)
. . .
[*191] By contrast, an appeal does not stay proceedings on
“ancillary or collateral matters which do not affect the judgment [or order] on
appeal” even though the proceedings may render the appeal moot. (
Betz, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 938.) For example, the Legislature has
established that certain proceedings, by law, are collateral to the merits of
an appeal despite their potential effect on the appeal. Thus, the Legislature,
through its enactments, has established that a motion for a new trial is
collateral to the judgment and may proceed despite an appeal from the judgment.
(See In re Estate of Waters (1919) 181 Cal. 584, 587 [185 P. 951] (Waters); see
also Neff v. Ernst (1957) 48 Cal.2d 628, 634 [311 P.2d 849].) And the language
and history of the lis pendens statute establish that a proceeding to expunge a
lis pendens is collateral to an appeal from the judgment in the underlying
action. (See United Professional Planning, Inc. v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.
App. 3d 377, 383–386 [88 Cal. Rptr. 551] (United Professional).)
A postjudgment or postorder proceeding is also ancillary or collateral
to the appeal despite its potential effect on the appeal, if the proceeding
could or would have occurred regardless of the outcome of the appeal. (See Horowitz, supra, 159 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 382–383 [finding no
automatic stay because the result of the proceeding could have been achieved
through other procedures regardless of the outcome of the appeal].) . . .
(Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189-91 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)
Accordingly, the motion to bifurcate the
ejectment cause of action and to set a trial date is DENIED.