Judge Christopher K. Lui, Case Number: 22STCV34672, Date: 2024-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 22STCV34672, Date: 2024-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV34672 Hearing Date: January 31, 2024 Dept: 76

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1), the Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein. Counsel must contact the staff in Department 76 to inform the Court whether they wish to submit on the tentative, or to argue the matter. As required by Rule 3.1308(a), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 of their intent to appear and argue.

Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776.

Per Rule of Court 3.1308, if notice of intention to appear is not given, the Court may adopt the tentative ruling as the final ruling.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have conspired to destroy Plaintiffs’ business enterprises through a social media smear campaign which characterizes Plaintiffs as a cult.

Cross-Complainants filed a Cross-Complaint alleging a bevy of claims against Plaintiffs regarding wrongful activities occurring within the church environment.

Cross-Defendants demur to the Second Amended Cross-Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants 7M Films, Inc., Hannah Shinn, RCP Financial, Inc., Robert Shinn, and Shekinah Church; and Cross-Defendants Abraham Park, Alpha Plus Realty, Christina Keller, Eung Seok Son, Imaginating Pictures, Isaiah Shinn, Jenny Park, Lemuel Betton, Matthew Shinn, Shirley Kim, Studio on the Mount, Inc., and Young Bin Kim’s demurrer to the Second Amended Cross-Complaint is OVERRULED as to the first, ninth, twenty-fourth, and twenty-eighth causes of action

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED as to Cross-Defendants Young and Abraham and SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to Cross-Defendants Jenny and Christina.

The demurrer to the twelfth, thirty-fourth, forty-fourth, forty-sixth, forty-seventh, forty-eighth, forty-ninth, and fiftieth causes of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

The demurrer to the fifty-second cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Cross-Complainant Fisher-Green will only be given one more opportunity to amend this cause of action only.

Cross-Complainant Fisher-Green is given 30 days’ leave to amend where indicated.

ANALYSIS

Demurrer

Meet and Confer

The Declaration of Neeloufar Mahrouyan reflects that Cross-Defendants’ counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 430.41.

Discussion

Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants 7M Films, Inc., Hannah Shinn, RCP Financial, Inc., Robert Shinn, and Shekinah Church; and Cross-Defendants Abraham Park, Alpha Plus Realty, Christina Keller, Eung Seok Son, Imaginating Pictures, Isaiah Shinn, Jenny Park, Lemuel Betton, Matthew Shinn, Shirley Kim, Studio on the Mount, Inc., and Young Bin Kim demur to the Second Amended Cross-Complaint as follows:

1. DEMURRER TO FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Fraud – By All Cross-Complainants Against Robert, Hannah, Matthew, Isaiah, Shirley, Kloe, Daniel, and Shekinah).

A. Re: Insufficient allegations made on information and belief

Cross-Defendants argue that fraud may not be pled on information and belief.

However, “[a]n allegation of material facts upon information or belief is a sufficient allegation.” (Buxton v. International Indem. Co. (1920) 47 Cal.App. 583, 591.) If Plaintiff would not have personal knowledge of a matter, but would ordinarily learn of the information from the declarations of others, it is appropriate to allege such information on information and belief:

Defendants contend, however, that the allegation is insufficient for the reason that the special damages are alleged only on information and belief. Plaintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within his personal knowledge, if he has information leading him to believe that the allegations are true. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 446; Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201, 206 [92 P. 184]; North v. Cecil B. DeMille Productions, 2 Cal.2d 55, 58-59 [39 P.2d 199]; Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo, 64 Cal.App.2d 858, 865 [149 P.2d 397]; Thompson v. Sutton, 50 Cal.App.2d 272, 279 [122 P.2d 975].) Plaintiff would ordinarily learn that he lost employment because of the libel from the declarations of others. It is therefore appropriate for him to allege such matters on information and belief. (Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, supra.)

Hall v. James, 79 Cal.App. 433, 435-436 [249 P. 876], does not compel a contrary result. In that case the court held insufficient an allegation on information and belief of the amount of damages sustained by plaintiff as the result of [*793] defendant's breach of contract. The court recognized that matters that are not within the personal knowledge of the pleader may be alleged on information and belief, but stated that "plaintiff is certainly in a position to know better than any informant the financial loss he sustained by reason of the breach of contract." ( Hall v. James, 79 Cal.App. at 436 [249 P. 876].) In the present case, the amount of financial loss plaintiff has sustained and the fact that the loss was caused by the libel are not necessarily within his personal knowledge, but may be ascertainable only from the declarations of others and may therefore be alleged on information and belief.

(Pridonoff v. Balokovich (1951) 36 Cal.2d 788, 792-93 [bold emphasis added].)

Here, Cross-Defendants cite certain allegations scattered throughout the 2AXC, but none of these are necessarily within the personal knowledge of Cross-Complainants, although they may obtain information to support such allegations through the declarations of others. Under Pridonoff, the allegations on information and belief are sufficient. Cross-Complainants are entitled to obtain evidence to support their allegations through discovery.

Moreover, Cross-Defendants fail to show how this cause of action is insufficiently pled given these allegations on information and belief.

This ground for demurrer is not persuasive.

B. Re: Failure To Meet Heightened Pleading Requirement For Fraud.

Cross-Defendants argue that this cause of action does not meet the heightened pleading standard for fraud.

“To establish a claim for deceit based on intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove seven essential elements: (1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff. (Citations omitted.)” (Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498 [italics omitted].)

Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with “ ‘general and conclusory allegations.’ ” (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184 [132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 65 P.3d 1255].) The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made. (Lazar v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)

We enforce the specificity requirement in consideration of its two purposes. The first purpose is to give notice to the defendant with sufficiently definite charges that the defendant can meet them. (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216 [197 Cal. Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660].) The second is to permit a court to weed out meritless fraud claims on the basis of the pleadings; thus, “the pleading should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 216–217.)

(West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.)

This cause of action is based on the following allegations:

231. Robert and the Mentors, individually and as agents of Shekinah, represented to all Cross-Complainants that tithes and offerings given to Shekinah and Robert would be used to support Shekinah, other religious institutions, or individuals visiting as “prophets” on Shekinah “prophecy nights.” The dates of these representations are set forth in the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

232. On information and belief, these representations were false because members’ actual offerings and tithes never added up to the final numbers given by Robert and the Mentors. Robert and the Mentors, individually and as agents of Shekinah, knew the representations were false when the representations were made, or at the very least, never intended to honor their representations because none of offerings were ever reflected on Shekinah’s end-of-year offering receipts. Robert and Shekinah would claim that the monetary “donations” were used to do “God’s work.” The tax documents provided to members at the end of each year were inaccurate, missing thousands of dollars that were given to Robert and Shekinah. Hannah, who controlled the accounts of many Shekinah members, including Elisha Leigh, would write checks to Shekinah and Robert, but these checks were never reflected in the members’ tax returns as offerings.

233. Instead, Robert, Hannah, Matthew, Isaiah, Shirley, individually and as agents of Shekinah, used the tithes for personal expenses and lived lavish lifestyles.

234. All Cross-Complainants reasonably relied on the representation that tithes and offerings would be used to support Shekinah or other religious institutions when tithes and offerings were given because that is a commonly accepted purpose of tithing, and they were explicitly informed that the money would be used to support Shekinah and/or other religious institutions. Cross-Complaints had no reason to know that the tithes would be used otherwise when given.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 231 – 234 [bold emphasis added].)

Regarding specific allegations as to each Cross-Complainant pertaining to the use of offerings the 2ACC alleges as follows:

44. All of the Cross-Complainants were required to give 10% of their income to Shekinah, a tithe, which Robert and the Mentors told them would support the church. In calling this 10% donation a tithe, Robert and the Mentors implied that this money would be used to support Shekinah, such as through maintenance of church buildings, funding church programs, or supporting other members or

religious institutions. If they did not give their tithes, Robert yelled at them or threatened consequences.

45. Robert encouraged them to give more than 10% by saying, “The more you give, the more you’ll receive,” and “Tithe is the minimum, you must one day get to a place where you give all of your money, time, body, mind and heart.” Robert said this frequently during sermons which were given twice a week. Robert gave sermons on Wednesday nights and Sunday mornings. In 2022, this changed Tuesday nights and Saturday mornings. All members were expected to attend sermons.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 44, 45 [bold emphasis added].)

47. These phrases, or slight variations thereof, would be repeated to Cross-Complainants regularly by their mentors, both in person as well as over text and email. Cross-Complainants were also told “When you give an offering to the Man of God, give cash so it’s more of a blessing because he doesn’t need to pay taxes.”

(2ACC, ¶ 47 [bold emphasis added].)

48. Members were expected to give 30% of their income: 10% tithe to Shekinah, 10% in cash to Robert the Man of God (which on information and belief Robert did not report as income, misclassifying it as a donation). Mentors, including Matthew and Shirley, told Shekinah members that they had to give the Man of God cash box, 10% or more strictly in cash, and an additional 10% “offering.” Robert stated multiple times in sermons that those who are committed to God donate 100% of their income and that was how one entered heaven. Robert and Shekinah would claim that the monetary “donations” were used to do “God’s work.” Meanwhile, Robert and his Mentors lived lavish lifestyles and the tax documents provided to members at the end of each year were inaccurate, missing

thousands of dollars that were given to Robert and Shekinah. Hannah, who controlled the accounts of many Shekinah members, including Elisha Leigh, would write checks to Shekinah and Robert, but these checks were never reflected in the members’ tax returns as offerings.

49. On information and belief, Robert took essentially 100% of what longtime members, including Elisha Leigh, made after those members were allowed to pay for basic necessities, such as car payments, insurance and income tax, as well as minimal monthly allowances. Often, Shekinah members were made to believe that the only way to get to heaven was to give everything, thereby becoming

favored by God. Shekinah Mentors were used as examples of people that gave everything to the Man of God and, thus, received a return from God.

50. Where members contributed more than 10% of their income to Shekinah, Ms. Leigh was to classify those contributions as “offerings” and not “tithes.”

51. However, Robert and the Mentors used much of the funds from tithes and offerings to cover personal expenses or other expenses that were not for Shekinah. None of the Cross-Complainants were given complete and accurate receipts of contribution from Shekinah.

52. If any of Cross-Complainants started to doubt whether Shekinah was legitimate or whether they were being treated fairly, they were told by Robert and the Mentors not to ask questions. This included asking questions for clarity or details. Total reliance on and faith in Robert was required If Shekinah members asked questions or didn’t follow instructions from Robert and the Mentors, they

would be forced to miss meetings or would be called out in front of everybody during church service or meetings and be demeaned before the church members.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 47 – 52.)

Here, the allegations regarding the use of tithes and offerings for church purposes, rather than personal purposes, may be found by a jury to have been implied:

A misrepresentation need not be oral; it may be implied by conduct. (See, e.g., Universal By-Products, Inc. v. City of Modesto (1974) 43 Cal. App. 3d 145, 151 [117 Cal. Rptr. 525] and Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, § 106, p. 736.) We are aware of no decision holding the unauthorized use of a telephone access code constitutes Misrepresentation. But decisions in analogous circumstances support that conclusion. For example, in State v. Hamm (Mo.Ct.App. 1978) 569 S.W.2d 289, the defendant used the bank card and personal identification number (PIN) of another person to steal cash at an automatic teller machine. Rejecting the assertion he made no misrepresentation, the court noted defendant's use of the card and confidential PIN was an was an implied misrepresentation as to his identity. ( Id. at pp. 290-291.) 9 The same logic applies here.

(Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1567.)

A misrepresentation need not be express but may be implied by or inferred from the circumstances. For example, it has been held that a person who sells securities impliedly represents that the applicable provisions of law have been complied with and the falsity of that representation may give rise to an action for fraud. (Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc., 12 Cal.2d 501, 519 [86 P.2d 102]; see also 37 Am.Jur.2d, § 42, p. 67.)

Moreover, in pleading a fraud action based on the alleged falsity of a representation or of a promise to perform a future act it is not necessary to allege the circumstantial evidence from which it may be inferred that the representation or promise was false -- these are evidentiary matters which give rise to the misrepresentation. The only essential allegation is the general statement that the representation or promise was false and that the defendant knew it to be false at the time it was made. (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Pleading, § 585, pp. 2222-2224.)

(Universal By-Products, Inc. v. City of Modesto (1974) 43 Cal. App. 3d 145, 151.)

The obvious harm is out-of-pocket loss in the form of tithes/offering given in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations.

Below are the allegations pertaining to each Cross-Complainant’s exposure to the alleged misrepresentations regarding the use of tithes/offerings, made at sermons. Because the dates on which the sermons occurred are known to Defendants, these allegations are sufficient for purposes of demurrer. Further details as to each Cross-Complainant’s reliance on said misrepresentations are properly the subject of discovery.

Cross-Complainant Elisha Leigh

77. Ms. Leigh was also told by Robert, Hannah, Shirley, and/or Matthew that she should “Submit all your finances to your mentor” and that “When you give an offering to the Man of God, give cash so it’s more of a blessing because he doesn’t need to pay taxes.”

(2ACC, ¶ 77.)

Cross-Complainants Marilyn and David Gonzalez

143. Shirley first told Marilyn about tithes and donations in or around November 2020. Shirley instructed Marilyn to give 10% tithe to Shekinah and a 10% offering to the Man of God for Robert Shinn. Shirley told Marilyn that cash was preferred for both tithes and Man of God offerings, especially for Man of God offerings which were strictly cash. Shirley also told Marilyn “We also bless the Man of God, He is the connection to God himself, and the more you give, the more you will be blessed back.”

Shirley gave Marilyn constant instructions and reminders about tithes orally as well as over text and email. Marilyn was under the impression that the tithes and offerings were given for normal church purposes – e.g., repairs to the church, helping people in need, supporting the church. She only found out

later this was not the case. Before joining Shekinah, David had been told by his brother, a Shekinah member, that tithes went to other churches.

144. Matthew told David orally and over text that it was very important to tithe. Initially, Matthew told David that the extra 10% donation to the Man of God was only if he wished to give it. A week or two later, Matthew told David to give the extra 10% to the Man of God.

145. Throughout his time in Shekinah, Matthew told David that he would be blessed if he gave more in tithes and donations. Matthew said this orally at Bible study nights on Tuesdays and over texts During sermons on Sundays and Wednesdays, Robert would tell the whole church that it was good to

give tithes and donations because then blessings would come. Shirley also instructed them to pay off the debt on their car.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 143 – 145 [bold emphasis added].)

Cross-Defendant Aubrey Fisher-Greene

177. Aubrey was encouraged to give more than 10% of his income to Shekinah by Robert Shinn and Aubrey’s mentor, Daniel. Robert would tell Aubrey to give tithes and offerings whenever Aubrey saw him speak, such as during church services, dinner meetings and Bible studies. Both Daniel and Robert would give Aubrey warnings that if I didn’t give money through tithes and offerings, telling Aubrey that he would suffer bad consequences. Sometimes Aubrey was privately and publicly harassed, criticized and rebuked if he didn’t give enough money. This would all be done in person, over phone calls, over texts, and over emails.

178. During Robert’s twice weekly sermons, Robert would regularly say “The more you give, the more you’ll receive,” “If you give you will receive,” “When you bless the Man of God you will be blessed by God,” and that blessings came to those who gave. These phrases were also repeated by Mentors – including Daniel, Matthew, and Kloe – during Monday dancer meetings, and Tuesday and Friday men’s meetings. Aubrey trusted Robert as his pastor and wanted to be closer to God and to be blessed so he gave to Shekinah.

179. During his twice weekly sermons Robert would recount stories of Shekinah giving money to other churches and foundations. Robert also held “Prophecy Nights” where other pastors and ministers would come to Shekinah and Shekinah members would be asked, encouraged, and instructed to give money to these prophets. This made Aubrey think that Shekinah was a giving ministry who gave support to other ministries.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 177 – 179 [bold emphasis added].)

Cross-Complainant Kylie Douglas

186. Kylie was taught by Robert during church services about Shekinah’s 10-10-10 practice with respect to member’s income: 10% tithe to Shekinah, 10% to the Man of God, and 10% in offering to Shekinah. Kylie understood the Man of God donation was to go straight to Robert, but the other 20% was supposed to go to the church.

(2ACC, ¶ 186.)

Cross-Complainant Kevin Davis

210. On top of the 20% 7M was taking, Kevin also gave 30% of his income to Shekinah: 10% tithe, 10% to the Man of God, and a 10% “offering.” Robert said during sermons that most of the tithes and offerings were going to other churches. On information and belief, those funds did not go to other churches because they were never mentioned in services or at meetings. When amounts were given to other prophets, they were minimal in comparison to what the members had donated specifically for the visiting prophets. Interestingly, Robert only ever spoke about what he was getting and how much money he had, but never about what he was doing with the thousands of dollars he was taking from his members.

(2ACC, ¶ 210 [bold emphasis added].)

Cross-Complainant Kailea Gray

218. Throughout her time at Shekinah, Kailea was told by Robert and Shirley that tithes given by her (and other members) would be used for other churches, to help “save souls,” and to help other Christian groups. The message was that Shekinah would use this money to help others. Kailea was told this by Robert during his sermons and by Shirley through text message, including but not limited on, on April 25, May 9, August 25, and November 3, 2021.

219. In addition to the tithes, Kailea was also told that the “Man of God” donations – another donation Shekinah required – would be used to help others. This was told to Kailea by Robert at a sermon on September 21, 2021. Finally, when Shekinah held “Prophecy Nights,” Kailea was told that the “prophets” (individuals visiting from other churches[1]) would be given the donations. Robert and Shirley told her this around March and April 2022. Kailea later discovered that money was not given to them. Kailea gave the tithes, Man of God offerings, and Prophecy Nights’ offerings based on the representations of where the money would go, had no other reason to believe it was false, and would not have done so had she known the truth.

. . .

227. Kailea gave approximately 10% of her income as tithe to Shekinah but Shekinah and Robert misled her as to what her contributions to Shekinah were for. He told Kailea that Shekinah gives away their money to other churches and they were going to use the funds to build a new building for Shekinah.

228. On information and belief none of that money went to other churches or to fund a new building for Shekinah.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 218, 219, 227, 227 [bold emphasis added].)

The Court finds that the fraud allegations are sufficient to survive demurrer. This ground is not persuasive.

The demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

2. DEMURRER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Aiding and Abetting Human Trafficking [Civil Code § 52.5] – By Elisha Leigh Against Young, Christina, Abraham, and Jenny)

Cross-Defendants argue that there are no allegations that Cross-Defendants were involved in a sex trafficking scheme, plan or pattern as defined in the applicable statutes. (Civ. Code, § 52.5; Pen. Code, § 236.1(h)(1).) Cross-Defendants argue that, to sufficiently plead human trafficking, Ms. Leigh must show, for example, threatened deportation, threats to withhold visas and immigration status, or threats to file civil lawsuits for work injuries. (Lesnik v. Eisenmann SE (N.D. Cal. 2019) 374 F. Supp. 3d 923, 952, 954.)

This cause of action purports to allege a violation of Civil Code, § 52.5, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) A victim of human trafficking, as defined in Section 236.1 of the Penal Code, may bring a civil action for actual damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, any combination of those, or any other appropriate relief. A prevailing plaintiff may also be awarded attorney’s fees and costs.

(Civ Code § 52.5(a).)

In turn, Penal Code, § 236.1 provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) A person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, is guilty of human trafficking and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 8, or 12 years and a fine of not more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).

(b) A person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section 266, 266h, 266i, 266j, 267, 311.1, 311.2, 311.3, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6, or 518 is guilty of human trafficking and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 8, 14, or 20 years and a fine of not more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).

. . .

(g) The Legislature finds that the definition of human trafficking in this section is equivalent to the federal definition of a severe form of trafficking found in Section 7102(11) of Title 22 of the United States Code.

(h) For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions apply:

(1) “Coercion” includes a scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process; debt bondage; or providing and facilitating the possession of a controlled substance to a person with the intent to impair the person’s judgment.

(2) “Commercial sex act” means sexual conduct on account of which anything of value is given or received by a person.

(3) “Deprivation or violation of the personal liberty of another” includes substantial and sustained restriction of another’s liberty accomplished through force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury to the victim or to another person, under circumstances where the person receiving or apprehending the threat reasonably believes that it is likely that the person making the threat would carry it out.

(4) “Duress” includes a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to cause a reasonable person to acquiesce in or perform an act which the person would otherwise not have submitted to or performed; a direct or implied threat to destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate, or possess an actual or purported passport or immigration document of the victim; or knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, or possessing an actual or purported passport or immigration document of the victim.

(5) “Forced labor or services” means labor or services that are performed or provided by a person and are obtained or maintained through force, fraud, duress, or coercion, or equivalent conduct that would reasonably overbear the will of the person.

(6) “Great bodily injury” means a significant or substantial physical injury.

(7) “Minor” means a person less than 18 years of age.

(8) “Serious harm” includes any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor, services, or commercial sexual acts in order to avoid incurring that harm.

(i) The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, the relationship between the victim and the trafficker or agents of the trafficker, and any handicap or disability of the victim, shall be factors to consider in determining the presence of “deprivation or violation of the personal liberty of another,” “duress,” and “coercion” as described in this section.

(Penal Code § 236.1 [bold emphasis added].)

As to the underlining claim of human trafficking, the third cause of action for Human Trafficking is based upon the following allegations:

248. Ms. Leigh was deprived of personal liberty by Robert, Shirley, and Hannah, individually and as agents of Shekinah, RCP, and Alpha. Ms. Leigh’s control over life was extremely limited by Cross-Defendants who exerted significant control over Ms. Leigh’s finances, housing, food intake, sexual activity, job, and more.

249. Robert, Shirley, and Hannah, individually and as agents of Shekinah, RCP, and Alpha recruited Ms. Leigh to Shekinah, housed Ms. Leigh, and deprived Ms. Leigh of her liberty with the intent to force Ms. Leigh to provide labor and services.

250. Ms. Leigh was coerced into performing services and having her liberty restrained by means of a plan or scheme enacted by Cross-Defendants Robert, Shirley, and Shekinah to cause Ms. Leigh to believe that, if she did not perform such services she would be disobeying the Man of God and would suffer serious harm by means of a plan or scheme enacted by Cross-Defendants Robert, Shirley, and Shekinah. Cross-Defendants intended to cause Ms. Leigh to believe that, if she did not perform such services she would be disobeying the Man of God and would suffer serious harm including: her and her family going to hell, inviting Satan into her and her family’s life, becoming demon possessed, experiencing anxiety and depression, potentially losing her job, being physically assaulted by other Shekinah members, and/or being emotionally abused and berated by Shekinah members in front of others. In fact, Ms. Leigh suffered serious psychological harm at the hands of Robert and Shirley as a direct result of her refusal to perform certain sexual services for Luke.

251. Ms. Leigh had to ask for permission to receive medical care from Robert and

subsequently was denied medical care when her ankle was injured. Ms. Leigh did not have control of her finances or bank accounts–Shirley, and later Hannah, did. Ms. Leigh was not allowed to complete her own taxes–those were done for her by Hannah and Cross-Defendant Christina. Shirley also denied Ms. Leigh access to food, her car, and her mail.

252. Ms. Leigh suffered serious physical, psychological, and financial harm as a result of Cross-Defendants’ plan or scheme.

253. Ms. Leigh was harmed and is owed damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including attorney’s fees and costs.

(1AXC, ¶¶ 248 - 253.)

The third cause of action sufficiently pleads the elements of human trafficking under the definitions set forth in Penal Code, § 236.1: the deprivation or violation of personal liberty with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, accomplished through coercion or duress, by way of a direct or implied threat of hardship or retribution, and serious psychological, financial or reputation harm under the total circumstances. (Penal Code, § 236.1(a), (h)(1), (3), (4), (5), (8), (i).)

Cross-Defendants argue that there are insufficient facts pled to constituting aiding and abetting against each of them.

“ ‘Liability may … be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person … knows the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so act … .’ [Citations.]” (Citation omitted.) This is consistent with the Restatement Second of Torts, which recognizes a cause of action for aiding and abetting in a civil action when it provides: “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he [¶] … [¶] (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself … .” (Rest.2d Torts, § 876, subd. (b).) “Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical assistance. … It likewise applies to a person who knowingly gives substantial aid to another who, as he knows, intends to do a tortious act.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 876, com. d, p. 317.)

(Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86, 93 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

The fourth cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

257. Cross-Defendants had actual knowledge of Robert’s coercion of services from and deprivation of liberty of Ms. Leigh and intended for such coercion and deprivation to occur.

258. On information and belief, Cross-Defendant Young substantially assisted or encouraged the coercion of sexual services and deprivation of liberty committed by Robert, individually and as an agent of RCP, against Ms. Leigh by ensuring that no other Shekinah members were at the Tujunga property when Robert wanted to have sex with Ms. Leigh. Robert followed a pattern with his visits: he would always arrive between 2:00 and 2:40 p.m., send a text message to Shirley, the house captain, then Shirley would text Young, the next person in charge, who would then alert everyone else not to go into the house because Robert was coming and needed to spend time with God. Robert would then enter the house, make his way to Elisha’s room, coerce sexual services, and then go to the living room. At that point, Shirley and Young would send a text message to everyone to come to the house and eat. Because Robert made Ms. Leigh feel that her job, livelihood, and spiritual wellbeing was at stake if she did not obey him and have sex with him, Young’s knowing facilitation of Robert’s sexual extortion of Ms.

Leigh substantially aided the deprivation of liberty committed by Robert against Ms. Leigh.

259. Cross Defendant Jenny knowingly and substantially assisted and encouraged the coercion of services and deprivation of liberty committed by Robert, Shirley, and Hannah, individually and as agents of Shekinah, against Ms. Leigh by applying for unemployment benefits, not providing Ms. Leigh with her EDD debit card, and keeping for herself or providing the same to Hannah and/or Shirley instead. .

260. Cross-Defendant Christina knowingly and substantially assisted or encouraged the coercion of services and deprivation of liberty committed by Robert, Shirley, and Hannah, individually and as agents of Shekinah, against Ms. Leigh by telling Hannah and Shirley to take money from Ms. Leigh’s accounts when they would call and ask whose money they should use to support and fund

Cross-Defendants.

261. Cross-Defendant Abraham substantially assisted or encouraged the coercion of sexual services and deprivation of liberty committed by Robert against Ms. Leigh by knowingly continuing to allow Robert to use his property at E. City Place to sexually coerce and exploit Ms. Leigh. Because

Robert made Ms. Leigh feel that her job, livelihood, and spiritual wellbeing was at stake if she did not obey him and have sex with him, Abraham’s knowing facilitation of Robert’s sexual extortion of Ms. Leigh substantially aided the deprivation of liberty committed by Robert against Ms. Leigh.

(2AXC, ¶¶ 257 – 261 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

Here, Cross-Complainant Leigh has not pled sex trafficking for purposes of Civil Code, § 52.5(a), which must be as defined in Penal Code, § 236.1(b), i.e., a violation of Section 266 [procurement], 266h [pimping], 266i [pandering], 266j [procurement of child], 267 [abduction of minor for prostitution], 311.1 [sale or distribution of obscene matter depicting person under age of 18 years engaging in sexual conduct], 311.2 [production, distribution, or exhibition of obscene matter], 311.3 [sexual exploitation of child], 311.4 [employment of minor in sale or distribution of obscene matter or production of pornography], 311.5 [advertising or promotion of matter represented to be obscene], 311.6 [obscene live conduct], or 518 [definition of extortion; consideration].

However, while the allegation that Cross-Defendant Young would ensure no one would be at the Tujunga property so Robert could have sex with Leigh (2ACC, ¶ 258) does not plead aiding and abetting of sex trafficking as that term is defined in Penal Code, § 236, it does plead aiding and abetting Robert’s forced sexual services at Abraham’s house.

Likewise as to the allegation that Cross-Defendant Abraham would continue to allow Robert to use his property to sexually coerce and exploit Leigh, (2ACC, ¶ 261.) this alleges aiding and abetting of human trafficking for sexual services.

The allegation that Cross-Defendant Jenny applied for unemployment benefits, did not provide Ms. Leigh with her EDD debit card, and keeping for herself or providing the same to Hannah and/or Shirley (2ACC, ¶ 259) instead does not allege aiding and abetting of human trafficking for labor or services, nor of sex trafficking.

The allegation that Cross-Defendant Christina told Hannah and Shirley to take money from Ms. Leigh’s accounts (2ACC, ¶ 260) does not allege aiding and abetting of human trafficking for labor or services, nor of sex trafficking.

As such, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED as to Cross-Defendants Young and Abraham and SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to Cross-Defendants Jenny and Christina.

3. DEMURRER TO NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Aiding and Abetting Breach of Voluntarily Assumed Fiduciary Duty) The Ninth Cause of Action in the SACC for aiding and abetting breach of voluntarily assumed fiduciary duty by Ms. Leigh against Abraham, Christina, and, Jenny fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e), (f).)

Cross-Defendants do not offer argument to support this demurrer. As such, the demurrer to the ninth cause of action is OVERRULED.

4. DEMURRER TO TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) The Twelfth Cause of Action in the SACC for intentional infliction of emotional distress by Ms. Douglas against Hannah and Shekinah fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e), (f).)

Cross-Defendants argue that “extreme and outrageous” conduct is not pled.

“The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. …” Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.]” (Citation omitted.) “It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” (Ibid.)

(Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 874-75.)

Here, Cross-Complainant Kylie Douglas bases her IIED claim on the following allegations:

331. Cross-Defendant Hannah, individually and as a representative of Shekinah, engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct including yelling, berating, and insulting Kylie about various aspects of her body and character in private and in front of other Shekinah members, and intentionally isolating Kylie from her boyfriend and other Shekinah members in part by excluding Kylie from events. Cross-Defendant Hannah acted to embarrass Kylie in front of others and to keep Kylie from seeing her family and interacting with anyone who was not a Shekinah Mentor or Sub-Mentor. On information and belief, Hannah did so as an agent of Shekinah to get Kylie to fully submit to Shekinah so that Shekinah could take further advantage of Kylie and obtain more money and services from her.

332. Cross-Defendant Hannah in so acting intended to cause Kylie emotional distress, or at the very least acted with reckless disregard that Kylie would suffer emotional distress, knowing that Kylie was present when the conduct occurred.

333. Kylie suffered severe emotional distress, and Hannah’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Kylie’s severe emotional distress.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 331 – 333.)

Ordinarily mere insulting language, without more, does not constitute outrageous conduct. The Restatement view is that liability "does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities . . . . There is no occasion for the law to intervene . . . where some one's feelings are hurt." (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d.) Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. (Prosser, Law of Torts, supra, at pp. 57-58; Rest.2d Torts, § 46, coms. e, f; Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. [10 Cal. App. 3d 376], supra, at p. 397 [89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 47 A.L.R.3d 286] (insurance agent's threatened and actual refusals to pay; threatening communication in bad faith to settle non-existent dispute); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering Inc., supra, at p. 496 (supervisor shouting insulting epithets; terminating employment; humiliating plaintiff); Golden v. Dungan [20 Cal. App. 3d 295], supra, at p. 305 [197 Cal. Rptr. 577] (process server knowingly and maliciously banging on door at midnight).)'" (25 Cal.3d at pp. 946-947.)

(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 155 [bold emphasis added].)

“‘Liabilities of course cannot be extended to every trivial indignity. … [¶] Accordingly, it is generally held that there can be no recovery for mere profanity, obscenity, or abuse, without circumstances of aggravation, or for insults, indignities or threats which are considered to amount to nothing more than mere annoyances. The plaintiff cannot recover merely because of hurt feelings.’” (Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1128 [257 Cal. Rptr. 665].)

(Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1610 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

Moreover, a callous disregard for professional and personal well-being is not extreme and outrageous conduct:

While the allegations of defendants' conduct, if true, demonstrate a callous disregard for plaintiffs' professional and personal well-being, the alleged conduct as stated is not extreme or outrageous to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780-81.)

The facts pled do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of this cause of action on behalf of Cross-Complainant Kylie Douglas.

The demurrer to the twelfth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

5. DEMURRER TO TWENTY-FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Breach of Contract) The Twenty-Fourth Cause of Action in the SACC for breach of contract by Mr. Fisher-Greene and Mr. Davis against 7M fails to plead whether a contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(g).)

Cross-Defendants argue that this cause of action fails to plead whether it was written, oral or implied by conduct, and the terms of performance and 7M’s breach.

However, ¶¶ 418 and 419 allege that the contracts were oral, and generally state the terms and breach thereof:

418. Kevin and Cross-Defendant 7M entered into an oral contract under which 7M would take 15% of all of Kevin’s brand deals. Cross-Defendant 7M breached this contract in taking 20% of all of Kevin’s brand deals.

419. Aubrey and Cross-Defendant 7M entered into an oral contract under which 7M would provide Aubrey $6,000 for a song promotion. Cross-Defendant 7M breached this contract in not paying Aubrey any of the $6,000 after Aubrey performed the promotion.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 418, 419.)

“An oral contract may be pleaded generally as to its effect, because it is rarely possible to allege the exact words. (Citation omitted.) A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (Citations omitted.)” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

This cause of action is sufficiently pled.

The demurrer to the twenty-fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

6. DEMURRER TO TWENTY-EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Violation of Labor Code, §§ 201–203) The Twenty-Eight Cause of Action in the SACC for violation of Labor Code, §§ 201–203 by Mr. Gonzalez against Shekinah fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).)

Cross-Defendants argue that Mr. Gonzalez fails to allege the existence of an employment relationship, and the terms thereof, nor intentional violations of the Labor Code.

Cross-Complainant alleges as follows:

130. In February 2021, Matthew had David perform a shower remodel for an RCP property for free so that David would learn to serve others for God’s work. Matthew then told David to quit his job with City of Orange. Around this time David met with Robert, Hannah, Shirley, and another Shekinah member, Daniel Kim. Robert asked David how much he makes per job and told David to come work for him. David told Robert to match his pay from City of Orange. Robert told Shirley and Hannah to pay David out of Studio on the Mount.

(2ACC, ¶ 130.)

139. Around the same time, Matthew told David he would be working at the Shekinah property and asked David to give a quote for his services. David told Matthew the cost of his services Matthew later told David that it was a blessing to do God’s work and never paid him. David worked almost 12-hour days without any pay.

140. Matthew would sometimes give David clients from Matthew’s real estate work for Alpha. Matthew initially, in 2021, told David to charge $100 per hour of work. In 2022, Matthew told David to charge $150 per hour. Matthew told David that these instructions came from Robert. David followed these instructions.

141. Matthew took his cut as their real estate agent on the sale of their house. Shekinah required them to give 10% of what was left as tithe and another 10% to the Man of God as a cash donation. Christina Keller, a long-time member and “sub-mentor” of Shekinah, gave Marilyn and David receipts that only reflected about 40% of the tithes they gave Shekinah.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 139 – 141 [bold emphasis added].)

444. David was an employee of Shekinah. Shekinah provided David with jobs and told David how much to charge for the work he performed. When David was working on Shekinah properties he would show up and be told what to do, he was not afforded initiative or control.

445. Sections 201 and 202 of the Labor Code require employers to promptly pay all wages owing to an employee at the conclusion of employment.

446. David no longer works for Cross-Defendant.

447. David is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that Cross-Defendant’s failure pay him upon his employment ending was willful.

448. David is no longer working for Cross-Defendant and is therefore entitled to penalties against Cross-Defendant in an amount to be determined at trial pursuant to Labor Code § 203.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 444 – 448 [bold emphasis added].)

This is sufficient to allege the existence of an employment relationship with Shekinah. Evidence thereof is a matter for discovery. Whether or not Shekinah willfully failed to pay wages upon David quitting, for purposes of the Labor Code, § 203 penalty, is a question of fact.

The demurrer to the twenty-eighth cause of action is OVERRULED.

7. DEMURRER TO THIRTY-FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Violation of Labor Code, § 226) The Thirty-Fourth Cause of Action in the SACC for violation of Labor Code, § 226 by Mrs. Gonzalez against 7M is barred by the Statute of Limitations and this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(a).)

Cross-Defendants argue that Marilyn alleges that in July 2021 she “was directed to perform craft services for 7M” and that she performed the work. (SACC, ¶ 482.) Marilyn further claims that she “never received any wage statements for the work performed” and suffered injuries. (Id., ¶ 484.) Conduct before March 21, 2022, is outside the statutes of limitation; the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over Marilyn’s allegations as to the thirty-fourth cause of action; and the Court should therefore strike these allegations. (Id., ¶¶ 482–485.)

The one-year statute of limitations set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 340(a) applies to “[a]action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.”

However, the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 338(a) for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture” applies to a recovery of damages for violation of Labor Code, § 226.

While California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340 prescribes a one-year limitations period for "[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture," California Code Civil Procedure Section 338 sets a three-year period for "[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture." The plain language of California Labor Code Section 226 provides for both actual damages and penalties. Cal. Labor Code § 226(e)(1) (providing that an employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure to provide an accurate wage statement is entitled to the greater of (1) "actual damages" or (2) specified penalties not to exceed $4,000.00). District courts that have recently confronted the issue have come to the same conclusion. See Sarkisov v. StoneMor Partners, L.P., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47021, 2014 WL 1340762, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (recognizing that two limitations periods could apply to a claim under Section 226 because it authorizes damages and penalties); Mouchati v. Bonnie Plaints, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60855, 2014 WL 1661245, *8-9 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (same); Taylor v. West Marine Products, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133728, 2014 WL 4683926, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (following Sarkisov); Singer v. Becton, Dickenson & Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56326, 2008 WL 2899825, *4-5 [*1025] (S.D. Cal. 2008). But see Werstiuk v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4203, 2014 WL 2621674, *5 (Cal.Ct.App. 2014) (finding that the one-year limitations period of Section 340 applies to claims under Section 226(e)(1) based on Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1108, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880, 155 P.3d 284 (2007) where the California Supreme Court referred to Section 226 as imposing a penalty).

Where courts have found that the one-year limitations period of California Civil Code Section 338(a) applies it has been in reliance on a passing reference by the California Supreme Court to Section 226 as imposing a penalty. Werstiuk, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4203, 2014 WL 2621674, *5 (citing Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1108). In referring to Section 226 as imposing a penalty, the California Supreme Court only referred to the $50 and $100 figures recoverable under subdivision (e).7 Murphy, 40 Cal.4th at 1108. Courts that have recognized that two limitations periods apply to Section 226 have uniformly found that the $50 and $100 figures recoverable under Section 226(e)(1) are penalties, subject to a one-year limitation period. Taylor, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133728, 2014 WL 4683926 at *7; Sarkisov, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47021, 2014 WL 1340762 at *2; Mouchati, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60855, 2014 WL 1661245 at *8-9; Singer, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56326, 2008 WL 2899825, *4-5. Furthermore, those cases have noted that Section 226(e)(1) allows recovery for lost wages which are a measure of damages, not a penalty. Id. This Court is convinced that Section 226 provides for both damages and penalties. Therefore, depending on the relief sought, a claim pursuant to Section 226(e)(1) could be subject to a one-year or a three-year limitations period.

(Novoa v. Charter Communs., Ltd. Liab. Co. (E.D. Cal. 2015) 100 F.Supp.3d 1013, 1024-25.)

The original Complaint was filed in this action on October 28, 2022. The 2ACC alleges that the video shoot occurred in July 2021. (2ACC, ¶ 482.) Although the natural inference is it only took one day, even if it took until August 2021, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to statutory penalties would begin to run on that date and would expire in August 2022, before the Complaint was filed in this action. Because Plaintiff only seeks statutory penalties (2ACC, ¶ 486), this cause of action is time-barred.

The demurrer to the thirty-fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

8. DEMURRER TO FORTY-FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Unjust Enrichment – By Elisha Leigh Against Imaginating and Robert)

Cross-Defendants argue that the Labor Code preempts claims for unjust enrichment predicated on claims for Labor Code violations.

This cause of action is pled in the alternative, if no employment relationship is found. As such, it is not preempted by the Labor Code.

However:

“Unjust enrichment is not a cause of action, however, or even a remedy, but rather ‘ “ ‘a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies’ ” … . [Citation.] It is synonymous with restitution.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Like the trial court, we will construe the cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.

“[A]n action based on an implied-in-fact or quasi-contract cannot lie where there exists between the parties a valid express contract covering the same subject matter.” (Citation omitted].) However, “restitution may be awarded in lieu of breach of contract damages when the parties had an express contract, but it was procured by fraud or is unenforceable or ineffective for some reason.” (McBride v. Boughton, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 388.) Thus, a party to an express contract can assert a claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment by “alleg[ing in that cause of action] that the express contract is void or was rescinded.” (Citation omitted.) A claim for restitution is permitted even if the party inconsistently pleads a breach of contract claim that alleges the existence of an enforceable agreement. (Citation omitted.)

(Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 231.)

This cause of action is based on the following allegations:

543. Should the Court find that Ms. Leigh was not an employee of Imaginating and/or that there was not an express contract for compensation, Ms. Leigh pleads in the alternative that Imaginating and Robert received services from Ms. Leigh, which she was not performing on a voluntary basis. Imaginating and Robert enriched themselves at the expense of Ms. Leigh through the knowing and

intentional procurement of unpaid forced labor in the form of craft services.

544. Cross-Defendants’ conduct arose out of and was done at least in part to further the trafficking scheme Ms . Leigh was subjected to.

545. Cross-Defendants were unjustly enriched in an amount to be determined at trial.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 543 – 545.)

“The mere nonpayment for services ‘does not constitute unjust enrichment.’” (Citation omitted.)” (Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 337, 353.) As such, there are no facts pled which constitute unjust enrichment.

The demurrer to the forty-fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

9. DEMURRER TO FORTY-SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Unjust Enrichment – David Against Shekinah)

This cause of action is based on the following allegations:

552. Should the Court find that David was not an employee of Shekinah and/or that there was not an express contract for compensation, David pleads in the alternative that Shekinah received services from David that he did not perform on a voluntary basis. Shekinah enriched itself at David’s expense by soliciting and not paying David for construction services David performed for Shekinah. David provided these services to maintain his housing, food, and status with Shekinah after being wrongfully coerced by Shekinah members into selling his house and quitting his job.

553. Cross-Defendant Shekinah was unjustly enriched in an amount to be determined at trial.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 552, 553.)

As noted above re: the forty-fourth cause of action, “[t]he mere nonpayment for services ‘does not constitute unjust enrichment.’” (Citation omitted.)” (Carter, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at 353.) As such, there are no facts pled which constitute unjust enrichment.

The demurrer to the forty-sixth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

10. DEMURRER TO FORTY-SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Unjust Enrichment – Kevin Against Shekinah).

This cause of action is based on the following allegations:

555. Should the Court find that Kevin was not an employee of Shekinah and/or that there was not an express contract for compensation, Kevin hereby pleads in the alternative that Shekinah did not pay for services performed. Shekinah enriched itself at Kevin’s expense by soliciting and not paying Kevin for music and choreography services for Shekinah’s short film “The Circuit.”

556. Cross-Defendant Shekinah was unjustly enriched in an amount to be determined at trial.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 555, 556.)

The demurrer to the forty-seventh cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

11. DEMURRER TO FORTY-EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION Unjust Enrichment – Marilyn Against 7M).

This cause of action is based on the following allegations:

558. Should the Court find that Marilyn was not an employee of 7M and/or that there was not express contract for compensation, Marilyn pleads in the alternative that 7M received services from Marilyn that she did not perform on a voluntary basis. 7M enriched itself at Marilyn’s expense through knowing and intentional procurement of unpaid forced labor in the form of craft services.

559. Cross-Defendant 7M was unjustly enriched in an amount to be determined at trial.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 558, 559.)

The demurrer to the forty-eighth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

12. DEMURRER TO FORTY-NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Unjust Enrichment – By Aubrey, Kevin, and Kailea Against 7M).

This cause of action is based on the following allegations:

561. Should the Court find that Aubrey, Kevin, and/or Kailea were not employees of 7M and/or that there were not express contracts for compensation, Aubrey, Kevin, and Kailea plead in the alternative that 7M received services that Aubrey, Kevin, and Kailea did not perform on a voluntary basis.

562. Cross-Defendant 7M enriched itself at Aubrey’s expense in not paying Aubrey for a song promotion Aubrey performed for 7M’s benefit.

563. Cross-Defendant 7M enriched itself at Kevin’s expense in taking 5% more of Kevin’s brand deals than 7M and Kevin had agreed upon.

564. Cross-Defendant 7M enriched itself at Kailea’s expense in only paying Kailea about half agreed upon salary for videography services Kailea performed for Cross-Defendant 7M’s benefit.

565. Cross-Defendant 7M was unjustly enriched in an amount to be determined at trial.

(2AXC, ¶¶ 561 – 565.)

Moreover, the other allegations only plead a breach of contract, i.e., paying less than agreed upon, without pleading why the contract is unenforceable or ineffective. (Rutherford Holdings, LLC, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 231.)

The demurrer to the forty-ninth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

13. FIFTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION (Unjust Enrichment – By David and Marilyn Against Matthew, Robert, Shekinah, and Studio on the Mount).

This cause of action is based on the following allegations:

567. Matthew, individually and as a representative of Shekinah, enriched himself [at] David and Marilyn’s expense in convincing them to sell their house, with Matthew as the seller’s agent, on the basis that Shekinah would provide housing for them. Matthew informed David and Marilyn that they would receive payment from Studio on the Mount as evidence of their relocation and sale of their house.

Shekinah provided them with this payment but Shirley took it back using the access she had to their financial accounts. Shekinah took money that was rightfully David and Marilyn’s.

568. David was told by Robert, in the presence of Hannah and Shirley, that he would get paid by Studio on the Mount, even though he would be working for Shekinah. Shekinah provided David with jobs and told David how much to charge for the work he performed. When David was working on Shekinah properties he would show up and be told what to do, he was not afforded initiative or control.

David performed these services for Shekinah and for Studio on the Mount, and it received the benefit of those services, which David was not performing on a voluntary basis.

569. Robert and Shekinah enriched themselves in taking nearly $150,000 from David and Marilyn at their expense.

570. Cross-Defendants were unjustly enriched in an amount to be determined at trial.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 567 – 580.)

Moreover, the other allegations only plead a breach of contract, without pleading why the contract is unenforceable or ineffective. (Rutherford Holdings, LLC, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 231.)

Further, the allegation that Shekinah took money does not state a quasi-contract theory.

The demurrer to the fiftieth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

14. DEMURRER TO FIFTY-SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Declaratory Relief) The Fifty-Second Cause of Action in the SACC for declaratory relief by Mr. Fisher- Greene, against Shekinah fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).)

Cross-Defendants argue that this cause of action cannot be pled on information and belief, and there are insufficient facts pled to show an ongoing or actual controversy.

576. As a result of the facts described in the preceding paragraphs, there exists a controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment that the non-disclosure agreement (the “NDA”) signed by Aubrey with Cross-Defendant Shekinah is unenforceable and not legally binding. On information and belief, Cross-Defendants take the position that the NDA is enforceable.

577. Cross-Complainant Aubrey alleges that the NDA is a generic internet form, overbroad and unenforceable as to scope, lacking in consideration, too vague as to time, and too vague as to consequences and is thus unenforceable.

578. Cross-Complainant is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the NDA is unenforceable and not legally binding.

(2ACC, ¶¶ 576, 578.)

Here, the 2ACC does not allege the terms of the NDA, nor attach a copy of the NDA to the 2ACC, nor allege why such terms are unenforceable.

As such, the demurrer to the fifty-second cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Cross-Complainant Aubrey Fisher-Greene will only be given one final opportunity to amend.

Cross-Complainant Fisher-Greene is given 30 days’ leave to amend.

[1] Although this would be a true representation, it does not negate the other alleged misrepresentations.