Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 22STCV41098, Date: 2023-12-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV41098    Hearing Date: April 9, 2024    Dept: 76

TENTATIVE RULING RE: PLAINTIFF CYNTHIA BECK'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

            Plaintiff alleges that a grant deed was forged conveying Plaintiff’s properties, which was then encumbered, all without Plaintiff’s authorization. Plaintiff brings a quiet title action.

            Plaintiff moves for a protective order regarding an inspection of the subject property.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Cynthia Beck’s motion for a protective order regarding an inspection of the subject property is DENIED.

ANALYSIS

Motion For Protective Order

Plaintiff moves for a protective order regarding an inspection of the subject property pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code, § 2031.060, which states in pertinent part:

(a) When an inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of documents, tangible things, places, or electronically stored information has been demanded, the party to whom the demand has been directed, and any other party or affected person, may promptly move for a protective order. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

(b) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions:

(1) That all or some of the items or categories of items in the demand need not be produced or made available at all.. . .

     (Civ. Proc. Code, § 2031.060(a) & (b).) 

            The Declaration of Peter K. Pritchard arguably reflects that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in meet and confer efforts as required by Civ. Proc. Code, § 2031.060(a).

            Defendants argue that this motion for protective order is untimely relative to the demand for inspection. The Court need not address the timeliness argument because, on the merits, Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for the requested protective order.

            Plaintiff argues that Defendants wish to conduct the inspection on the property on a fishing trip and to harass Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that if the subject property has a granite surface, this is not probative of whether the photograph was taken at those locations. Plaintiff also pays lip service to privacy rights, where by the property is co-owned by a non-party

            First:

A request for discovery is not subject to the objection that the proponent is engaged in a "fishing expedition." In our discovery statutes the Legislature has authorized "fishing expeditions" and thus "the claim that a party is engaged upon a fishing expedition is not, and under no circumstances can be, a valid objection to an otherwise proper attempt to utilize the provisions of the discovery statutes." (Citation omitted.)

(Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 n.4.)

            Second, whether or not the existence of granite countertops on the subject property is “probative” or “dispositive” of a material fact is for the jury to decide.

Except as otherwise provided by law, where the trial is by jury:

(a) All questions of fact are to be decided by the jury.

(b) Subject to the control of the court, the jury is to determine the effect and value of the evidence addressed to it, including the credibility of witnesses and hearsay declarants.

     (Evid. Code § 312.)

            Third, Plaintiff did not engage in the balancing test required relative to right of privacy objections to discovery. As such, the Court does not engage in the balancing of interest analysis.

The California Supreme Court has held that a compelling interest or compelling need is not always required in order to discover private information—the Court must consider the factors articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994)  7 Cal.4^th 1 to determine the seriousness of the privacy invasion and the strength of the countervailing interest required to overcome that invasion. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.)

In ruling upon a privacy objection in the contact of discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552.) The party asserting a privacy right must also establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances. (Id.) Further, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.)  The Court need not proceed to the fourth step of balancing competing interests if all three of the above are not satisfied. (Id. at 555.) If the Court reaches the fourth step, the Court must balance these competing considerations: The party seeking information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves.  (Id. at 552.) The party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.  (Id.) Courts may not require the party seeking discovery to demonstrate a “compelling state interest” or “compelling need[1]” simply because discovery of any facially private information is sought.  (Id. at 556-57.)

            As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for the requested protective order. The motion for a protective order is DENIED.