Judge Christopher K. Lui, Case 23STCV02073 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1), the Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein. Counsel must contact the staff in Department 76 to inform the Court whether they wish to submit on the tentative, or to argue the matter. As required by Rule 3.1308(a)(2), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 of their intent to appear and argue.

Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776.

Per Rule of Court 3.1308, if notice of intention to appear is not given, the Court may adopt the tentative ruling as the final ruling.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, including her husband whom she is divorcing and his attorney, have conspired to defame, stalk, eavesdrop and threaten/harass Plaintiff.

Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney bring an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Complaint.

Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney’s anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Complaint is GRANTED as to the first through eighth causes of action.

(1) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, filed April 4, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 1); (2) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Request for Order Re Child Custody, Visitation and Other, filed June 7, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 2); (3) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order, filed August 1, 2022 in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 3); (4) Notice of Court Hearing (DV-109) and Temporary Restraining Order (DV-110) Denial, filed August 3, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 4); (5) Neda Heidari’s Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order, filed September 12, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 5); (6) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Ex Parte Request for Temporary Emergency Orders Re Surrender of Rolls Royce, filed November 22, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 6); (7) Temporary Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders issued by the Court for Khoddami’s ex parte application (RJN 6), filed November 22, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 7); (8) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Ex Parte Request for Temporary Emergency Orders that Plaintiff be responsible for Rolls Royce, filed December 22, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 8); (9) Temporary Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders issued by the Court for Khoddami’s ex parte application (RJN 8), filed December 22, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 9).

Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney bring an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Complaint.

In ruling on a defendant’s special motion to strike, the trial court uses a “summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) This is a two-step process. First, the defendant must show that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b)(1).) Second, if the defendant carries that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b)(3).) The defendant has the burden on the first issue, and the plaintiff on the second. (Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 928; Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 919.) In making both determinations the trial court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., §425.16(b)(2); Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)

The Defendant’s act underlying the cause of action must itself have been in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 69, 76-78.) The defendant’s acts are protected activity – that is, made in furtherance of protected petition or free speech in connection with a public issue – if they fit into one of the following categories under the section 425.16, subdivision (e) categories: (1) oral or written statements made before a legislative, executive, judicial or any other official proceeding; (2) oral or written statements made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) written or oral statements made in a place open to the public or in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; and (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(e).)

If such a showing is made, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b)(1).) To establish a probability of prevailing on the merits, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4^th 539, 548.) In making this assessment it is the court’s responsibility to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff. (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4^th 204, 212.) The Complaint needs only to establish that his or her claim has minimal merit (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4^th 82, 89) to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4^th728, 738.)

“For purposes of this inquiry, ‘the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.’ (Citation omitted.)” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.)

1. Re: Whether the Causes of Action Are Subject To Being Stricken Pursuant to CCP § 425.16.

Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney move to strike all causes of action asserted against moving Defendants. Moving Defendants are a lawyer and her law offices. (Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 6.)

At all times relevant herein, Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, with the use of the resources available from and/or made available by Defendant LAW OFFICES OF J. ELLIE SWEENEY, sought to engage in, be a part of, or otherwise effectuate a civil conspiracy with the central goal of harassing and/or otherwise causing reputational, business, economical, social, personal, emotional, and/or other harm and/or legal harm to Plaintiff HEIDARI.

Although Plaintiff alleges that moving Defendants—lawyer and her law offices—conspired with the co-Defendants, the Court must examine the conduct in which moving Defendants are alleged to have engaged. Where a defendant bringing an anti-SLAPP motion was engaging in the representation of clients, such activity is protected under the statute. “ ‘[A]ll communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.’ (Citation omitted.)” (Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 409.) This is true even if the attorney is alleged to have conspired in or aided and abetted the underlying tort. (Id. at 410-11.)

The first cause of action for civil harassment is based upon an alleged violation of Civ. Proc. Code, § 527.6(b) (Complaint, ¶ 21).

The Complaint does not allege exactly what acts were performed by moving attorney Defendants[1], other than lumping them in with co-Defendants Khoddami and Collison to “employ, retain, and/or otherwise engage” Rafael Jiminez to harass, stalk and/or otherwise civilly harass Plaintiff (Complaint, ¶ 15), as well as the following:

[E]ngaged in repeated acts of false statements, including but not limited to falsifying evidence to attack the credibility of Plaintiff HEIDARI, attack the financial health of Plaintiff HEIDARI by falsely portraying Plaintiff as a con artist or criminal, including but not limited to implicating Plaintiff HEIDARI in the vandalism of a four-hundred thousand dollar ($400,000.00) 2018 Rolls Royce Ghost, the false allegations of hiring of individuals to participate in assaults, or worse, capital offenses, as to Defendant KHODDAMI so as to carry out the promise by Defendant KHODDAMI to ruin Plaintiff HEIDARI, both reputationally, professionally, socially, and legally in the divorce proceeding, by means of staging and creating falsehoods, and has put that promise into effect through, inter alia, false testimony, fraudulent alteration of evidence, and more.

[E]ngaged in additional repeated acts of false statements, including but not limited to falsifying the nature of Plaintiff HEIDARI’s conduct, implying that Plaintiff HEIDARI was engaged in promiscuous conduct in public at gyms, engaged in promiscuous conduct in public at banks, sleeping with bankers, sleeping with men for money, and otherwise falsely attempting to demean and diminish the social status of Plaintiff HEIDARI through oral and/or written communications, including, inter alia, by text message over cellular networks.

[E]ngaged in illegal and unethical staging and commission of vandalism of the 2018 Rolls Royce Ghost, valued at over four-hundred thousand dollars ($400,000.00) at the time of acquisition, so as to falsely, fraudulently, and/or without justification impugne upon Plaintiff HEIDARI the crime of vandalism, so as to defraud Plaintiff HEIDARI of the benefits afforded by the insurance as to the same, as well as to call into doubt both professionally and privately the ethical, moral, and propriety of Plaintiff HEIDARI’s character as a physician, mother, wife, and person, in an effort to diminish and demean and civilly harass Plaintiff HEIDARI through the aforementioned oppressive and criminal conduct.

Moving Defendants allegedly “condoned and/or ratified and/or approved of the conduct or otherwise sanctioned and supported the same” by Defendant Khoddami as to statements he made to Plaintiff, as alleged in ¶ 20.

The Court must examine which individual actually engaged in the underlying tort, and if the only evidence presented is that moving attorney Defendants were rendering legal advice or representing their clients in legal proceedings, then their activity is protected conduct.

Defendant Sweeney presents evidence that she did not engage in any tortious conduct, and only represented co-Defendant Khoddami in his divorce proceedings involving Plaintiff. (See Declaration of Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney.) On the other hand, in support of the opposition, Plaintiff does not present any evidence to the contract. (See Declaration of Neda Heidari.)

As such, because Defendant Sweeney and her law offices were only engaged in representing her client in connection with legal proceedings, this cause of action is subject to being stricken pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, even though these Defendants are alleged to have conspired in or aided and abetted the underlying tort. (Contreras, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 409, 410-11.)

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on this claim, which is discussed below re: the second prong.

28. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, made false statements, that were unprivileged in nature, and publicized to third parties other than Plaintiff HEIDARI, of or concerning Plaintiff HEIDARI, which exposed Plaintiff HEIDARI to disgrace and injured her in her occupation and livelihood. These statements were made negligently, intentionally, and/or with reckless disregard and malice for the impact that they had.

29. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, have published specific content containing messages, words, remarks, representations, or characteristics as to Plaintiff HEIDARI that are incorrect, improper, and false, including but not limited to statements such as, inter alia, matters pertaining to her fidelity and false characteristics as a mother to her abilities as a medical doctor and competence thereto. Additional statements have been made, even as to previous disputes between Plaintiff HEIDARI and Defendant KHODDAMI, wherein Plaintiff HEIDARI’s character and lawfulness was impugned so as to portray her a criminal to the public.

As noted above, Defendant Sweeney presents evidence that she did not engage in any tortious conduct, and only represented co-Defendant Khoddami in his divorce proceedings involving Plaintiff, and Plaintiff does not present any evidence to the contrary. (See Declaration of Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney; see Declaration of Neda Heidari.)

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on this claim, which is discussed below re: the second prong.

The defamation—libel per se cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

36. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, made false statements, that were unprivileged in nature, and publicized to third parties other than Plaintiff HEIDARI, of or concerning Plaintiff HEIDARI, which exposed Plaintiff HEIDARI to disgrace and injured her in her occupation and livelihood. These statements were made negligently, intentionally, and/or with reckless disregard and malice for the impact that they had.

37. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, have published specific content containing messages, words, remarks, representations, or characteristics as to Plaintiff HEIDARI that are incorrect, improper, and false, including but not limited to statements such as, inter alia, matters pertaining to her fidelity and false characteristics as a mother to her abilities as a medical doctor and competence thereto. Additional statements have been made, even as to previous disputes between Plaintiff HEIDARI and Defendant KHODDAMI, wherein Plaintiff HEIDARI’s character and lawfulness was impugned so as to portray her a criminal to the public.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on this claim, which is discussed below re: the second prong.

The defamation—slander cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

46. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, have uttered false statements regarding Plaintiff HEIDARI’s business and/or professional reputation, false statements regarding Plaintiff HEIDARI’s lawfulness or alleged criminality, and false statements regarding Plaintiff HEIDARI’s chastity and fabricated promiscuity.

47. These words, remarks, representations, or characteristics ascribed as to Plaintiff HEIDARI are incorrect, improper, and false, including but not limited to statements such as, inter alia, matters pertaining to her fidelity and false characteristics as a mother to her abilities as a medical doctor and competence. Additional statements have been made, even as to previous disputes between Plaintiff HEIDARI and Defendant KHODDAMI, wherein Plaintiff HEIDARI’s character and lawfulness was impugned so as to portray her as a criminal to the public.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on this claim, which is discussed below re: the second prong.

The intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

57. The aforementioned actions of Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, on or about the Subject Date and continuing on to the present, as alleged hereinabove, were outrageous, intentional malicious, wanton, and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiff severe emotional distress, mental anguish and with motivations thereto resulting from derogatory, defamatory, and demeaning slurs resulting in further causing of humiliation and self-loathing.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on this claim, which is discussed below re: the second prong.

The negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

64. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that on or about the Subject Date, Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through inclusive, and each of them, OWED Plaintiff a duty of care in their dealings with Plaintiff.

SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, knew, or should have known, that each of their individual, and therein also imputed, failure(s) to exercise care towards Plaintiff would cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress.

COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of their, behavior, acts or omissions, Plaintiff suffered the injuries to his person described above.

67. As a further legal (proximate) result of Defendants', KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of their, behavior, acts or omissions, and the consequences proximately caused by it, as hereinabove alleged, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress and mental suffering, all to his damages.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on this claim, which is discussed below re: the second prong.

70. That Plaintiff was harmed as a result of the civil harassment, defamation in the form of libel, and defamation in the form of slander, as described hereinabove in Paragraphs 12 through 59.

71. That a conspiracy existed in the form of an agreement, between each of and amongst Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, to commit a wrongful act, chiefly, to unduly and illegally harass, cause embarrassment, stalk, defame, and otherwise interfere with Plaintiff HEIDARI’s ability to exercise her individual sovereignty so as to deprive her of her family, health, and wealth in business and personal affairs.

72. That Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, are members and/or constituents and/or principals of the conspiracy to commit such wrongful acts as described in Paragraphs 12 through 59 above.

73. Specifically, Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, whether orally or in writing, or implied by the conduct of the Defendants, sought to induce one another to defame and harass Plaintiff HEIDARI as described hereinabove in Paragraphs 12 through 59.

74. That Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, was aware that each co-conspirator planned to defame and harass as so described above in Paragraphs 12 through 59.

75. That Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, individually agreed with each other co-conspirator, and others, and intended that the aforementioned wrongful acts in fact be committed.

76. That, as a result of this conspiracy, Plaintiff HEIDARI has been harmed in fact, and that Plaintiff HEIDARI has sustained, and will continue to sustain, damages in an amount to be determined at trial, for which Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, should pay and/or be otherwise held responsible and/or accountable for.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on this claim, which is discussed below re: the second prong.

H. Eighth Cause of Action (Unfair Competition, Violations of Business & Professions Code, § 17200).

78. That Plaintiff is informed and believes and theron alleges that Defendants SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of their, acts and omissions described hereinabove, whether arising out of intentional conduct, reckless conduct, negligent conduct, or otherwise, constitutes the standard and ongoing business practices of Defendants.

79. That Defendants SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, are bound by California law to comply with the California Business Professions Code §§ 6000 – 6243, inclusive, governing the regulation of attorneys in the State of California. Defendants SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, violated those regulations and will continue violating those regulations in their engagement with the public at large, including, without limitation, the improper and illegal tampering with witnesses and fraudulent creation of improper and altered recordings as evidence in violation of Penal Code §§ 131 – 132, 133 – 135, 136.1 – 136.7, and 137 – 141, inclusive. Unless and until an injunction is issued by this Court to prohibit the continuing violations of law, including the unauthorized practice of law by non-attorney Defendant COLLINSON, both Plaintiff and the public are in jeopardy of ongoing deprivation of rights and direct benefit will continue to be accrued illegally by Defendants SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them.

80. The acts and omissions of Defendants SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of their, conduct described above constitute a violation of various statutes and regulations governing the conduct of attorneys in the State of California, including Rules of Professional Conduct, and those Business & Professions Codes governing attorney and law firm practice with regards to non-attorneys and improper referral practices resulting in unfair and improper advantages.

81. These acts and omissions constitute unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts or practices within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 17200.

82. Pursuant to California’s Unfair Competition Law, which permits violations of ethical standards to serve as a basis for a claim under Section 17200, et seq., Plaintiff herein is informed, and thereon believes and alleges that Defendants SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, have engaged in such practices as so described hereinabove in paragraphs 1 through 77, constituting violations of the law and of the prohibition

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on this claim, which is discussed below re: the second prong.

2. Re: Whether Plaintiff Has Established That There Is A Probability She Will Prevail On The Claims – CCP ¶ 425.16(b)(1).

On this second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to show a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Civ. Pro. Code, § 425.16(b)(1).)

As discussed above, the Court addresses the following causes of action as to which Defendants have met their burden on the first prong:

As noted above, this cause of action alleges a violation of ¶ 527.6(b)(Complaint, ¶ 21), which states in pertinent part as follows:

(b) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:

(1) “Course of conduct” is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or email. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.”

(2) “Credible threat of violence” is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for the person’s safety or the safety of the person’s immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.

(3) “Harassment” is unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.

(7) “Unlawful violence” is any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, but does not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others.

37. I did not hire Rafael Jimenez to do anything with respect to Plaintiff Heidari. I did not pay him, or direct him, or agree with him, to do anything. I did not pay him, or direct him, or agree with him to alter any evidence. I had no relationship or knowledge of him until Defendant Khoddami informed me that Rafael reached out to him on about July 5, 2022.

38. I did not alter evidence on my own. With respect to the recording discussed in ¶ 29(f), I did not alter any aspect of it.

39. I did not pay, or direct, or agree with, anyone to vandalize the Rolls Royce or stage its vandalism.

40. I never agreed to be part of a civil conspiracy with anyone to harass, defame, or injure (either reputationally, socially, economically, personally, legally, or otherwise) Plaintiff Heidari.

41. I never assisted, encouraged, or authorized any individual, including Defendant Sean Collinson, to engage in the unauthorized practice of law.

42. I deny committing any illegal or unlawful behavior in connection with the Divorce proceedings.

43. My only relationship and involvement with the Plaintiff are through the Divorce Proceedings, in which I represent Defendant Khoddami. All of my conduct in connection with the Divorce Proceedings has been as the attorney of record for Defendant Khoddami, and through my law firm. All of my conduct in connection with the Divorce Proceedings has been intended to achieve the object of the litigation for my client.

“[A] SLAPP motion, like a summary judgment motion, pierces the pleadings and requires an evidentiary showing.” (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 [112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397].) “ ‘[A]lthough by its terms [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) calls upon a court to determine whether “the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim” … , past cases interpreting this provision establish that the Legislature did not intend that a court, in ruling on a motion to strike under this statute, would weigh conflicting evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that plaintiff will prevail on the claim, but rather intended to establish a summary-judgment-like procedure available at an early stage of litigation that poses a potential chilling effect on speech-related activities.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he court's responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff … .’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he defendant's evidence is considered with a view toward whether it defeats the plaintiff's showing as a matter of law, such as by establishing a defense or the absence of a necessary element.’ [Citation.]” (Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204, 215 [105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683].)

Plaintiff does not present any evidence that moving lawyer Defendants personally engaged in acts constituting harassment under Civ. Proc. Code, § 527.6(b).

Nor does Plaintiff present evidence that moving lawyer Defendants entered into a conspiracy or aided and abetted the client in harassing Plaintiff. The mere existence of an attorney-client relationship is insufficient to give rise to such an inference:

[A]n anti-SLAPP motion is an evidentiary motion (citation omitted), but Contreras fails to provide evidentiary support for her allegations of conspiracy or aiding and abetting. “Because civil conspiracy is so easy to allege, plaintiffs have a weighty burden to prove it.” (Citation omitted.) “To prove a claim for civil conspiracy, [Contreras] was required to provide substantial evidence of three elements: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.” (Citation omitted.) For liability to attach, knowledge of the planned tort must be combined with intent to aid in [*417] its commission. (Citation omitted.) “While knowledge and intent ‘may be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances’ [citation], ‘“[c]onspiracies cannot be established by suspicions. There must be some evidence. Mere association does not make a conspiracy. There must be evidence of some participation or interest in the commission of the offense.”’ [Citation.] An inference must flow logically from other facts established in the action.” (Citation omitted.)

Finally, as she did in the court below, Contreras argues Dowling's concurrence in his clients' illegal entry into her apartment may be inferred from the existence of the attorney-client relationship itself. She reasons that such a relationship “typically is premised on an agreement between an attorney and his client to attain certain mutual objectives.” In this case, the alleged mutual objective was to remove Contreras from her apartment. [*418] Contreras offers no authority to support her novel view of the attorney-client relationship. Indeed, she misconceives the nature of that relationship; it is generally one in which the attorney acts as agent for the client, who is the principal. (Citations omitted.) A lawyer works “to advance a client's lawful objectives, as defined by the client after consultation.” (Rest., Law Governing Lawyers, § 16(1), italics added.)

We decline to infer Dowling's concurrence in his clients' acts from the mere existence of their attorney-client relationship. Contreras cites no authority holding that an attorney-client relationship is evidence of a conspiracy between the attorney and client, and our own research discloses none. Moreover, we share Dowling's expressed concern about the implications of such a holding. He contends there will be a chilling effect on attorneys if their communicative acts can be placed outside the protection of section 425.16 by the unadorned allegation that they conspired in their clients' torts. Contreras airily dismisses this concern, arguing “any chilling effect that conclusion may have on conspiracies between lawyers and their clients must be counted an unalloyed benefit.” We are not so sanguine. “The fears of chilled speech and hindered justice are too much a part of our case law to be disregarded as unproved.” (McClatchey Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 961, 971 [234 Cal. Rptr. 702] [allegation of conspiracy to permit witness to make defamatory statements in deposition does not “pierce the protective shield” of Civ. Code, § 47].) We refuse Contreras's invitation to infer an attorney-client conspiracy from the mere existence of an attorney-client relationship.

Accordingly, there is no basis to hold moving attorney Defendants liable for the conduct or statements as alleged in ¶¶ 15 – 23 of the Complaint. Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on this claim as against the moving lawyer Defendants.

The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the first cause of action as to Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney.

[L]ibel, [is] defined as: “[A] false and unprivileged publication by writing … which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which … has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” (Civ. Code, § 45; see id., §§ 44, subd. (a), 45a.) To prevail on a claim for libel, plaintiff must show four elements: that defendants published the statements; that the statements were about plaintiff; that they were false; and that defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity. (CACI No. 1704.)

As noted above, Defendant Sweeney presented evidence that her only involvement with Plaintiff was in connection with her representation of Defendant Khoddami in the divorce proceedings:

Thus, to the extent Defendant Sweeney and her law firm published statements about Plaintiff (Complaint, ¶ 29), they were in connection with the divorce proceedings, and thus come within the absolute litigation privilege:

"Publications made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged under the provisions of subdivision 2 of section 47 (citations omitted) even though they are made with actual malice. (Citation omitted.) The absolute privilege attaches to any publication that has any reasonable relation to the action and is permitted by law if made to achieve the objects of the litigation, 'even though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is invoked.' (Citation omitted.) Accordingly, 'it is not limited to the pleadings, the oral or written evidence, to publications in open court or in briefs or affidavits.' (Citation omitted.)

" To be privileged under subdivision 2 of section 47 the defamatory matter need not be relevant, pertinent or material to any issue before the court, it only need have some connection or some relation to the judicial proceeding. (Citations omitted.)

"Although section 47 refers to the 'publication' made in a 'judicial proceeding,' and does not list the persons who are absolutely privileged, the privilege therein provided has been extended to judges (citation omitted), attorneys (citations omitted), and to parties to private litigation (citation omitted). In Thornton, supra, the rule of the Restatement which lists judicial officers (§ 585), attorneys (§ 586), parties (§ 587), witnesses (§ 588), and jurors (§ 589) as persons entitled to the absolute privilege in judicial proceedings is equated to the rule declared in subdivision 2 of section 47. (P. 90.)"

Moreover, as discussed above, there is no evidence that the lawyer Defendants entered into a conspiracy with or aided and abetted Defendant Khoddami’s statements to Plaintiff which may have occurred outside the scope of the litigation privilege.

As such, Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on this claim as against the moving lawyer Defendants.

The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the second cause of action as to Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney.

As noted above, Defendant Sweeney presented evidence that her only involvement with Plaintiff was in connection with her representation of Defendant Khoddami in the divorce proceedings. (Sweeney Decl., ¶ 43.)

Thus, to the extent Defendant Sweeney and her law firm published statements about Plaintiff (Complaint, ¶¶ 36, 37), they were in connection with the divorce proceedings, and thus come within the absolute litigation privilege. (Rader, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at 887-88.)

As such, Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on this claim as against the moving lawyer Defendants.

The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the third cause of action as to Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney.

Thus, to the extent Defendant Sweeney and her law firm published statements about Plaintiff (Complaint, ¶¶ 45 – 47) they were in connection with the divorce proceedings, and thus come within the absolute litigation privilege. (Rader, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at 887-88.)

As such, Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on this claim as against the moving lawyer Defendants.

The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the fourth cause of action as to Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney.

This cause of action is based upon the alleged derogatory, defamatory and demeaning slurs about Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 57.) This cause of action fails for two reasons.

Ordinarily mere insulting language, without more, does not constitute outrageous conduct. The Restatement view is that liability "does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities . . . . There is no occasion for the law to intervene . . . where some one's feelings are hurt." (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d.) Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. (Citations omitted.)

(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 155 [bold emphasis added].)

Second, as discussed above, the litigation privilege bars this cause of action and, to there is no evidence of conspiracy or aiding and abetting liability on the part of moving lawyer Defendants.

As such, Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on this claim as against the moving lawyer Defendants.

The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the fifth cause of action as to Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney.

For the reasons discussed above re: the fifth cause of action, Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on this claim as against the moving lawyer Defendants.

Moreover, this cause of action fails because there is no allegation that Plaintiff was threatened with physical injury:

[B]ecause the [*156] only injury Wilson claimed in her lawsuit was emotional distress, she was required to show that Edison's breach threatened physical injury to her. (See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984–985 [25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 863 P.2d 795] (Potter) [“[T]here is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.] The tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element. [Citations.] That duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.”].) “[U]nless the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant's breach of some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty. Even then, with rare exceptions, a breach of the duty must threaten physical injury, not simply damage to property or financial interests.” (Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 985.) Thus, at the very least, there could not have been a breach of duty during the period when no shocks were felt on the property.

(Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 155-156.)

The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the sixth cause of action as to Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney.

To prove a claim for civil conspiracy, Kidron was required to provide substantial evidence of three elements: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct. As is well established, civil conspiracy is not an independent tort. (Citation omitted.) Rather, civil conspiracy is a "legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration. [Citation.]" ( Id., at pp. 510-511.) As Witkin explains, "If [the plaintiff] can show that each [of several defendants] committed a wrongful act or some part of it, e.g., that each made false representations, he has no need of averments of conspiracy. But if A alone made representations, the plaintiff can hold B and C liable with A only by alleging and proving that A acted pursuant to an agreement (conspiracy) with B and C to defraud." (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 869, p. 311.)

[*1582] Accordingly, "[ t]he basis of a civil conspiracy is the formation of a group of two or more persons who have agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious act." (Citations omitted.) The conspiring defendants must also have actual knowledge that a tort is planned and concur in the tortious scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose. (Citations omitted.)

However, actual knowledge of the planned tort, without more, is insufficient to serve as the basis for a conspiracy claim. Knowledge of the planned tort must be combined with intent to aid in its commission. " The sine qua non of a conspiratorial agreement is the knowledge on the part of the alleged conspirators of its unlawful objective and their intent to aid in achieving that objective." (Citations omitted.) "This rule derives from the principle that a person is generally under no duty to take affirmative action to aid or protect others." (1 Levy et al., Cal. Torts, supra, Civil Conspiracy, § 9.03[2], p. 9-13.)

While knowledge and intent "may be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstance (Citation omitted), " '[c]onspiracies cannot be established by suspicions. There must be some evidence. Mere association does not make a conspiracy. There must be evidence of some participation or interest in the commission of the offense.' " (Citation omitted.) An inference must flow logically from other facts established in the action. (Citation omitted.)

In opposing an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations of the complaint, but must produce evidence that would be admissible at trial. (Citation omitted.) Thus, declarations may not be based upon “information and belief” (citation omitted) and documents submitted without the proper foundation are not to be considered. (Citation omitted.)

While plaintiff's burden may not be “high,” he must demonstrate that his claim is legally sufficient. (Citation omitted.) And he must show that it is supported by a sufficient prima facie showing, one made with “competent and admissible evidence.” (Citations omitted.) Plaintiff's demonstration does not measure up.

(Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 468-69.)

Here, Plaintiff did not submit any evidence to support the formation of a conspiracy, which was Plaintiffs burden, not Defendants’. As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on this conspiracy claim.

The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the seventh cause of action as to Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney.

H. Eighth Cause of Action (Unfair Competition, Violations of Business & Professions Code, § 17200).

inclusive, and each of them, are bound by California law to comply with the California Business & Professions Code §§ 6000 – 6243, inclusive, governing the regulation of attorneys in the State of California. Defendants SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, violated those regulations and will continue violating those regulations in their

engagement with the public at large, including, without limitation, the improper and illegal tampering with witnesses and fraudulent creation of improper and altered recordings as evidence in violation of Penal Code §§ 131 – 132, 133 – 135, 136.1 – 136.7, and 137 – 141, inclusive. Unless and until an injunction is issued by this Court to prohibit the continuing violations of law, including the unauthorized practice of law by non-attorney Defendant COLLINSON, both

Plaintiff and the public are in jeopardy of ongoing deprivation of rights and direct benefit will continue to be accrued illegally by Defendants SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them.

As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on this claim.

The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the eighth cause of action as to Defendants Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney and Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney.

Defendants may bring a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code, § 425.16(c)(1).

[1] Although it does not expressly say so, the Complaint apparently refers to moving Defendant Sweeney as “Sweeney” and moving Defendant Law Offices of J. Ellie Sweeney as “JES.”