Judge Christopher K. Lui, Case 23STCV02073 2023-05-16 Tentative Ruling

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1), the Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein. Counsel must contact the staff in Department 76 to inform the Court whether they wish to submit on the tentative, or to argue the matter. As required by Rule 3.1308(a)(2), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 of their intent to appear and argue.

Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776.

Per Rule of Court 3.1308, if notice of intention to appear is not given, the Court may adopt the tentative ruling as the final ruling.

Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants, including her husband whom she is divorcing and his attorney, have conspired to defame, stalk, eavesdrop and threaten/harass Plaintiff.

Defendant Seyed M. Khoddami, M.D. brings an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Complaint.

Defendant Sean Collinson also brings an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Complaint.

Defendant Seyed M. Khoddami, M.D’s anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Complaint is GRANTED as to the first through seventh causes of action.

Defendant Khoddami may bring a properly-noticed motion for attorney’s fees.

Defendant Sean Collinson’s anti-SLAPP special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the first through eighth causes of action.

Defendant Collinson may bring a properly-noticed motion for attorney’s fees.

No. 1: OVERRULED. This is an in-court statement. “ ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200(a).) Sufficient foundation.

No. 1: SUSTAINED. Hearsay.
No. 2: OVERRULED. Not hearsay; sufficient foundation; goes to weight.

No. 3: OVERRULED. Hearsay exception—admission of party opponent; not hearsay if being offered to show content of text messages, not the truth thereof; sufficient foundation.

(1) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, filed April 4, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 1); (2) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Request for Order Re Child Custody, Visitation and Other, filed June 7, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 2); (3) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order, filed August 1, 2022 in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 3); (4) Notice of Court Hearing (DV-109) and Temporary Restraining Order (DV-110) Denial, filed August 3, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 4); (5) Neda Heidari’s Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order, filed September 12, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 5); (6) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Ex Parte Request for Temporary Emergency Orders Re Surrender of Rolls Royce, filed November 22, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 6); (7) Temporary Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders issued by the Court for Khoddami’s ex parte application (RJN 6), filed November 22, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 7); (8) Seyed M. Khoddami’s Ex Parte Request for Temporary Emergency Orders that Plaintiff be responsible for Rolls Royce, filed December 22, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 8); (9) Temporary Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders issued by the Court for Khoddami’s ex parte application (RJN 8), filed December 22, 2022, in the Superior Court for the County of Ventura, for the action entitled Seyed Khoddami vs. Neda Heidari, Case No: D405177 (Exh. 9).

Defendant Seyed M. Khoddami, M.D. brings an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Complaint.

In ruling on a defendant’s special motion to strike, the trial court uses a “summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) This is a two-step process. First, the defendant must show that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b)(1).) Second, if the defendant carries that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b)(3).) The defendant has the burden on the first issue, and the plaintiff on the second. (Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 928; Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 919.) In making both determinations the trial court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., §425.16(b)(2); Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)

The Defendant’s act underlying the cause of action must itself have been in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 69, 76-78.) The defendant’s acts are protected activity – that is, made in furtherance of protected petition or free speech in connection with a public issue – if they fit into one of the following categories under the section 425.16, subdivision (e) categories: (1) oral or written statements made before a legislative, executive, judicial or any other official proceeding; (2) oral or written statements made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) written or oral statements made in a place open to the public or in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; and (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(e).)

If such a showing is made, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(b)(1).) To establish a probability of prevailing on the merits, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4^th 539, 548.) In making this assessment it is the court’s responsibility to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff. (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4^th 204, 212.) The Complaint needs only to establish that his or her claim has minimal merit (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4^th 82, 89) to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4^th728, 738.)

“For purposes of this inquiry, ‘the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.’ (Citation omitted.)” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.)

1. Re: Whether the Causes of Action Are Subject To Being Stricken Pursuant to CCP § 425.16.

Defendant Seyed M. Khoddami, M.D. moves to strike the first through seventh causes of action in the Complaint asserted against him. Defendant Khoddami is alleged to have been involved in divorce proceedings from his wife, Plaintiff Heidari. (See Complaint, ¶ 16.)

The Complaint attributes the following conduct to moving Defendant Khoddami, and the Court will address whether each paragraph[1] alleges conduct protected under Civ. Proc. Code, § 425.16:

KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, did so employ, retain, and/or otherwise engage with RAFAEL JIMINEZ to harass, stalk, and/or otherwise civilly harass Plaintiff HEIDARI, by stalking, following, and eavesdropping on Plaintiff HEIDARI, including but not limited to through the use of improperly and illegally installed and/or planted surveillance devices upon the private medical office of Plaintiff HEIDARI, as well as the improper use of global positioning systems (“GPS”) on Plaintiff HEIDARI’s vehicle.

Because moving Defendant Khoddami is not a lawyer[2], the allegations of conspiracy would only subject Khoddami to liability for the underlying tort, but the Court must examine whether the tort itself, not the act which evidences participation in a conspiracy, is protected conduct subject to being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute:

In this case, plaintiffs sued Thiel and Mowat for public nuisance, assault and battery—not necessarily for any acts of nuisance, assault or battery which they personally may have committed, but for acts committed by other Bay Boys with whom Thiel and Mowat had allegedly conspired. The question presented to us is: When a tort cause of action is asserted on a conspiracy theory, which of the defendant's alleged “acts” are considered for the purposes of the first prong anti-SLAPP analysis—the acts which constitute the tort itself, or the acts which evidence the defendant's participation in the conspiracy? Thiel's and Mowat's anti-SLAPP motions are based on the assumption that only the latter acts are considered. We disagree; it is the tort itself that controls, not individual acts that demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy.

Indeed, this conclusion is compelled by Park, which holds “a claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) When liability is asserted for the target act of a conspiracy, the preliminary speech or petitioning activity is simply evidence of the defendant's liability, not “the wrong complained of.”

(Spencer v. Mowat (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1037 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

Thus, the Court must examine whether the alleged conduct in which Rafael Jiminez[3] engaged constitutes protected activity. At ¶ 15 of the Complaint, Plaintiff characterizes Jiminez’s conduct as harassment and stalking by following, stalking and eavesdropping on Plaintiff, through the use of improperly and illegally installed and/or planted surveillance devices at Plaintiff’s medical office and using global positioning systems on Plaintiff’s vehicle.

In this regard, Defendant presents evidence that Jiminez testified that he was introduced to Plaintiff, and that she had hired Jiminez because she believed Khoddami was cheating on her, and Jiminez approached Khoddami because Plaintiff owed Jiminez money. (Sweeney Decl., ¶¶ 26(c), 26(d), Exh. E[4], pp. 21:18 – 24:7, 29:9 – 24.)

Defendant also argues that hiring a private investigator to investigate Plaintiff for purposes of the divorce proceedings would be protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. Defendant cites Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5^th 648, 658 for this proposition. That case held that “the act of hiring a private investigator in connection with potential or actual litigation falls within the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Id. at 660.)

The evidence Defendant presents (by way of declaration) is that Plaintiff hired Jiminez to investigate Defendant Khoddami; there is no evidence that Defendant hired Jiminez to investigate Plaintiff.

In the Opposition, Plaintiff suggests that Defendant Collinson—a non-attorney who holds himself out to be an attorney—actively solicited Jiminez to facilitate witness tampering and intimidation of Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that this is not the equivalent of the hiring of a private investigator.

However, Plaintiff does not allege that Collinson hired Jiminez to engage in witness tampering and intimidation of Plaintiff. (See Complaint, ¶ 15.) Rather, the allegations of hiring Jiminez to stalk, follow, eavesdrop on Heidari and to place surveillance devices upon Plaintiff’s medical office, as well as the use of GPS on her vehicle (¶ 15), could come within private investigator activities.

To the extent Jiminez performed such activities relative to Plaintiff, it was done “in connection with” the divorce proceedings, i.e., the issues of spousal support, division of assets and custody of the children. “To the extent there is any doubt, we construe the statute broadly to achieve its purposes. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 871, 899-900.)

Plaintiff’s argument that illegal activity is not protected under Civ. Proc. Code, § 425.16 is not persuasive, as Defendant does not admit to such illegal activity, and the evidence presented does not conclusively establish illegality. Neither condition is fulfilled here, so the illegality exception does not apply.

[O]nce the defendant has made the required threshold showing that the challenged action arises from assertedly protected activity, the plaintiff may counter by demonstrating that the underlying action was [*287] illegal as a matter of law because either the defendant concedes the illegality of the assertedly protected activity or the illegality is conclusively established by the evidence presented in connection with the motion to strike. In doing so, the plaintiff must identify with particularity the statute or statutes violated by the filing and maintenance of the underlying action. (Citation omitted.) This requirement of identifying a specific statute, violation of which the plaintiff contends is illegal as a matter of law, is consistent with the narrow nature of the exemption set forth in section 425.18, subdivision (h) because it prevents a plaintiff from advancing a generalized claim that a defendant's conduct was illegal and therefore subject to the exemption. In this same vein, the requirement of specificity provides notice to both the defendant and the court about the particular statute or statutes the defendant is alleged to have violated as a matter of law so as to allow the defendant to intelligibly respond to, and the court to assess, the claim. Additionally, as part of the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating illegality as a matter of law, the plaintiff must show the specific manner in which the statute or statutes were violated with reference to their elements. A generalized assertion that a particular statute was violated by the filing or maintenance of the underlying action without a particularized showing of the violation will be insufficient to demonstrate illegality as a matter of law.

(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 260, 286-287 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

Accordingly, the Court finds that ¶ 15 is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the first cause of action as to ¶ 15 in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

16. Furthermore, Defendant KHODDAMI, from the time beginning on or about April 2022, after already initiating divorce proceedings against Plaintiff HEIDARI and moving out of the family home unexpectedly, engaged in conduct amounting to civil harassment of Plaintiff HEIDARI by contacting various banking institutions allegedly on behalf of Plaintiff HEIDARI, including but not limited to Wells Fargo and CitiBank, and/or otherwise employed agents to carry out the same, in order to determine the location of Plaintiff HEIDARI, as well as to determine what Plaintiff HEIDARI was spending money on, if anything, in order to maintain surveillance of her and her whereabouts. This conduct included, but is not limited to, ongoing procurement of account balances without authorization and/or with false or fraudulent authorization of the same.

Defendant argues that this related to Plaintiff’s finances, which were directly at issue in the divorce proceedings, as the petition asks the court to determine rights to community and quasi-community assets and debts. (Sweeney Decl., ¶ 5; RJN No. 1 at § 10 of Petition.) This argument is persuasive.

[I]information about the value of community assets and the parties' financial status is clearly relevant to the spouse's interests in obtaining a fair division of those assets and fair attorney fee and spousal support (and, in other cases, child support) awards. Moreover, at least as to a division of assets and child and spousal support awards, those interests are strongly protected by California law.

As discussed above, investigation in preparation for litigation falls within the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Timothy W., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at 660.)

The Court finds that ¶ 16 is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the first cause of action as to ¶ 16 in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

17. Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and have engaged in repeated acts of false statements, including but not limited to falsifying evidence to attack the credibility of Plaintiff HEIDARI, attack the financial health of Plaintiff HEIDARI by falsely portraying Plaintiff as a con artist or criminal, including but not limited to implicating Plaintiff HEIDARI in the vandalism of a four-hundred thousand dollar ($400,000.00) 2018 Rolls Royce Ghost, the false allegations of hiring of individuals to participate in assaults, or worse, capital offenses, as to Defendant KHODDAMI so as to carry out the promise by Defendant KHODDAMI to ruin Plaintiff HEIDARI, both reputationally, professionally, socially, and legally in the divorce proceeding, by means of staging and creating falsehoods, and has put that promise into effect through, inter alia, false testimony, fraudulent alteration of evidence, and more.

These alleged statements all have a relation to the divorce proceedings between Defendant Khoddami and Plaintiff, as ¶ 17 expressly recognizes, the conduct consists of “falsifying evidence to attack the credibility of Plaintiff . . . [and] attack the financial health of Plaintiff. . . .” Plaintiff also refers to “false testimony” and “fraudulent alteration of evidence.” (Id.) This evidence and credibility of testimony obviously refers to the divorce proceedings. Likewise, the vandalism of the Rolls Royce Ghost and hiring or individuals to assault Defendant Khoddami relate, respectively, to the division of community assets or a police report[5] Defendant made about Plaintiff hiring Jiminez to follow Defendant and to plant drugs on him. (See Khoddami Decl., ¶¶ 16 – 22, 27 – 29.)

The Court finds that ¶ 17 is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the first cause of action as to ¶ 17 in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

18. Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and have engaged in additional repeated acts of false statements, including but not limited to falsifying the nature of Plaintiff HEIDARI’s conduct, implying that Plaintiff HEIDARI was engaged in promiscuous conduct in public at gyms, engaged in promiscuous conduct in public at banks, sleeping with bankers, sleeping with men for money, and otherwise falsely attempting to demean and diminish the social status of Plaintiff HEIDARI through oral and/or written communications, including, inter alia, by text message over cellular networks.

Defendant has presented evidence that all these allegedly false statements were made in communications between parties during the Divorce Proceedings, and are thus petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. Defendant Khoddami and Plaintiff

Heidari disputed some $410,000 in cash that Heidari possessed, as well as disputed responsibility for utility costs. Plaintiff Heidari testified in the Divorce Proceedings, however, that four (4) text messages Khoddami sent during the divorce concerning (1) the $410,000 and (2) paying utilities for guests at the house were really “code” that she was sleeping with men (and bankers) for money. (Khoddami SLAPP Decl. ¶¶ 31-32(b) and exhibits referenced; Sweeney Decl. ¶¶ 36-36(b).) defendant argues that, as utility costs, unaccounted community property finances, and guests at the children’s house, were (and are) issues in the Divorce Proceedings (Sweeney Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 16-24), Defendant Khoddami sending texts related to those issues, to a party in litigation, plainly falls under the anti-SLAPP.

Plaintiff does not offer any persuasive argument or evidence to dispute Defendant’s above showing. The Court finds Defendant’s argument to be well-taken because the communications were made to Plaintiff, with whom Defendant was engaged in divorce proceedings, regarding issues that were under consideration by the court in the divorce proceedings:

A statement is “in connection with” an issue under consideration by a court in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of clause (2) of section 425.16, subdivision (e) if it relates to a substantive issue in the proceeding and is directed to a person having some interest in the proceeding. (Citation omitted.)

The Court finds that ¶ 18 is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the first cause of action as to ¶ 18 in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

19. Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, have engaged in illegal and unethical staging and commission of vandalism of the 2018 Rolls Royce Ghost, valued at over four-hundred thousand dollars ($400,000.00) at the time of acquisition, so as to falsely, fraudulently, and/or without justification impugne upon Plaintiff HEIDARI the crime of vandalism, so as to defraud Plaintiff HEIDARI of the benefits afforded by the insurance as to the same, as well as to call into doubt both professionally and privately the ethical, moral, and propriety of Plaintiff HEIDARI’s character as a physician, mother, wife, and person, in an effort to diminish and demean and civilly harass Plaintiff HEIDARI through the aforementioned oppressive and criminal conduct.

Defendant argues that the alleged “impugning” of vandalism arises from Defendant Khodammi’s ex parte application where he states she “negligently left” the car “on the side of the road in Century City” for two days without calling to have it towed. (RJN No. 8, at ¶¶ 4, 22-28, of Declaration of Seyed Khoddami attached thereto.) Defendant argues that, as his ex parte declaration is a “writing” made in official proceedings, the allegations in paragraph 19 trigger the anti-SLAPP statute.

Plaintiff does not offer any persuasive argument or evidence to dispute Defendant’s above showing. The Court finds that ¶ 19 is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the first cause of action as to ¶ 19 in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

20. Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLISON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, condoned and/or ratified and/or approved of the conduct, or otherwise sanctioned and supported the same, by Defendant KHODDAMI against Plaintiff HEIDARI, including but not limited to Defendant KHODDAMI informing Plaintiff HEIDARI of the intent to destroy and manipulate her life so as to civilly harass her, including making statements while laughing maniacally, including but not limited to:

e. “Congratulations, whoever did it did it well [referring to the vandalism of

the Ghost]. Glad you always chose best people to deliver best damage…Can’t wait to hear new stories.”

For the reasons discussed above, these statements relate to the divorce proceedings between Plaintiff and Defendant, made between those litigants, as thus come within the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Fremont Reorganizing Corp., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 1167.)

The Court finds that ¶ 20 is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the first cause of action as to ¶ 20 in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

28. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, made false statements, that were unprivileged in nature, and publicized to third parties other than Plaintiff HEIDARI, of or concerning Plaintiff HEIDARI, which exposed Plaintiff HEIDARI

to disgrace and injured her in her occupation and livelihood. These statements were made negligently, intentionally, and/or with reckless disregard and malice for the impact that they had.

29. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, have published specific content containing messages, words, remarks, representations, or characteristics as to Plaintiff HEIDARI that are incorrect, improper, and false, including but not

limited to statements such as, inter alia, matters pertaining to her fidelity and false characteristics as a mother to her abilities as a medical doctor and competence thereto. Additional statements have been made, even as to previous disputes between Plaintiff HEIDARI and Defendant KHODDAMI, wherein Plaintiff HEIDARI’s character and lawfulness was impugned so as to

30. Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, communicated or assisted in the communication, or otherwise facilitated the communication and distribution of such false statements and had made them in such a manner so as to have a natural tendency to injure Plaintiff HEIDARI, including in matters of the

As Defendant points out, Plaintiff has admitted in ¶ 30 that these statements were made in matters of record in court. Further, Defendant has presented evidence that the alleged libelous statements of Plaintiff’s actions as a medical doctor and as a criminal occurred in the divorce proceedings, as Defendant accused her hiring Jiminez to plant drugs on Defendant Khoddami and committing medical and insurance fraud (Sweeney Decl. ¶¶ 8-15, 25, 29-30(c)). Defendants’ allegations about her “characteristics as a mother” were also made in the Divorce Proceedings, as Defendant Khoddami testified Plaintiff was emotionally abusive and put the children’s safety at risk. (Id.) Finally, the libel of Plaintiff’s “fidelity” was also at issue in the Divorce Proceedings

as Plaintiff claimed Khoddami’s texts about finances and monies at issue in the divorce implied she was unchaste. (Khoddami SLAPP Decl.¶¶ 31-32(b).)

Plaintiff argues that allegations which arise out of false allegations of criminal conduct are not appropriate for anti-SLAPP protections, citing Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4^th 1122, 1127. However, Weinberg is distinguishable from the instant case. In Weinberg, the defendant did not report his suspicions to law enforcement, nor did he intent to pursue civil charges against plaintiff, but rather engaged in a private campaign of falsely accusing the plaintiff of criminal conduct, which was not a public issue:

We disagree and shall affirm the order denying the special motion to strike. As we will explain, defendant did not report his suspicions to law enforcement, and there is no evidence that he intended to pursue civil charges against [*1127] plaintiff. Rather, it is alleged that defendant began a private campaign, so to speak, to discredit plaintiff in the eyes of a relatively small group of fellow collectors. Since the record does not support a conclusion that plaintiff is a public figure or that he has thrust himself into any public issue, defendant’s accusations related to what in effect was a private matter. Under the circumstances, the fact that defendant accused plaintiff of criminal conduct did not make the accusations a matter of public interest.

Simply stated, causes of action arising out of false allegations of criminal conduct, made under circumstances like those alleged in this case, are not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. Otherwise, wrongful accusations of criminal conduct, which are among the most clear and egregious types of defamatory statements, automatically would be accorded the most stringent protections provided by law, without regard to the circumstances in which they were made—a result that would be inconsistent with the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute and would unduly undermine the protection accorded by paragraph 1 of Civil Code section 46, which includes as slander any false and unprivileged communication charging a person with a crime, and the California rule that false accusations of crime are libel per se (Civ. Code, § 45a; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 482, p. 566).

(Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1126-27 [bold emphasis added].)

Here, by contrast, as discussed above, Defendant reported Plaintiff’s alleged criminal conduct to the police, and he made statements in connection with issues under consideration by a court in the divorce proceedings. For the reasons discussed above, these statements are protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.

The Court finds that the second cause of action is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the second cause of action in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

The defamation—libel per se cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, made false statements, that were unprivileged in nature, and publicized to third parties other than Plaintiff HEIDARI, of or concerning Plaintiff HEIDARI, which exposed Plaintiff HEIDARI to disgrace and injured her in her occupation and livelihood. These statements were made negligently, intentionally, and/or with reckless disregard and malice for the impact that they had.

KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, have published specific content containing messages, words, remarks, representations, or characteristics as to Plaintiff HEIDARI that are incorrect, improper, and false, including but not limited to statements such as, inter alia, matters pertaining to her fidelity and false characteristics as a mother to her abilities as a medical doctor and competence thereto. Additional statements have been made, even as to previous disputes between Plaintiff HEIDARI and Defendant KHODDAMI, wherein Plaintiff HEIDARI’s character and lawfulness was impugned so as to portray her a criminal to the public.

38. These statements are objectively and patently defamatory in nature, requiring no further showing of explanatory matter, innuendo, or other extrinsic fact pursuant to California Civil Code § 45a.

39. Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, communicated or assisted in the communication, or otherwise facilitated the communication and distribution of such patently false statements to third parties other than Plaintiff HEIDARI, of or concerning Plaintiff HEIDARI, that are of such a manner and character so as to have a natural and invariable tendency and probability of injuring Plaintiff

40. Such statements related to Plaintiff HEIDARI’s qualifications and credentials as a duly licensed, acclaimed, and well respected medical doctor, which were falsely represented as being less than diligent, and barely competent, are objectively and facially defamatory rising to the level of “libel per se” pursuant to Civ. Code §45a.

The parties present the same arguments as to the third cause of action as to the second cause of action. For the reasons discussed above re: the second cause of action, the Court finds that the third cause of action is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the third cause of action in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

The defamation—slander cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, have uttered false statements regarding Plaintiff HEIDARI’s business and/or professional reputation, false statements regarding Plaintiff HEIDARI’s lawfulness or alleged criminality, and false statements regarding Plaintiff HEIDARI’s chastity and fabricated promiscuity.

47. These words, remarks, representations, or characteristics ascribed as to Plaintiff HEIDARI are incorrect, improper, and false, including but not limited to statements such as, inter alia, matters pertaining to her fidelity and false characteristics as a mother to her abilities as a medical doctor and competence. Additional statements have been made, even as to previous disputes between Plaintiff HEIDARI and Defendant KHODDAMI, wherein Plaintiff HEIDARI’s character and lawfulness was impugned so as to portray her as a criminal to the public.

48. These statements are objectively and patently defamatory and slanderous in nature, and so are presumed to have caused Plaintiff HEIDARI damage, entitling her to damages for, without limitation, her hurt feelings, mental suffering, and humiliation without further proof.

49. Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, communicated or assisted in the communication, or otherwise facilitated the communication and distribution of such patently false statements that are of such a manner and character so as to have a natural and invariable tendency and probability of injuring Plaintiff HEIDARI.

50. Such statements related to Plaintiff HEIDARI’s qualifications and credentials as a duly licensed, acclaimed, and well respected medical doctor, which were falsely represented as being less than diligent, and barely competent, are objectively and facially defamatory rising to the level of “libel per se” pursuant to Civ. Code §45a.

The parties present the same arguments as to the fourth causes of action as to the second cause of action. For the reasons discussed above re: the second cause of action, the Court finds that the fourth cause of action is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the fourth cause of action in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

The intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

57. The aforementioned actions of Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, on or about the Subject Date and continuing on to the present, as alleged hereinabove, were outrageous, intentional malicious, wanton, and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiff severe emotional distress, mental anguish and with motivations thereto resulting from derogatory, defamatory, and demeaning slurs resulting in further causing of humiliation and self-loathing.

Defendant incorporates his arguments pertaining to the defamation causes of action above.

In the Opposition, Plaintiff argues that this cause of action is based upon Defendant’s agent, Defendant Collinson, facilitated under the guise of the operation of a law practice, even when making a police report and directly communicating with law enforcement personnel.

However, the Complaint does not based the IIED cause of action on Collinson’s conduct. Moreover, any statements made in a police report or communicating with law enforcement personnel are subject to being stricken. “The law is that communications to the police are within SLAPP. (Citations omitted.)” (Comstock, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 941.)

The Court finds that the fifth cause of action is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the fifth cause of action in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

The negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

64. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that on or about the Subject Date, Defendants KHADDAFI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through inclusive, and each of them, OWED Plaintiff a duty of care in their dealings with Plaintiff.

SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, knew, or should have known, that each of their individual, and therein also imputed, failure(s) to exercise care towards Plaintiff would cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress.

COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of their, behavior, acts or omissions, Plaintiff suffered the injuries to his person described above.

67. As a further legal (proximate) result of Defendants', KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of their, behavior, acts or omissions, and the consequences proximately caused by it, as hereinabove alleged, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress and mental suffering, all to his damages.

Because this cause of action incorporates the allegations from the prior causes of action, it is likewise subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the sixth cause of action in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

70. That Plaintiff was harmed as a result of the civil harassment, defamation in the

form of libel, and defamation in the form of slander, as described hereinabove in Paragraphs 12 through 59.

71. That a conspiracy existed in the form of an agreement, between each of and amongst Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, to commit a wrongful act, chiefly, to unduly and illegally harass, cause embarrassment, stalk, defame, and otherwise interfere with Plaintiff HEIDARI’s ability to exercise her individual sovereignty so as to deprive her of her family, health, and wealth in business and personal affairs.

72. That Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, are members and/or constituents and/or principals of the conspiracy to commit such wrongful acts as described in Paragraphs 12 through 59 above.

73. Specifically, Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, whether orally or in writing, or implied by the conduct of the Defendants, sought to induce one another to defame and harass Plaintiff HEIDARI as described hereinabove in Paragraphs 12 through 59.

74. That Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, was aware that each co-conspirator planned to defame and harass as so described above in Paragraphs 12 through 59.

75. That Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, individually agreed with each other co-conspirator, and others, and intended that the aforementioned wrongful acts in fact be committed.

76. That, as a result of this conspiracy, Plaintiff HEIDARI has been harmed in fact, and that Plaintiff HEIDARI has sustained, and will continue to sustain, damages in an amount to be determined at trial, for which Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, should pay and/or be otherwise held responsible and/or accountable for.

As discussed above, where conspiracy is alleged, the Court must examine the underlying tort itself to determine whether the cause of action is subject to being stricken. (Spencer, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at 1037.) For the reasons discussed above, the alleged conspiracy is based upon torts which are subject to being stricken. As such, the seventh cause of action is subject to being stricken. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the seventh cause of action in the second prong of the SLAPP analysis.

2. Re: Whether Plaintiff Has Established That There Is A Probability She Will Prevail On The Claims – CCP ¶ 425.16(b)(1).

On this second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to show a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Civ. Pro. Code, § 425.16(b)(1).)

As discussed above, the Court addresses the following causes of action as to which Defendants have met their burden on the first prong:

As noted above, this cause of action alleges a violation of ¶ 527.6(b)(Complaint, ¶ 21), which states in pertinent part as follows:

(b) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:

(1) “Course of conduct” is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or email. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.”

(2) “Credible threat of violence” is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for the person’s safety or the safety of the person’s immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.

(3) “Harassment” is unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.

(7) “Unlawful violence” is any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, but does not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others.

“[A] SLAPP motion, like a summary judgment motion, pierces the pleadings and requires an evidentiary showing.” (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 [112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397].) “ ‘[A]lthough by its terms [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) calls upon a court to determine whether “the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim” … , past cases interpreting this provision establish that the Legislature did not intend that a court, in ruling on a motion to strike under this statute, would weigh conflicting evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that plaintiff will prevail on the claim, but rather intended to establish a summary-judgment-like procedure available at an early stage of litigation that poses a potential chilling effect on speech-related activities.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he court's responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff … .’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he defendant's evidence is considered with a view toward whether it defeats the plaintiff's showing as a matter of law, such as by establishing a defense or the absence of a necessary element.’ [Citation.]” (Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204, 215 [105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683].)

Defendant argues that the litigation privilege bars this claim. This argument is not persuasive.

The litigation privilege is absolute and broadly applied regardless of malice. (Citation omitted.) Its purposes are to “‘afford litigants and witnesses free access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions, to encourage open channels of communication and zealous advocacy, to promote complete and truthful testimony, to give finality to judgments and to avoid unending litigation.’” (Ibid.) It promotes effective judicial proceedings by encouraging full communication with the courts. (Ibid.) Accordingly, doubts as to whether the privilege applies are resolved in its favor. (Citations omitted.)

Despite its broad and absolute nature, the litigation privilege only protects publications and communications. Thus, “a ‘threshold issue in determining the applicability’ of the privilege is whether the defendant's conduct was communicative or noncommunicative. … The distinction between communicative and noncommunicative conduct hinges on the gravamen of the action. … That is, the key in determining whether the privilege applies is whether the injury allegedly resulted from an act that was communicative in its essential nature.” (Citations omitted.) And, if the gravamen of the action is based on a communicative act, “the litigation [*1273] privilege extends to noncommunicative acts that are necessarily related to the communicative conduct … . Stated another way, unless it is demonstrated that an independent, noncommunicative, wrongful act was the gravamen of the action, the litigation privilege applies.” (Citations omitted.) The interpretation of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) is a pure question of law that we review independently. (Citation omitted.)

(Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1272-73 [bold emphasis added].)

Here, the alleged eavesdropping and surveillance is not communicative conduct, and so, the litigation privilege would not apply to such conduct:

It is true that in Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355 [212 Cal.Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637, 49 A.L.R.4th 417] and Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202 [271 Cal.Rptr. 191, 793 P.2d 524], we pointed out that when it is noncommunicative conduct, such as eavesdropping or surreptitious taping, rather than communication for the purpose of litigation that causes an injury, the litigation privilege does not apply.

However, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence which demonstrates that the alleged eavesdropping and surveillance rose to the level of harassment as defined in Civ. Proc. Code, § 527.6(b) to mean “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.”

As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing as to ¶ 15 of the first cause of action. The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to ¶ 15 of the first cause of action.

Here, the litigation privilege would apply and bar this cause of action because the alleged harm occurred to Plaintiff as a result of Defendant communicating with banking institutions to obtain information about Plaintiff for purposes of the divorce proceedings, as discussed above.

As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing as to ¶ 16 of the first cause of action. The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to ¶ 16 of the first cause of action.

As discussed above, these communications were made in the course of a judicial proceeding, to achieve the object of the litigation, and have some connection or logical relation to the action. As such, the litigation privilege bars this cause of action based on the allegations in ¶ 17.

The privilege is generally described as applying to "any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." (Citations omitted.) The Supreme Court has characterized the third prong of the foregoing test, the requirement that a communication be in furtherance of the objects of the litigation, as being "simply part of" the fourth, the requirement that the communication be connected with, or have some logical relation to, the action. (Citation omitted.) The high court has specifically disapproved any interpretation of the "furtheranc requirement as a test of the motives, morals, ethics or intent of the person claiming the privilege. (Citation omitted.) Statements to nonparticipants in the action are generally not privileged under section 47, subdivision (b), and are thus actionable unless privileged on some other basis. (Citations omitted.)

The litigation privilege applies even as to fraudulent communications or perjured testimony:

To accomplish these objectives, the privilege is “an ‘absolute’ privilege, and it bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution.” (Citation omitted.) The litigation privilege has been applied in “numerous cases” involving “fraudulent communication or perjured testimony.” (Citations omitted.)

As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing as to ¶ 17 of the first cause of action. The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to ¶ 17 of the first cause of action.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing as to ¶ 18 of the first cause of action. The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to ¶ 18 of the first cause of action.

19. Defendants KHODDAMI, SWEENEY, COLLINSON, JES and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, have engaged in illegal and unethical staging and commission of vandalism of the 2018 Rolls Royce Ghost, valued at over four-hundred thousand dollars ($400,000.00) at the time of acquisition, so as to falsely, fraudulently, and/or without justification impugne upon Plaintiff HEIDARI the crime of vandalism, so as to defraud Plaintiff HEIDARI of the benefits afforded by the insurance as to the same, as well as to call into doubt both professionally and privately the ethical, moral, and properiaty of Plaintiff HEIDARI’s character as a physician, mother, wife, and person, in an effort to diminish and demean and civilly harass Plaintiff HEIDARI through the aforementioned oppressive and criminal conduct.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing as to ¶ 19 of the first cause of action. The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to ¶ 19 of the first cause of action.

e. “Congratulations, whoever did it did it well [referring to the vandalism of

the Ghost]. Glad you always chose best people to deliver best damage…Can’t wait to hear new stories.”

Here, the litigation privilege would not apply, because these alleged statements are not “a useful step in the litigation process [which] serve its purposes.” (Sipple v. Found. for Nat. Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 241.)

However, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence which demonstrates that the alleged comments Defendant made to her rose to the level of harassment as defined in Civ. Proc. Code, § 527.6(b) to mean “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.”

As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing as to ¶ 20 of the first cause of action. The special motion to strike is GRANTED as to ¶ 20 of the first cause of action.

Because all substantive allegations in the first cause of action have been stricken, there are no acts remaining to support the first cause of action. The special motion to strike the entire first cause of action is GRANTED as to moving Defendant Khoddami.

[L]ibel, [is] defined as: “[A] false and unprivileged publication by writing … which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which … has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” (Civ. Code, § 45; see id., §§ 44, subd. (a), 45a.) To prevail on a claim for libel, plaintiff must show four elements: that defendants published the statements; that the statements were about plaintiff; that they were false; and that defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity. (CACI No. 1704.)

to disgrace and injured her in her occupation and livelihood. These statements were made negligently, intentionally, and/or with reckless disregard and malice for the impact that they had.

As discussed above, Defendant reported Plaintiff’s alleged criminal conduct to the police[6], and he made statements in connection with issues under consideration by a court in the divorce proceedings. For the reasons discussed above, these statements come within the litigation privilege, which bars this cause of action.

The special motion to strike the second cause of action is GRANTED as to moving Defendant Khoddami.

The defamation—libel per se cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

38. These statements are objectively and patently defamatory in nature, requiring no further showing of explanatory matter, innuendo, or other extrinsic fact pursuant to California Civil Code § 45a.

As discussed above, Defendant reported Plaintiff’s alleged criminal conduct to the police[7], and he made statements in connection with issues under consideration by a court in the divorce proceedings. For the reasons discussed above, these statements come within the litigation privilege, which bars this cause of action.

The special motion to strike the third cause of action is GRANTED as to moving Defendant Khoddami.

The defamation—slander cause of action is based upon the following allegations:

As discussed above, Defendant reported Plaintiff’s alleged criminal conduct to the police[8], and he made statements in connection with issues under consideration by a court in the divorce proceedings. For the reasons discussed above, these statements come within the litigation privilege, which bars this cause of action.

The special motion to strike the fourth cause of action is GRANTED as to moving Defendant Khoddami.

This cause of action is based upon the alleged derogatory, defamatory and demeaning slurs about Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 57.) This cause of action fails as a matter of law:

Ordinarily mere insulting language, without more, does not constitute outrageous conduct. The Restatement view is that liability "does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities . . . . There is no occasion for the law to intervene . . . where some one's feelings are hurt." (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d.) Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. (Citations omitted.)

(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 155 [bold emphasis added].)

The special motion to strike the fifth cause of action is GRANTED as to moving Defendant Khoddami.

This cause of action fails because there is no allegation that Plaintiff was threatened with physical injury:

[B]ecause the [*156] only injury Wilson claimed in her lawsuit was emotional distress, she was required to show that Edison's breach threatened physical injury to her. (See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984–985 [25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 863 P.2d 795] (Potter) [“[T]here is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.] The tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element. [Citations.] That duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.”].) “[U]nless the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant's breach of some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty. Even then, with rare exceptions, a breach of the duty must threaten physical injury, not simply damage to property or financial interests.” (Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 985.) Thus, at the very least, there could not have been a breach of duty during the period when no shocks were felt on the property.

(Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 155-156.)

The special motion to strike the sixth cause of action is GRANTED as to moving Defendant Khoddami.

To prove a claim for civil conspiracy, Kidron was required to provide substantial evidence of three elements: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct. As is well established, civil conspiracy is not an independent tort. (Citation omitted.) Rather, civil conspiracy is a "legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration. [Citation.]" ( Id., at pp. 510-511.) As Witkin explains, "If [the plaintiff] can show that each [of several defendants] committed a wrongful act or some part of it, e.g., that each made false representations, he has no need of averments of conspiracy. But if A alone made representations, the plaintiff can hold B and C liable with A only by alleging and proving that A acted pursuant to an agreement (conspiracy) with B and C to defraud." (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 869, p. 311.)

[*1582] Accordingly, "[ t]he basis of a civil conspiracy is the formation of a group of two or more persons who have agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious act." (Citations omitted.) The conspiring defendants must also have actual knowledge that a tort is planned and concur in the tortious scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose. (Citations omitted.)

However, actual knowledge of the planned tort, without more, is insufficient to serve as the basis for a conspiracy claim. Knowledge of the planned tort must be combined with intent to aid in its commission. " The sine qua non of a conspiratorial agreement is the knowledge on the part of the alleged conspirators of its unlawful objective and their intent to aid in achieving that objective." (Citations omitted.) "This rule derives from the principle that a person is generally under no duty to take affirmative action to aid or protect others." (1 Levy et al., Cal. Torts, supra, Civil Conspiracy, § 9.03[2], p. 9-13.)

While knowledge and intent "may be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstance (Citation omitted), " '[c]onspiracies cannot be established by suspicions. There must be some evidence. Mere association does not make a conspiracy. There must be evidence of some participation or interest in the commission of the offense.' " (Citation omitted.) An inference must flow logically from other facts established in the action. (Citation omitted.)

In opposing an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations of the complaint, but must produce evidence that would be admissible at trial. (Citation omitted.) Thus, declarations may not be based upon “information and belief” (citation omitted) and documents submitted without the proper foundation are not to be considered. (Citation omitted.)

While plaintiff's burden may not be “high,” he must demonstrate that his claim is legally sufficient. (Citation omitted.) And he must show that it is supported by a sufficient prima facie showing, one made with “competent and admissible evidence.” (Citations omitted.) Plaintiff's demonstration does not measure up.

(Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 468-69.)

Here, Plaintiff did not submit any evidence to support the formation of a conspiracy, which was Plaintiffs burden, not Defendant’s. As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on this conspiracy claim.

The special motion to strike the seventh cause of action is GRANTED as to moving Defendant Khoddami.

Defendant Sean Collinson also brings an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Complaint. Given the Court’s extensive analysis above re: Defendant Khoddami’s special motion to strike, the Court addresses defendant Collinson’s motion in a more summarized manner.

To the extent that Collinson is alleged to have conspired with Defendant Khoddami to accomplish the acts which Defendant Khoddami allegedly committed (see, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 15, 28, 29, 31, 36, 37, 39, 45 – 52, 57, 58, 64 – 68, 71 - 75, 78 - 79) the above analysis regarding Khoddami’s special motion to strike applies. Because the Court found that all causes of action asserted against Khoddami are subject to being stricken, to the extent Collinson is alleged to have conspired with Khoddami to commit such acts, all such causes of action are subject to being stricken.

12. Plaintiff is informed and believed and thereupon alleges that at all relevant times herein, Defendants SWEENEY, COLLINSON, and JES were engaged in conduct, activities, and/or practices amounting to the unauthorized practice of law, wherein Defendant COLLISON was employed, enlisted, hired, assigned, or otherwise supported by Defendants SWEENEY and JES, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and each of them, in the unauthorized practice of law, illegal witness tampering, improper and illegal unlawful recordings, the coercion of third parties to engage in other unlawful practices, and also further engage in the intentional and malicious vandalism of a 2018 Rolls Royce Ghost, so as to falsely implicate Plaintiff HEIDARI in the same.

Thus, the Complaint alleges that Collinson conspired with Defendants Sweeney and Collins to engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The Court must examine the underlying conduct to see if what Plaintiff alleges was the unauthorized practice of law is activity which is subject to being stricken pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code, § 425.16. “In determining the acts on which the causes of action against Thiel and Mowat are based, we focus on the tortious acts in which they are alleged to have conspired. . . .” (Spencer v. Mowat (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1040.)

Defendant Collinson submits a Declaration whereby he states that he is a mediator specializing in family disputes and conflicts. (Declaration of Sean Collinson, ¶ 4.) Collinson represents that Defendant Khoddami was referred to Collinson through a third-party to whom he had previously provided mediation services. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Although Collinson and Khoddami discussed his marriage to Plaintiff, Khoddami did not retain Collinson to mediate any issues with his wife. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7.) Collinson thereafter referred him to attorney Defendant Sweeney in March 2022. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

Collinson indicates that he undertook the following actions pertaining to the divorce proceeding:

l0. On or about July 7, 2022, Khoddami contacted me and represented that a third party named Rafael Jiminez ("Jiminez") contacted him the previous night and represented that Plaintiff Heidari hired him (Jiminez) to follow Khoddami in Mexico and plant drugs in his car.

11. I met Khoddami that day and accompanied him while he reported to a police officer what Jiminez allegedly told him about Plaintiff Heidari.

a. I went with Khoddami on behalf of Defendant Sweeney's law firm, as she could not attend that morning.

b. I was not there in the capacity of his attorney. Although, when the officer asked if I was his attorney, I apparently stated something to the effect of, "yeah yeah, I'm with his law firm." I never intended or implied that I was an attorney, only that I was just trying to let the officer know I was there on behalf of his firm.

c. I have never provided legal advice to Khoddami as his attorney. To the contrary, the reason I referred him to Defendant Sweeney is precisely because I am aware that I am not, and do possess the skills of, an attorney.

12. On or about August 3, 2022, Khoddami's filed a Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order against Neda Heidari (DVRO). (See concurrently filed Request for Judicial Notice, "RJN," No. 3.)

a. The hearing was scheduled for August 30, 2022, but was continued to October 11, 2022 and subsequently it was heard on December 21 and December 22, 2022 and February 14, 21, and 28 of 2023. I accompanied Ms. Sweeney to court on August 30, and the hearings above that followed as her legal assistant.

13. I did speak with Jimemez around seven (7) times, although that was always after he reached out to me. I encouraged him to report his claims about Plaintiff Heidari to the police.

14. On or about early October 2022, I provided some assistance to Defendant Sweeney in locating a process server. Specifically, I referred to her Alfred Profett, a registered process server to serve Heidari Law Firm with a Subpoena for Personal Appearance to Mr. Sam Heidari, who was potentially a witness to the allegations in the Divorce Proceedings. It is my understanding service was effectuated on October 7, 2022.

15. Lastly, I testified on December 22, 2022, at a DVRO hearing. Among other things, I testified that: I met Khoddami regarding his marriage; that I referred him to Sweeney; that I accompanied him to the police regarding Jiminez; that I spoke to Jiminez on the phone perhaps seven times; and that I did not pay, or offer money to, Jimemez to testify against Heidari. (A true and correct copy of the relevant pages of my testimony is attached hereto as Exhibit I to the concurrently filed Declaration of Ellie Sweeney, see pp 251:18-256:19, pp. 256:22 258:18, pp.)

The foregoing evidence shows that Defendant Collinson engaged in protected activity in accompanying Khoddami to speak to the police, and testifying at a DVRO hearing. “The law is that communications to the police are within SLAPP. (Citations omitted.)” (Comstock, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 941.) And statements made at a court hearing obviously are within the scope of Civ. Proc. Code, § 425.16(e)(1)(any written or oral statement or writing made before a judicial proceeding).

Although case law has held that filing false police reports is not protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statutes, this applies only where the police report is conceded to be false, which is not the case here:

Plaintiff's reliance on Lefebvre, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 696 is misplaced. In that case, the wife conceded that her report to the police was both false and illegal. Here, defendants deny that any report they made to the police was false or illegal. Thus, this case is controlled by the case law holding that when allegations of making false reports are controverted, they are insufficient to render that alleged conduct unlawful as a matter of law and outside the protection of section 425.16. (Citations omitted.)

(Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 967 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

To the extent that the first through eighth causes of action is expressly based upon the alleged unauthorized practice of law or alleged witness tampering by Collinson, as discussed above, his alleged statements to the police and the court (Complaint, ¶¶ 17, 18, 19, 21, 28, 29, 30, 36, 37, 39, 40, 45, 46, 51, 57, 64 – 67, 71 – 75, 79, 80) are subject to being stricken.

Notably, even procuring false testimony or offering false evidence in a judicial proceeding is subject to being stricken pursuant to the Civ. Proc. Code, § 425.16:

Paragraph 31(o) alleges that Smith breached his fiduciary duties by “willfully conspiring with Newlin to have both of them testify falsely in depositions in the Partnership Case.”

Smith's purported oral statements to Newlin (and their attorney, Brunwasser) about how to testify in upcoming depositions in a pending lawsuit constitute statements made in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)). (See Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1478 [74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1] [“ ‘statements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute …’ ”].) The alleged activity therefore falls within the scope of the SLAPP statute.

HAFCI argues that the SLAPP statute does not protect the act of agreeing to lie in a deposition. HAFCI cites no legal authority for this proposition, but the argument appears to be that such conduct is not protected by the federal Constitution. HAFCI further asserts that false testimony does not constitute the “valid exercise” of the constitutional right of free speech to which the Legislature referred in section 425.16, subdivision (a).

HAFCI's argument is unpersuasive. To make their threshold showing under the first prong of the SLAPP analysis, appellants need not prove that the targeted activity is in fact constitutionally protected. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94–95 [124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 52 P.3d 703] [“ ‘The Legislature did not intend that … to invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first establish her actions are constitutionally protected under the First Amend. as a matter of law.’ ”]; Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. [*1549] Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 305 [106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906] [lawsuit was not outside scope of SLAPP statute even though defendant had no 1st Amend. right to disclose privileged and confidential information or refuse to return materials to their rightful owner].) Appellants need only show that the activity falls within the scope of section 425.16, subdivision (e), by which the Legislature has set forth the parameters of activity subject to the SLAPP protections. (Schaffer, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1001–1004.) As discussed ante, the allegations of paragraph 31(o) fall within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).

Similarly, section 425.16, subdivision (a) does not limit the SLAPP scheme to activity that itself constitutes a “valid exercise” of the constitutional right of free speech or petition. Section 425.16, subdivision (a) reads in pertinent part: “The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” (Italics added.) In order to curb such lawsuits and their chilling effect, the Legislature has required early scrutiny of causes of action arising from activity identified in section 425.16, subdivision (e). Appellants have established that paragraph 31(o) alleges activity within the scope of that subdivision.

(Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1548-49.)

As such, the first through eighth causes of action are subject to being stricken pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code, § 425.16. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing as to these causes of action on the second prong,

18. I did not hire, coordinate with, or influence Rafael Jiminez to do anything with respect to Plaintiff Heidari. I did not pay him, or direct him, or agree with him, to do anything. I did not pay him, or direct him, or agree with him to alter any evidence. I had no relationship or knowledge of him until Defendant Khoddami informed me that Rafael reached out to him on about 6 July 5, 2022.

19. I did not alter evidence on my own or with anyone else. With respect to the recording discussed in ¶ 29(f) of concurrently filed Declaration of Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney, I did not alter any aspect of it.

20. I did not pay, or direct, or agree with, anyone to vandalize the Rolls Royce or stage its vandalism.

21. I never agreed to be part of a civil conspiracy with anyone to harass, defame, or injure (either reputationally, socially, economically, personally, legally, or otherwise) Plaintiff Heidari.

22. I deny that I did any illegal act alleged in Plaintiff Heidari's Complaint.

23. I never worked with Jelisaveta Ellie Sweeney or her firm on anything concerning Plaintiff Heidari except for the Divorce Proceedings.

24. In addition to the actions I took in connection with the Divorce Proceedings on behalf of Sweeney's law firm or at the request of Khoddami, I have performed contract work for Sweeney and her law firm from time to time as a legal assistant. But I have not ever worked as an attorney or engaged in unauthorized practice of law.

Plaintiff argues that, on April 8, 2022, Defendants Sweeney (an attorney), Collinson (not an attorney), and Khoddami entered into an arrangement whereby Defendant Khoddami paid Defendants Sweeney and Collinson $10,000 – $7,500 to Sweeney, and $2,500 to Collinson – to engage him in a systematic scheme to denigrate, demean, and devalue Plaintiff Heidari and otherwise tarnish her reputation. (Cassandra Decl., ¶ 4 – Exhibit A – American Express Statement.)

Plaintiff argues that this occurred less than one week following Defendant Khoddami’s instituting divorce proceedings against Plaintiff Heidari. By his own admission, Defendant Collinson claims to “work with” Defendant Sweeney. (Cassandra Decl., ¶ 5 – Exhibit B – December 22, 2022 Court Transcript; 269:23-24.)

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Collinson, in concert with his Co-Conspirators Defendant Khoddami and Defendant Sweeney, has caused to be set forth a narrative regarding Plaintiff Heidari inconsistent with the truth. (Cassandra Decl., ¶ 6 – Exhibit C – 01:14 through 06:30.)

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant Collinson also engaged in the use of Rafael Jiminez to testify on his behalf, only to make it appear as though it was all his wife’s doing in conversations with the police. (Id., Exhibit C – 6:30 through 10:00; Exhibit E – Police Report.)

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Collinson, at the direction of Defendant Sweeney, in an effort to harm Plaintiff Heidari, tampered with the testimony of Rafael Jiminez and further facilitated his potential waiver of his Fifth Amendment right against Self-Incrimination. (Cassandra Decl., ¶ Exhibit D – 96:16-18; 96:25-28; 97:13 – 98:9.).

Plaintiff argues Defendant Collinson is also presently under investigation by the State Bar of California, in connection with an investigation looking into Defendant Sweeney, as well, regarding their respective conduct both individually as well as in relation to one another. (Cassandra Decl., ¶ 8 – Exhibit F – State Bar Investigation 23-O-10884; ¶ 9 – Exhibit G –State Bar Investigation 22- NA-16692.)

The Court notes that, because Defendant Collinson does not admit to engaging in any illegal act, absent evidence conclusively establishing illegal activity, the conduct may still be protected under Civ. Proc. Code, § 425.16:

[O]nce the defendant has made the required threshold showing that the challenged action arises from assertedly protected activity, the plaintiff may counter by demonstrating that the underlying action was [*287] illegal as a matter of law because either the defendant concedes the illegality of the assertedly protected activity or the illegality is conclusively established by the evidence presented in connection with the motion to strike. In doing so, the plaintiff must identify with particularity the statute or statutes violated by the filing and maintenance of the underlying action. (See Paul, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1360–1361.) This requirement of identifying a specific statute, violation of which the plaintiff contends is illegal as a matter of law, is consistent with the narrow nature of the exemption set forth in section 425.18, subdivision (h) because it prevents a plaintiff from advancing a generalized claim that a defendant's conduct was illegal and therefore subject to the exemption. In this same vein, the requirement of specificity provides notice to both the defendant and the court about the particular statute or statutes the defendant is alleged to have violated as a matter of law so as to allow the defendant to intelligibly respond to, and the court to assess, the claim. Additionally, as part of the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating illegality as a matter of law, the plaintiff must show the specific manner in which the statute or statutes were violated with reference to their elements. A generalized assertion that a particular statute was violated by the filing or maintenance of the underlying action without a particularized showing of the violation will be insufficient to demonstrate illegality as a matter of law.

(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 260, 286-287 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

Plaintiff argues that the exception for dissolution proceedings in Civil Code, § 47(b)(1) makes the litigation privilege inapplicable here. § 47(b)(1) provides:

(b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows:

(1) An allegation or averment contained in any pleading or affidavit filed in an action for marital dissolution or legal separation made of or concerning a person by or against whom no affirmative relief is prayed in the action shall not be a privileged publication or broadcast as to the person making the allegation or averment within the meaning of this section unless the pleading is verified or affidavit sworn to, and is made without malice, by one having reasonable and probable cause for believing the truth of the allegation or averment and unless the allegation or averment is material and relevant to the issues in the action.

Here, the dissolution proceedings involved affirmative relief as to Plaintiff Heidari, so the exception set forth in § 47(b)(1) does not apply, and the litigation privilege does apply. Indeed, Plaintiff does not prove that the pleading or affidavit was not verified or sworn to, was made with malice, was made without reasonable and probable cause, or that the allegation/averment was not material and relevant to the issues on the action. (Civil Code, § 47(b)(1).)

In this regard, Plaintiff has not present evidence which would place the alleged conduct in which Defendant Collinson engaged outside the scope of the litigation privilege. As noted above, litigation privilege applies even to fraudulent communication or perjured testimony.

“The principal purpose of [Civil Code] section [47, subdivision (b)] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 213 [266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d [*322] 365].) Additionally, the privilege promotes effective judicial proceedings by encouraging “ ‘open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence’ ” without the external threat of liability (ibid.), and “by encouraging attorneys to zealously protect their clients' interests.” (Id. at p. 214.) “Finally, in immunizing participants from liability for torts arising from communications made during judicial proceedings, the law places upon litigants the burden of exposing during trial the bias of witnesses and the falsity of evidence, thereby enhancing the finality of judgments and avoiding an unending roundelay of litigation, an evil far worse than an occasional unfair result.” (Ibid.)

To accomplish these objectives, the privilege is “an ‘absolute’ privilege, and it bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360 [7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 81 P.3d 244].) The litigation privilege has been applied in “numerous cases” involving “fraudulent communication or perjured testimony.” (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 218; see, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 17, 20, 22–26 [116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 583] [attorney's misrepresentation of available insurance policy limits to induce the settlement of a lawsuit]; Doctors' Co. Ins. Services v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 1284, 1300 [275 Cal. Rptr. 674] [subornation of perjury]; Carden v. Getzoff (1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 907, 915 [235 Cal. Rptr. 698] [perjury]; Steiner v. Eikerling (1986) 181 Cal. App. 3d 639, 642–643 [226 Cal. Rptr. 694] [preparation of a forged will and presentation of it for probate]; O'Neil v. Cunningham (1981) 118 Cal. App. 3d 466, 472–477 [173 Cal. Rptr. 422] [attorney's letter sent in the course of judicial proceedings allegedly defaming his client].) The privilege has also been held to apply to “statements made prior to the filing of a lawsuit.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 361.)

Moreover, as also noted above, reporting suspected criminal activity to the police is protected by the litigation privilege:

As applicable to communications made in a “judicial proceeding” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)), the privilege applies not only to statements made [*121] in the courtroom but also to prelitigation communications made in preparation for anticipated litigation. (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1241, 1251; Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 361.) Similarly, communications made to governmental agencies requesting that the agencies investigate or remedy wrongdoing are absolutely privileged as communications made “in any other official proceeding authorized by law” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)). (Hagberg, supra, at pp. 362–364.)

“[W]hen a citizen contacts law enforcement personnel to report suspected criminal activity and to instigate law enforcement personnel to respond, the communication also enjoys an unqualified privilege under [Civil Code] section 47[,subd. ](b).” (Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 364.) “[T]he broad application of the privilege serves the important public interest of securing open channels of communication between citizens and law enforcement personnel and other public officials charged with investigating and remedying wrongdoing.” (Id. at p. 372.)

The privilege established by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) applies not only to oral and written statements, but also to other communicative conduct. (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1248–1249.) Whether conduct is considered communicative or noncommunicative depends on the gravamen of the cause of action. (Ibid.; Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1058 [39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516, 128 P.3d 713].) The question is whether the conduct allegedly resulting in the plaintiff's injury was essentially communicative in nature. (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1248–1249; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058.) If so, the privilege also “extends to noncommunicative acts that are necessarily related to the communicative conduct.” (Rusheen, supra, at p. 1065.) The privilege does not apply, however, if the gravamen of the action is noncommunicative conduct independent of any privileged communication. (Ibid.)

(Kerner v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 84, 120-21 [bold emphasis added].)

In this regard, even if Defendant Collinson were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, it would come within the litigation privilege because the evidence shows the Collinson only engaged in communicative conduct which comes within the litigation privilege.

Further, Plaintiff did not submit any evidence to support the formation of a conspiracy, which was Plaintiffs burden, not Defendant’s. As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the conspiracy claim.

As such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated with evidence a probability of prevailing on any of the eighth causes of action asserted against Defendant Collinson.

Defendant Collinson’s anti-SLAPP special motion to strike is GRANTED as to the first through eighth causes of action.

[1] Pursuant to a § 425.16 special motion to strike, the Court may strike portions of a pleading, but may not strike “merely incidental” assertions. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393-94.)

[2] The court in Spencer v. Mowat distinguished the rule it enunciated from the holding in Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5^th 394, on the factual ground that it involved a scenario of an attorney allegedly acting in concert with his clients and alleged nothing beyond the provision of routine legal services. (Spencer v. Mowat (2020) 46 Cal.App.5^th 1024, 1039.)

[3] The Complaint refers to “Rafael Jiminez,” while the parties’ briefs refer to “Rafael Jimenez.” It is not clear which of these is the correct spelling. The Court will use the spelling “Jiminez” since the allegations of the Complaint use that spelling.

[4] The deposition transcript attached as Exh. E to the Sweeney Declaration inexplicably does not include page numbers.

[5] “The law is that communications to the police are within SLAPP. (Citations omitted.)” (Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal. App. 4th 931, 941.)

[6]

Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350 [7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 81 P.3d 244], [is] a case in which our Supreme Court held the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), applies to communications made to law enforcement personnel reporting suspected criminal activity. (32 Cal.4th at p. 355.)

(Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 397, overruled in part on other grounds in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.4^th 376, 391.)

[7]

(Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 397, overruled in part on other grounds in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.4^th 376, 391.)

[8]

(Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 397, overruled in part on other grounds in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.4^th 376, 391.)