Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 23STCV12092, Date: 2024-03-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV12092 Hearing Date: March 22, 2024 Dept: 76
Pursuant to California Rule of Court
3.1308(a)(1), the Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed
herein. Counsel must contact the staff
in Department 76 to inform the Court whether they wish to submit on the
tentative, or to argue the matter. As
required by Rule 3.1308(a), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL
OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 of their intent to appear and
argue.
Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to
smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776.
Per Rule of Court 3.1308, if notice of intention to appear is not given, the Court may adopt the tentative ruling as the final ruling.
Plaintiff Paul Reubens (now deceased) alleges that Defendants stole personal property from Plaintiff and have resold such personal property at auctions.
Allison Berry moves for an order substituting in as successor in interest for deceased Plaintiff.
TENTATIVE RULING
Allison Berry’s motion for an order substituting in as successor in interest for deceased Plaintiff is GRANTED.
ANALYSIS
Motion To Substitute In As Successor In Interest
Discussion
Allison Berry moves for an order substituting in as successor in interest for deceased Plaintiff. Berry has submitted a Declaration pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code § 377.32 stating that she is the successor in interest for the deceased plaintiff in this action, Paul Reubens, and provides a certified copy of his death certificate. (Declaration of Allison Berry, ¶ 3; Exh. 1.)
Berry’s Declaration states in full as follows:
I,
Allison Berry, declare and state:
1. I am the successor in interest of the plaintiff in this
action and the decedent, Paul Reubens. As explained further below, I am the
successor in interest in his causes of action and the property subject to this
dispute. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. If called
to testify, I could and would competently testify as to the truth of the facts
set forth herein.
2. Mr. Reubens died on July 30, 2023 at the Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center located at 8700 Beverly Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
90048. A certified copy of Mr. Reubens' death certificate is attached hereto as
Exhibit 1 and incorporated by reference.
3. I am the successor in interest of Mr. Reubens as the
term is defined in Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 377.11, and succeed his interests in
this action. No court has appointed any personal representative for Mr.
Reubens' estate. Mr. Reubens had no probate estate and all of his assets were
put into a trust. He named me as the successor trustee and sole residual
beneficiary of his trust (meaning that I receive all of the non-cash assets in
the trust, including the surviving causes of action). I am also the nominated
executor of his will. Accordingly, all of Mr. Reubens' surviving causes of
action were distributed to me as the successor trustee and sole residual
beneficiary of Mr. Reubens' trust, there was no estate administration, and
there is no final order of distribution to attach hereto pursuant to Cal. Code
Civ. Proc., § 377.32.
4. No proceeding is now pending in California for
administration of the estate of Paul Reubens.
5. No other person has a superior right to commence the
action or be substituted for Mr. Reubens in the pending action.
Civ. Proc. Code § 377.20 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action
for or against a person is not lost by reason of the person's death, but
survives subject to the applicable limitations period.
(b) This section applies even though a loss or damage occurs simultaneously with or after the death of a person who would have been liable if the person's death had not preceded or occurred simultaneously with the loss or damage.
(Civ. Proc. Code, § 337.20.)
Civ. Proc. Code § 377.21 provides that “[a] pending action or proceeding does not abate by the death of a party if the cause of action survives.”
Civ. Proc. Code § 377.31 provides:
On motion after the death of a person who commenced an action or proceeding, the court shall allow a pending action or proceeding that does not abate to be continued by the decedent's personal representative or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest.
(Civ. Proc. Code, § 377.31 [bold emphasis added]).
Here, moving party Berry does not claim to be the decedent’s personal representative, which would require that she be appointed as such by the Probate Court. (Probate Code, § 58; Boyd v. Lancaster (1939) 32 Cal. App. 2d 574, 579; Estate of Wong (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 366, 375 n.3.) As such, Berry must qualify as “decedent’s successor in interest,” which in Civ. Proc. Code § 377.11 as follows:
For the purposes of this chapter, "decedent's successor in interest" means the beneficiary of the decedent's estate or other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action or to a particular item of the property that is the subject of a cause of action.
(Civ. Proc. Code, § 377.11.)
In turn, Civ. Proc. Code, § 377.10 defines “beneficiary of the
decedent’s estate” as follows:
For the purposes of this chapter, "beneficiary of the decedent's
estate" means:
(Civ. Proc. Code, § 377.10(a) [bold emphasis and underlining added].)
Berry admits in her Declaration that decedent died leaving a will. (Berry Decl., ¶ 3.) Moreover, she indicates that she is the sole beneficiary under the decedent’s will.
Berry has demonstrated that she is the sole beneficiary and there are no other trust beneficiaries who would also become successors in interest to causes of action or items of property by operation of law:
Code of
Civil Procedure section 377.11's definition of a successor in interest includes
a successor in interest
to a cause of action or item of property. [Probate Code] Sections 19400
and 19402 establish that the trustee and trust beneficiaries are the
decedent's successors in
interest to trust property for the purposes of claims when there is no personal
representative. Code of Civil Procedure
section 377.40 is therefore consistent with sections 19400 and 19402.
(Spears v. Spears (2023) 97 Cal. App. 5th 1294, 1303 [bold emphasis and
underlining added].)
As such, Berry has demonstrated that she qualifies as decedent’s successor in interest for purposes of this lawsuit.
The motion for an order substituting
in as plaintiff is GRANTED.