Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 23STCV12228, Date: 2025-01-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV12228    Hearing Date: January 15, 2025    Dept: 76

The following tentative ruling is issued pursuant to Rule of Court 3.1308 at 2:24 PM on January 14, 2025. 

Notice of intent to appear is REQUIRED pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1).  The Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein. 

As required by Rule 3.1308(a)(1), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 by 4:00 p.m. on January 14, 2025.

Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776.

Per Rule of Court 3.1308, if notice of intention to appear is not given, oral argument will not be permitted.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has defamed Plaintiff by making false statements to Plaintiff’s relatives to encourage them to file a lawsuit against him regarding misappropriation/mismanagement of trust assets.

Defendant Leticia Roa Saguanpong moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Leticia Roa Saguanpong’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Complaint is GRANTED without leave to amend as to the first through third causes of action. The Complaint is ordered dismissed with prejudice.

ANALYSIS

Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings

Meet and Confer

            The Declaration of Defendant Leticia Roa Saguanpong reflects that she satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 439.

Discussion

On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the same rules applicable on demurrer apply. (County of Orange v. Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 21, 32-33.)

Defendant Leticia Roa Saguanpong moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the Complaint as follows:

1.         First Cause of Action (Slander Per Se).

            A.        Re: Litigation Privilege.

            Defendant argues that the litigation privilege bars this cause of action, as it is based on communications and statements possibly made by Defendant in the course and scope of an investigation during ongoing litigation of the Trust case. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are thus entirely predicated on Defendant’s internal communications amongst Plaintiff’s relatives and their attorney regarding Defendant’s observations while acting as Plaintiff’s caregiver. Defendant argues that stating observations or reports of suspected criminal activities are absolutely privileged and may not serve as predicates for tort claims, except malicious prosecution.

            Plaintiff argues that at the time of the alleged statements, Fierstadt’s prior petition had been dismissed under the five year rule pursuant to a motion made in May 2022, and there was no other petition threatened in any form by Fierstadt against Lance Mann until March 2023, when the present petition was filed by Fierstadt without prior discussion, threat or notice. Plaintiff argues that Defendant defamed Plaintiff by making the misrepresentations after the 2018 petition of the four siblings was dismissed in early fall of 2022, and before the filed a new petition based on the misrepresentations of Movant in fall of 2022 and early 2023, presumably to infuse the situation with bad blood and get the litigation going again.

            Here, the Complaint expressly alleges that the statements which Defendant Leticia Roa Saguanpong, referred to in the Complaint as “Letty” made to Plaintiff’s niece Joy Mann, referred to in the Complaint as “Joy,” were for the purpose of encouraging Joy to start new litigation against Plaintiff, and which successfully caused Joy and her brothers to file a new petition against Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶¶ 7 – 36.) These alleged statements made to encourage litigation are protected by the litigation privilege, even though they are alleged to have been known to be false and even if made with malice:

The litigation privilege “precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding.” (Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1172 [131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478].) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies “to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 [266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365] (Silberg).) Silberg emphasizes that, to be protected by the litigation privilege, a communication must be “in furtherance of the objects of the litigation.” (Id. at p. 219.) This is “part of the requirement that the communication be connected with, or have some logical relation to, the action, i.e., that it not be extraneous to the action.” (Id. at pp. 219–220.)

“Many cases have explained that [Civil Code] section 47(b) encompasses not only testimony in court and statements made in pleadings, but also statements made prior to the filing of a lawsuit, whether in preparation for [*608]  anticipated litigation or to investigate the feasibility of filing a lawsuit.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 361 [7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 81 P.3d 244].) “A prelitigation communication is privileged only when it relates to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.” (Citations omitted.)

      (Kettler v. Gould (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 593, 607-608 [bold emphasis added].)

The litigation privilege applies “to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Citation omitted.) “This privilege is absolute in nature, applying ‘to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.’ [Citation.]” (Citation omitted..) “‘Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it. [Citation.]’” (Citation omitted.)

(Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 415 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

The litigation privilege is absolute; it applies, if at all, regardless whether the communication was made with malice or the intent to harm. (Citation omitted.) Put another way, application of the privilege does not depend on the publisher’s “motives, morals, ethics or intent.” (Citation omitted.) Although originally applied only to defamation actions, the privilege has been extended to any communication, not just a publication, having “some relation” to a judicial proceeding, and to all torts other than malicious prosecution. ( Citations omitted.) . . .

If there is no dispute as to the operative facts, the applicability of the litigation privilege is a question of law. (Citation omitted.) Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it. (Citation omitted.)

(Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

            This cause of action is based on the foregoing alleged statements. As such, the allegations against Defendant which form the basis of this cause of action are barred by the litigation privilege.

            The motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED without leave to amend as to the first cause of action, unless Plaintiff can demonstrate a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.

            B.        Re: Common Interest Privilege.

            Defendant argues that communications between Plaintiff’s relatives and any person acting in an assistant/caregiver capacity for Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff’s overall health and the 

inner workings of the Trust assets for which Plaintiff’s relatives are beneficiaries fall squarely  within the common interest privilege codified in Civil Code §47(c). Moreover, Defendant argues, Plaintiff cannot show that any statements were made with malice to defeat the qualified privilege.

            Plaintiff argues that this privilege is inapplicable because Defendant has stated that she has no interest in the trust at issue, and was not a party to the now-dismissed probate action, and thus she has no common interest.

            Based on the ruling on the litigation privilege, above at 1.A., the Court does not address this argument.

            C.        Re: Failure to State Prima Facie Case.

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not pled that he has been charged with a crime or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for a crime, that Defendant has imputed him with the present existence of an infectious, contagious or loathsome disease, that he has been injured with respect to his office, profession, trade or business, or imputes to him importance or a want of chastity.

            Plaintiff argues that the statements may injure him in his office as trustee of a trust, that he managed with his mother and then took over after she died.

            Based on the ruling on the litigation privilege, above at 1.A., the Court does not address this argument.

2.         Second Cause of Action (Libel Per Se).

            A.        Re: Litigation Privilege.

            Defendant argues that the litigation privilege bars this cause of action. See argument above at 1.A.

            This cause of action is based on the foregoing alleged statements. As such, the allegations against Defendant which form the basis of this cause of action are barred by the litigation privilege.

            The motion for judgment on the pleading is GRANTED without leave to amend as to the second cause of action, unless Plaintiff can demonstrate a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.

            B.        Re: Common Interest Privilege.

See argument above at 1.B.

            Based on the ruling on the litigation privilege, above at 2.A., the Court does not address this argument.

            C.        Re: Failure to State Prima Facie Case.

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot plead a prima facie case of libel per se because Defendant did not publish any writing, printing, picture, effigy or other fixed representation.

            Based on the ruling on the litigation privilege, above at 2.A., the Court does not address this argument.

3.         Third Cause of Action (Abuse of Process).

            A.        Re: Litigation Privilege.

            Defendant argues that the litigation privilege bars this cause of action. See argument above at 1.A.

This cause of action is based on the foregoing statements made to Joy and her counsel. (Complaint, ¶ 52.) The litigation privilege applies to an abuse of process claim. (JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522.)

            The motion for judgment on the pleading is GRANTED without leave to amend as to the third cause of action, unless Plaintiff can demonstrate a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.

            B.        Re: Common Interest Privilege.

See argument above at 1.B.

            Based on the ruling on the litigation privilege, above at 3.A., the Court does not address this argument.

            C.        Re: Failure to State Prima Facie Case.

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot plead a prima facie case of abuse of process because she is not a party to the underlying Trust matter, and has nothing to gain in that litigation.

            Plaintiff argues that a defendant can commit the tort by knowingly facilitating or encouraging the filing of a false claim. The fact that the claim is false both obviates protection of the litigation privilege and in any case, the truth or falsity of the defense is not provable on the face of the complaint.

            Based on the ruling on the litigation privilege, above at 3.A., the Court does not address this argument.

            Based on the foregoing ruling, the Complaint is ordered dismissed with prejudice.