Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 23STCV21314, Date: 2024-10-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV21314 Hearing Date: October 4, 2024 Dept: 76
Defendant Mass Automotive Group LLC
moves to compel arbitration and stay or dismiss proceedings.
Existence of Agreement To
Arbitrate
Under California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1343; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.) A party petitioning to compel arbitration has the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence any fact necessary to its defense. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356.) The court may weigh the evidence by considering affidavits, declarations, documents and oral testimony. (Id. at 357.)
Defendant submits two arbitration agreements to which Plaintiff purportedly agreed: one which Plaintiff purportedly signed with a wet ink signature (Declaration of Adriana Ayala, Exh. A)—which Plaintiff claims is not his; the other, Defendant claims Plaintiff electronically signed (Ayala Decl., Exh. B), which Plaintiff says he does not remember signing.
If an employee denies signing, or even indicates a failure to recall electronically signing the agreement, the moving party has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the electronic signature is authentic. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846.)
An employer may do this by explaining how the employees name could only have been placed on the arbitration agreement by a person using the employee’s unique login ID and password, that the date and time of the signature is accurately reflected next to the electronic signature, that all employees were required to use their unique login ID and password when they logged into the HR system and signed electronic forms and agreements, and thus, the electronic signature on the arbitration agreement was apparently made by the employee. (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 844.)
Civil Code section 1633.9 addresses how a proponent of an electronic signature may authenticate the signature—that is, show the signature is, in fact, the signature of the person the proponent claims it is. The statute states: “(a) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a), italics added.)
(Id.
at 843.)
Indeed, Main did not explain that
an electronic signature in the name of “Ernesto Zamora Ruiz” could only have
been placed on the 2011 agreement (i.e., on the employee acknowledgement form)
by a person using Ruiz's “unique login ID and password”; that the date and time
printed next to the electronic signature indicated the date and time the
electronic signature was made; that all Moss Bros. employees were required to
use their unique login ID and password when they logged into the HR system and
signed electronic forms and agreements; and the electronic signature on the
2011 agreement was, therefore, apparently made by Ruiz on September 21, 2011,
at 11:47 a.m. Rather than offer this or any other explanation of how she
inferred the electronic signature on the 2011 agreement was the act of
Ruiz, Main only offered her unsupported assertion that Ruiz was the person who
electronically signed the 2011 agreement. In the face of Ruiz's failure to
recall electronically signing the 2011 agreement, the fact the 2011 agreement
had an electronic signature on it in the name of Ruiz, and a date and time
stamp for the signature, was insufficient to support a finding that the
electronic signature was, in fact, “the act of” Ruiz. (Civ. Code, § 1633.9,
subd. (a).) For the same reason, the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding that the electronic signature was what Moss Bros. claimed it was: the
electronic signature of Ruiz. (Evid. Code, § 1400, item (a).) This was not a
difficult evidentiary burden to meet, but it was not met here.
Moss Bros. maintains that if
Ruiz “were to have his way, the evidentiary burden of enforcing an
electronically signed contract would be so much higher than hand-signed
contracts that the practical result would be to disfavor, discourage, and
ultimately disapprove of the use of electronic signatures.” We disagree. As
indicated, the burden of authenticating an electronic signature is not great.
(Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a) [an
electronic [*845] signature is attributable to a person
if it is the act of the person, and this may be shown in any
manner]; Evid. Code, § 1400, item (a); People v. Skiles, supra,
51 Cal.4th at p. 1187 [the means of authenticating a writing are not
limited to those specified in the Evid. Code; a writing can be authenticated by
circumstantial evidence and by its contents]; Newton v. American Debt
Services, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 854 F.Supp.2d 712, 731–732 [electronic
signature on arbitration agreement proved to be the plaintiff's signature
because it was made using DocuSign, a company used to electronically sign
documents in compliance with the federal Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.), and the process DocuSign
used to verify the plaintiff's electronic signature was explained].)
(Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 844-45.)
Given the Court’s ruling on the evidentiary objections, the Ayala Declaration does not sufficiently authenticate Plaintiff’s electronic signature, and he does not recall having electronically signed the arbitration agreement attached as Exhibit B to the Ayala Declaration. (Declaration of Cesar Luna, ¶ 4.) Further, Plaintiff claims the wet ink signature on Exhibit A to the Ayala Declaration is not his. (Luna Decl., ¶ 5.)
The Court will give Defendant an opportunity to authenticate either or both of Plaintiff’s purported signatures on Exhs. A & B to the Ayala Declaration. The hearing is CONTINUED to November 18, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. Defendant’s supplemental brief and evidence is due by October 21, 2024. Plaintiff’s supplemental opposition and evidence is due by November 4, 2024. Defendant’s supplemental reply is due November 11, 2024.