Judge Christopher K. Lui, Case Number: 23STCV29504, Date: 2025-02-25 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated after requesting accommodations for her physical disability, as instructed by her doctor.

Plaintiff moves to quash or modify Defendant’s subpoenas for production of employment records served upon JetBlue Airways Corporation.

The hearing on the motion to quash or modify the deposition subpoena is CONTINUED to April 11, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. Defendant is to file an opposing separate statement per the Court’s instructions by March 14, 2025. Plaintiff may file a reply separate statement by March 28, 2025.

Plaintiff moves to quash or modify Defendant’s subpoenas for production of employment records served upon JetBlue Airways Corporation.

(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

There is no meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 1987.1.

However, case law has imposed the “good cause” requirement for subpoena document requests propounded upon non-parties, that is, the propounding party must articulate specific facts relating to each category of materials sought to justify production:

In the course of the litigation, Thiem served a subpoena under section 2020 on Calcor's custodian of records demanding Calcor, a nonparty and Thiem's competitor, to, in effect, produce all materials in its possession relating to gun mounts, going back nearly 10 years. The subpoena fails to identify any specific document but merely describes broad categories of documents and other materials.

Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. . . . [Former] Section 2031, subdivision (l), which applies to document production requests served on a party, requires a [*224] party seeking to compel such production to "set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand . . . ." (Italics in original.) Section 2020, the statute at issue, contains no such specific requirement. However, since both sections are part of a single statutory scheme, and since it is unlikely the Legislature intended to place greater burdens on a nonparty than on a party to the litigation, we read a similar requirement into the latter section.

Even were we to ignore that the statements purporting to justify an order compelling Calcor to produce its documents and other materials are unverified, they still fail. There is an absence of specific facts relating to each category of materials sought to be produced; the justifications offered for the production are mere generalities. The very vice of the subpoena's promiscuity is well illustrated by Thiem's inability to provide focused, fact-specific justifications for its demands. The noted generality of the subpoena's definitions, instructions and categories which merely add up to a demand Calcor produce everything in its possession having anything to do with gun mounts, precludes Thiem from demonstrating any particular item or category in fact constitutes or contains matter which "is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (§ 2017, subd. (a).) The purported justification for imposing this great burden on Calcor necessarily suffers from the same generality as the subpoena itself.

Although appellate courts have frequently stated "fishing expeditions" are permissible in discovery, there is a limit. As noted in Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1539 [39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896], "These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery ( Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 785, 790), and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases." (Id. at p. 1546.) However, early in the development of our discovery law our Supreme Court recognized the limits on such "fishing expeditions." In [*225] Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355 [15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266], the seminal case in California civil discovery, the court gave examples of improper "fishing" WHICH CLEARLY APPLY HERE: "The method of 'fishing' may be, in a particular case, entirely improper (i.e., insufficient identification of the requested information to acquaint the other party with the nature of information desired, attempt to place the burden and cost of supplying information equally available to both solely upon the adversary, placing more burden upon the adversary than the value of the information warrants, etc.). Such improper methods of 'fishing' may be (and should be) controlled by the trial court under the powers granted to it by the statute." ( Id. at pp. 384-385.) The concerns for avoiding undue burdens on the "adversary" in the litigation expressed in Greyhound apply with even more weight to a nonparty.

Had the Greyhound court been able to anticipate the tremendous burdens promiscuous discovery has placed on litigants and nonparties alike, it might well have taken a stronger stand against such "fishing." Greyhound's optimism in noting the then new discovery system would be "simple, convenient and inexpensive," would "expedite litigation," and "expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial," has certainly proven to have been considerably off the mark. (56 Cal. 2d at p. 376.)

The issues in this litigation may essentially be reduced to the question whether Thiem's work met Delco's specifications. This may be determined without any reference to the contract between Delco and Calcor or the specifications which are part of that contract. Another issue which may exist is whether Delco may recover the excess of the cost of the gun mounts procured from Calcor as damages for "cover" under California Uniform Commercial Code section 2712. (See Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Assn. of Seventh Day Adventists (1971) 14 Cal. App. 3d 209, 217-218 [92 Cal. Rptr. 111].) If so, differences in specifications issued to Thiem and to Calcor may be relevant. However, discovery by Thiem from Delco should normally provide it with this evidence. As between parties to litigation and nonparties, the burden of discovery should be placed on the latter only if the former do not possess the material sought to be discovered. An exception to this may exist where a showing is made the material obtained from the party is unreliable and may be subject to impeachment by material in possession of the nonparty. Thiem has not even attempted to demonstrate why it cannot obtain the needed materials from Delco or why such materials might be unreliable.

(Calcor Space Facility, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 224-25 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

In the separate statement, Plaintiff seeks to quash the following categories of documents sought in Defendant’s subpoena (Exh. B.):

1. All DOCUMENTS pertaining to Tamara Jackson's employment with JetBlue Airways Corporation ("JetBlue") including her dates of employment, job description, job duties, etc…

2. All DOCUMENTS pertaining to any reasonable accommodations or modifications of job duties Tamara Jackson has received from JetBlue for injuries, disabilities, or work restrictions Tamara Jackson has or had.

3. All DOCUMENTS pertaining to any leaves of absence Tamara Jackson has taken while employed by JetBlue.

4. All DOCUMENTS pertaining to Tamara Jackson regarding the compensation she receives and/or is entitled to receive as an employee of JetBlue including, but not limited to, her payroll records, salary information, compensation information, benefit information, retirement benefits including, but not limited to, 401(k) participation and any and all matching/contribution she is entitled to receive, medical benefits, life insurance benefits, and any and all forms of compensation she is entitled to receive and/or does receive as an employee of JetBlue.

5. All DOCUMENTS pertaining to Tamara Jackson regarding the days and hours she has worked since she began working for JetBlue including, but not limited to, the date she was hired; the days she has worked for JetBlue since she was hired; for each day she has worked for JetBlue, the number of hours she worked each day; each and every hourly rate she has been paid since she began working for JetBlue; her attendance records; and any and all other documents showing the day or days she was scheduled to work but that she did not work.

6. Any and all medical DOCUMENTS and REPORTS regarding Tamara Jackson for any and all injuries she has suffered while working for JetBlue, including a right shoulder injury, including, but not limited to, any and all behavioral health records, counseling and psychological records, and medical records; including all notes, all histories, all questionnaires, all charts, all reports, all summaries, all diagnoses, all prognoses, all correspondence, all test results, all information regarding any and all prescriptions of any drug pertaining to treatment, and all information regarding any examination of or meetings with any and all physicians.

Defendant did not submit an opposing separate statement setting forth fact-specific good cause for each category of documents. Defendant must explain how the documents sought will tend to prove an issue of relevance in this case. Only after such good cause has been demonstrated will the Court engage in a Williams privacy balancing test. In this regard, if Defendant demonstrates good cause, this goes to the balancing of competing interests.

In ruling upon a privacy objection in the contact of discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552.) The party asserting a privacy right must also establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances. (Id.) Further, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.) The Court need not proceed to the fourth step of balancing competing interests if all three of the above are not satisfied. (Id. at 555.) If the Court reaches the fourth step, the Court must balance these competing considerations: The party seeking information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves. (Id. at 552.) The party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. (Id.) Courts may not require the party seeking discovery to demonstrate a “compelling state interest” or “compelling need[1]” simply because discovery of any facially private information is sought. (Id. at 556-57.)

The hearing on the motion to quash or modify the deposition subpoena is CONTINUED to April 11, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. Defendant is to file an opposing separate statement by March 14, 2025. Plaintiff may file a reply separate statement by March 28, 2025.

[1] In this regard, Plaintiff’s repeated argument that Defendants must show a compelling need for the discovery is based on authority which has been overruled.