Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 24STCV02768, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV02768 Hearing Date: February 19, 2025 Dept: 76
Plaintiff
alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race in terms of
promotional opportunities and pay.
Plaintiff
Ariel Robertson moves for an order quashing the medical records subpoena served
upon non-party Optum regarding medical treatment Plaintiff received.
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff Ariel Robertson’s
motion to quash medical records subpoena is DENIED.
Motion To Quash Medical
Records Subpoena
Request For Judicial Notice
Defendant’s
request that the Court take judicial notice of the Complaint filed in this
action is GRANTED per Evid. Code, § 452(d)(court records).
Discussion
Plaintiff
Ariel Robertson moves for an order quashing the medical records subpoena served
upon non-party Optum regarding medical treatment Plaintiff received.
Civ.
Proc. Code § 1987.1(a) provides: “If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of
. . . documents . . . at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion . .
. may make an order quashing the subpoena entirety, modifying it, or directing
compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare,
including protective orders. . . .” (Civ. Proc. Code, § 1987.1.)
§ 1987.1 does not contain a meet
and confer requirement.
However,
case law has imposed the “good cause” requirement for subpoena document
requests propounded upon non-parties, that is, the propounding party must
articulate specific facts relating to each category of materials sought to
justify production:
In the course of the litigation, Thiem
served a subpoena under section 2020 on Calcor's custodian of records demanding
Calcor, a nonparty and Thiem's competitor, to, in effect, produce all materials
in its possession relating to gun mounts, going back nearly 10 years. The
subpoena fails to identify any specific document but merely describes broad
categories of documents and other materials.
(Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 219.)
Although the scope of civil discovery
is broad, it is not limitless. . . .
[Former] Section 2031, subdivision (l), which applies to document
production requests served on a party, requires a [*224] party
seeking to compel such production to "set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the
discovery sought by the inspection demand . . . ." (Italics in original.)
Section 2020, the statute at issue, contains no such specific requirement.
However, since both sections are part of a single statutory scheme, and since
it is unlikely the Legislature intended to place greater burdens on a nonparty
than on a party to the litigation, we read a similar requirement into the
latter section.
(Calcor Space Facility, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 223-24.)
Even were we to ignore that the statements purporting to justify an order
compelling Calcor to produce its documents and other materials are unverified,
they still fail. There is an absence
of specific facts relating to each category of materials sought to be produced;
the justifications offered for the production are mere generalities.
The very vice of the subpoena's promiscuity is well illustrated by Thiem's inability to provide focused, fact-specific
justifications for its demands. The noted generality of the subpoena's
definitions, instructions and categories which merely add up to a demand Calcor
produce everything in its possession having anything to do with gun mounts,
precludes Thiem from demonstrating any particular item or category in fact
constitutes or contains matter which "is itself admissible in
evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." (§ 2017, subd. (a).) The purported justification for
imposing this great burden on Calcor necessarily suffers from the same
generality as the subpoena itself.
Although appellate courts have frequently stated "fishing
expeditions" are permissible in discovery, there is a limit. As noted in
Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1539 [39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896],
"These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery ( Colonial Life
& Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 785, 790), and
(contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some
cases." (Id. at p. 1546.) However, early in the development of our
discovery law our Supreme Court recognized the limits on such "fishing
expeditions." In [*225] Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court
(1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355 [15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266], the seminal case in
California civil discovery, the court gave examples of improper
"fishing" WHICH CLEARLY APPLY HERE: "The method of 'fishing' may be, in a particular case,
entirely improper (i.e., insufficient identification of the requested
information to acquaint the other party with the nature of information desired,
attempt to place the burden and cost of supplying information equally available
to both solely upon the adversary, placing more burden upon the adversary than
the value of the information warrants, etc.). Such improper methods of
'fishing' may be (and should be) controlled by the trial court under the powers
granted to it by the statute." ( Id. at pp. 384-385.) The concerns for
avoiding undue burdens on the "adversary" in the litigation expressed
in Greyhound apply with even more weight to a nonparty.
Had the Greyhound court been able to anticipate the tremendous burdens
promiscuous discovery has placed on litigants and nonparties alike, it might
well have taken a stronger stand against such "fishing." Greyhound's
optimism in noting the then new discovery system would be "simple,
convenient and inexpensive," would "expedite litigation," and
"expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial," has certainly
proven to have been considerably off the mark. (56 Cal. 2d at p. 376.)
The issues in this litigation may essentially be reduced [***18] to
the question whether Thiem's work met Delco's specifications. This may be
determined without any reference to the contract between Delco and Calcor or
the specifications which are part of that contract. Another issue which may
exist is whether Delco may recover the excess of the cost of the gun mounts
procured from Calcor as damages for "cover" under California Uniform
Commercial Code section 2712. (See Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Assn. of Seventh
Day Adventists (1971) 14 Cal. App. 3d 209, 217-218 [92 Cal. Rptr. 111].) If so,
differences in specifications issued to Thiem and to Calcor may be relevant.
However, discovery by Thiem from Delco should normally provide it with this
evidence. 1As between parties to litigation and nonparties, the burden of
discovery should be placed on the latter only if the former do not possess the
material sought to be discovered. An exception to this may exist where a
showing is made the material obtained from the party is unreliable and may be
subject to impeachment by material in possession of the nonparty. Thiem has not
even attempted to demonstrate why it cannot obtain the needed materials from
Delco or why such materials might be unreliable.
(Calcor Space Facility, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 224-25 [bold
emphasis and underlining added].)
On October 2, 2024, Defendant served a subpoena for production of medical
records that Defendant American Honda Finance corporation served on Optum. Per
Plaintiff’s separate statement, Plaintiff seeks to quash the subpoena which
seeks the following medical records:
Any and all records, including all
electronically stored information, relating to the subject’s medical and/or
mental health treatment from Optum, and any of its doctors, nurses, staff,
attorneys, agents, employees, and/or other persons acting or purporting to act
on its behalf, including but not limited to Dr. Susan Tang, for the time period
of January 1, 2018 to Present Date, including but not limited to:
a) All medical records and documents that pertain to the subject’s
physical or mental health condition(s), including, but not limited to, notes,
opinions, reports, summaries, electronic data, correspondence, tests, and
complete and entire chart and file(s).
b) Any and all documents that pertain to the subject’s treatment,
consultation or evaluation for any physical or mental injuries, conditions,
complaints or illnesses including, but not limited to, doctors’ notes, nurses’
notes, opinions, reports, summaries, electronic data, correspondence, tests,
diagnoses, observations and/or examination of the subject including the
subject’s complete and entire chart and file(s).
c) All documents that evidence
and/or pertain to any and all prescriptions, medications, and/or treatments
that were prescribed, refilled or recommended to the subject.
d) Any and all bills and invoices, including all health insurance claims
information, pertaining to any medical or mental health care, counseling,
therapy, diagnosis, examination or treatment pertaining to the subject.
e) All documents showing or reflecting payment of any bills or expenses
incurred by the subject for your services, including but not limited to
receipts, invoices, and copies of checks.
f) All documents that evidence
and/or pertain to any and all referrals you made to the subject, including but
not limited to referrals to another doctor, nurse practitioner, chiropractor,
hospital, clinic, or other health or medical or mental health facility.
(Declaration of Carlos Montoya (Montoya
Decl.) Ln 2, Exhibit A.)
Plaintiff argues that the Subpoena
is overly broad and seeks information that is irrelevant to this action.
Plaintiff also asserts her and third party rights of privacy outweighs
Defendant’s need for the subpoenaed records.
Defendant argues that Defendant is
now only seeking medical records for the time period during which Plaintiff was
employed. Defendant argues that by asserting a causal link between her mental
and physical condition and Honda’s conduct, Plaintiff has placed her mental and
physical condition in controversy and waived her right to privacy as to other
sources which may be the cause of her mental and physical condition.
Privacy is an inalienable right under the California
Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p.
569.) It is well established that the right to privacy extends to medical
records (Cross v. Superior
Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 305, 325–326 [217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569] (Cross)),
which may contain “matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the
concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.” (Wood v.
Superior Court (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1147 [212 Cal. Rptr. 811] (Wood).)
The privacy interest in psychiatric records is particularly strong and, in some
respects, entitled to more robust protection than other types of medical
records. (See In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 421–422, 434–435, fn.
20 [85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557]; Susan S. v. Israels (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 1290, 1298–1299 [67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42].)
But the privacy right is not absolute and at times must
yield to other important interests. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37 [26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 865 P.2d 633] (Hill);
People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 [194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 668
P.2d 738].)
(Grafilo v. Soorani (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 497, 507.)
Although a plaintiff waives privacy
as to information which relates to any physical or mental condition put in
issue by bringing the lawsuit, the plaintiff retains the privacy interest in
unrelated past medical or psychotherapeutic treatment; a disclosure of the
entire lifetime of medical history is unwarranted. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 865.)
Here, the Complaint alleges that
since beginning her transfer to Senior Customer Account in the Collections
Department in California in October 2018 and continuing through the present, she
has been subjected to racial discrimination and harassment in terms of
treatment, denials of promotion and salary. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14 – 32.)
Plaintiff’s privacy interest in her
medical records is outweighed by Defendant’s interest in discovering whether
Plaintiff had pre-existing or concurrent emotional injuries, or other sources
of emotional injuries/distress which could be physical. A chronic illness or
physical trauma could contribute to depression/emotional distress for which
Defendant would not be liable. The subpoena itself is limited to the time
period of January 1, 2018 to the present. This is a reasonable time period, as
it could include conditions which pre-exist the period when Plaintiff claims
that the discrimination and harassment began in October 2018, but is not
overreaching in this regard. Defendant will be permitted to discover all
documents as requested in the subpoena.
As such, the motion to quash is DENIED.
No sanctions were requested.