Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 24STCV09811, Date: 2024-09-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV09811 Hearing Date: September 19, 2024 Dept: 76
Plaintiff alleges a breach of agreement to marry and seeks to establish equitable ownership in property.
Defendant Jeffrey Goh demurs to the Complaint and moves to strike portions thereof.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant Jeffrey Goh’s demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth and eighth causes of action and OVERRULED as to the fourth and seventh causes of action.
Defendant’s motion to strike is
GRANTED with leave to amend as to prayer on page 17 of the Complaint re:
punitive damages and is MOOT given the ruling on the demurrer as to Page 14, ¶
50, ¶ 51 and Page 15, ¶ 57.
Plaintiff is given 30 days’ leave to amend where indicated.
ANALYSIS
Demurrer
Meet and Confer
Defendant’s counsel filed a form meet and confer declaration indicating that Plaintiff’s counsel did not respond in good faith to meet and confer efforts. This satisfies Civ. Proc. Code, § 430.41(a)(3)(B).
Discussion
Defendant Jeffrey Goh demurs to the Complaint as follows:
1. First Cause of Action (Specific Performance or Damages Based Upon Breach of Express Contract).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not pled a verbatim statement of the terms of the oral contract.
“An oral contract may be pleaded generally as to its effect, because it is rarely possible to allege the exact words. (Citation omitted.) A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (Citations omitted.)” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
Here, the terms of the purported oral agreement are sufficiently pled at ¶¶ 5 – 6.
Defendant also argues that any agreement would need to be supported by a relationship evolving out of cohabitation, not just sex, or an agreement to be a companion or confidante.
The Marvin court held
"that adults who voluntarily live together and
engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to
contract respecting their earnings and property rights." ( Marvin
v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal. 3d at p. 674, italics added.) So long as the
agreement does not depend upon meretricious sexual relations for its
consideration, or so long as that portion of the consideration may be severed
from other proper forms of consideration, such agreements are enforceable. (Ibid.)
In Taylor v. Fields (1986)
178 Cal. App. 3d 653 [224 Cal. Rptr. 186] (Taylor), the court seized
upon the italicized "live together" reference in Marvin to
hold that a dead man's mistress, who never lived with the decedent, was
not entitled to enforce their purported Marvin agreement. Examining Marvin and
other related decisions, the Taylor court held
that cohabitation was a prerequisite to recovery under Marvin.
Because the appellant's agreement in Taylor rested
upon an illicit sexual relationship for its consideration, it was not
enforceable. ( Taylor, supra, 178 Cal. App. 3d at pp.
660-665.)
Taylor was followed by Bergen
v. Wood (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 854 [18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75] (Bergen).
The plaintiff in Bergen had a long-term sexual relationship
with the decedent, acting as his hostess and social
companion. [*291] Though he had supposedly promised to support
the plaintiff, they never lived together. In reversing a judgment for the
plaintiff, the Bergen court noted that cohabitation was
required under Marvin "not in and of itself, but rather,
because from cohabitation flows the rendition of domestic services, which
services amount to lawful consideration for a contract between the parties.
[P] We make the additional observation that if cohabitation were not a
prerequisite to recovery, every dating relationship would have the potential
for giving rise to such claims, a result no one favors." ( Id.
at p. 858.) Citing both Marvin and Taylor,
the Bergen court noted that recovery under Marvin "requires
a showing of a stable and significant relationship arising out of
cohabitation." ( Id. at p. 857.) Because the plaintiff
never lived with her decedent, it was impossible to sever the sexual component
of their relationship from other appropriate consideration. ( Id.
at p. 858.)
. . .
We save for another day the issue whether
consenting adults need cohabit at all in order to enter an
enforceable agreement regarding their earnings and property. Assuming for
discussion's sake that cohabitation is required, we conclude that the rationale
of Marvin is satisfied in appropriate cases by a cohabitation
arrangement that is less than full-time. Here, as so construed, there was
sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact on the
cohabitation element.
. . .
We find these decisions both persuasive and
analogous on the issue of cohabitation in the context of a Marvin agreement.
The purpose of Marvin [*293] was to permit
parties to a significant and stable relationship to contract concerning their
earnings and property rights. "So long as the agreement does not rest upon
illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic
affairs as they choose . . . ." ( Marvin v. Marvin, supra,
18 Cal. 3d at p. 674.) To require nothing short of full-time cohabitation
before enforcing an agreement would defeat the reasonable expectations of
persons who may clearly enjoy a significant and stable relationship arising
from cohabitation, albeit less than a full-time living arrangement. For
instance, it would exclude otherwise valid support agreements made by parties
who, perhaps because their jobs are geographically far apart, maintain a
part-time residence for one party, and also a second residence where at
times they live jointly. Certainly the rationale of Marvin does
not support such a result.
Here, the parties had shared a long-term,
stable and significant relationship. In this context, evidence that they lived
together two to four days a week both before and at the time they entered
their Marvin agreement is sufficient to raise a triable issue
of fact that they cohabitated under Marvin.
(Cochran v. Cochran (2001) 89 Cal. App. 4th 283, 290-293 [bold emphasis added].)
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the parties cohabitated, at least to some extent. As such, Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action based on a Marvin agreement.
The demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
2. Second Cause of Action (Impose Constructive Trust Based On Breach of Express Contract).
This cause of action fails for the reasons discussed above re: the first cause of action.
The demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
3. Third Cause of Action (Impose Constructive Trust or Damages Based on Breach of Implied In Fact Contract).
In Marvin v. Marvin (1976)
18 Cal.3d 660, 681 [134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106] (Marvin), the
California Supreme Court “determined that the Family Law Act was not intended
by the Legislature to delineate the property rights of nonmarital
partners. However, the court also determined (a) that the courts should enforce
contracts between nonmarital partners and (b) that in the absence of an express
contract, the courts should look to the conduct of the parties to determine
whether or not that conduct demonstrates ‘an implied contract, agreement of
partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the
parties.’ [Citation.] [¶] The Marvin court also held
that, in the absence of an express agreement, the courts may look to a variety
of remedies to protect the parties' expectations. Among those remedies, the
court suggested that principles of constructive trust, resulting trust or quantum
meruit might be employed by the courts. [Citation.] In footnote 25, the
court noted that the remedies suggested were not exclusive and that ‘additional
equitable remedies [may evolve] to protect the expectations of the parties to a
nonmarital relationship in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate …
in light of the factual setting in which they
arise.’ [Citation.]” [*1176] (Friedman v. Friedman (1993)
20 Cal.App.4th 876, 883 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 892].) Support agreements between
cohabitants have also been found “enforceable under the Marvin case.”
(Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1063 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d
908].)
(Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1175-76.)
Here, the underlying Mavin agreement, even if implied, fails for the reasons set forth above re: the first cause of action. As such, the demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
4. Fourth Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request for maintenance can only be granted if a dissolution or legal separation action is pending. Defendant cites Civil Code, § 43.5(d), which states: “No cause of action arises for . . . breach of a promise of marriage.”
Defendant’s argument only goes to
one portion of the cause of action/relief sought, which is properly the subject
of a motion to strike, not a demurrer. A
demurrer does not lie to only part of a cause of action or a particular type of
damage or remedy. (See Kong v. City of
Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
1028, 1046; PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court
(Ibershof) (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682.) The proper procedure is to bring a motion to
strike the substantively defective allegation.
(Id. at 1682-83.)
The demurrer to the fourth cause of
action is OVERRULED.
5. Fifth Cause of Action (Fraud and
Deceit).
Defendant argues that the elements
of this cause of action are not sufficiently pled.
“To
establish a claim for deceit based on intentional misrepresentation, the
plaintiff must prove seven essential elements: (1) the defendant represented to
the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was
false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the
defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and
without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff
rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was
harmed; and (7) the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's representation was
a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff. (Citations
omitted.)” (Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498 [italics omitted].)
“The
mere failure to carry out a promise is not a tort, and it is therefore
essential, in pleading fraud consisting of a false promise, to allege the
elements of fraud.” (Maynes v.
Angeles Mesa Land Co. (1938)
10 Cal.2d 587, 589.)
Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with “ ‘general and
conclusory allegations.’ ” (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th
167, 184 [132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 65 P.3d 1255].) The specificity
requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to
whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a
corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who
made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation,
to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was
made. (Lazar v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)
We enforce the specificity requirement in consideration of its two
purposes. The first purpose is to give notice to the defendant with
sufficiently definite charges that the defendant can meet them. (Committee on
Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216
[197 Cal. Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660].) The second is to permit a court to weed
out meritless fraud claims on the basis of the pleadings; thus, “the pleading
should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts
pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of
fraud.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 216–217.)
(West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.)
Here, Plaintiff does not plead
exactly what Defendant said, when and in what manner (orally or in writing),
why such representation was known to be false when made and Plaintiff’s
reliance on the representations.
The demurrer to the fifth cause of
action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
6. Sixth Cause of Action for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff does
not plead extreme and outrageous conduct.
“The elements of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress are: ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by
the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering
severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of
the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. …” Conduct to be
outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated
in a civilized community.’ [Citation.]” (Citation omitted.) “It is not enough
that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the
presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” (Ibid.)
(Catsouras v. Department of
California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 874-75.)
Here,
Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant repudiated his agreement with Plaintiff.
(Complaint, ¶ 53.) This is insufficient to constitute extreme and outrageous
conduct as a matter of law.
Here, the allegations in the first
amended complaint consist of defendants misleading plaintiffs into believing
they would be compensated in an amount [*781] that would allow them
to retire if they continued to work for West Coast until the company was sold.
While the allegations of defendants' conduct, if true, demonstrate a callous
disregard for plaintiffs' professional and personal well-being, the alleged
conduct as stated is not extreme or outrageous to support a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(Moncada v. West Coast Quartz
Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780-81.)
The demurrer to the sixth cause of
action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
7. Seventh Cause of Action (Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress).
Defendant argues that there is no
independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
no fiduciary duty exists unless the parties were married.
[“[T]here is no
independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.] The
tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an
essential element. [Citations.] That duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by
the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.”].) “[U]nless
the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition
of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is available only if the
emotional distress arises out of the defendant's breach of some other legal
duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty.
(Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
123, 156 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)
Plaintiff
alleges a confidential relationship between the parties in that they were
engaged to be married. (Complaint, ¶ 60.)
It is well settled that "[a] confidential
relationship exists when one party gains the confidence of the other and
purports to act or advise with the other's interests in mind; it may exist
although there is no fiduciary relationship; it is particularly likely to exist
when there is a family relationship or one of friendship." (Citations
omitted.) It has been more succinctly said that "[a] confidential
relationship exists when trust and confidence are reposed by one person in the
integrity and fidelity of another." (Citation omitted.) It is not
necessary "that there be an extended period of business or accommodation
transactions or dealings between persons in order for a confidential
relationship to be established between them." (Citation omitted.)
(Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 615 [bold emphasis added].)
Here, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to give rise to a confidential
relationship between the parties, and an implicit duty to avoid causing harm to
Plaintiff’s emotional condition as a result of that relationship. This cause of
action is sufficiently pled.
The
demurrer to the seventh cause of action is OVERRULED.
8. Eighth Cause of Action (Partition).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff did
not file a notice of pendency of action and has failed to identify any real
property in the Complaint. (Civ. Proc. Code, § 872.230.)
“An equitable
interest is sufficient to support a partition action. (Watson v. Sutro, 86 Cal.
500, 528 [24 P. 172, 25 P. 64]; 37 Cal.Jur.2d, Partition, § 35, p. 451.)” (Powers v. Powers (1963) 221 Cal. App. 2d
746.)
In Watson v. Sutro, 86 Cal. 500, [24
Pac. 172, 25 Pac. 64], it was held that an action for partition may be
maintained by the owner of an equitable title. "As legal and equitable
remedies may be had in the same case, the owner of the equitable [*396]
title to an undivided interest in land may sue to establish his right, and to
obtain a partition of the common estate."
(Buhrmeister v. Buhrmeister (1909) 10 Cal. App. 392, 395-396.)
However, based on the rulings on the
contract-based causes of action, Plaintiff has not pled an equitable interest
in any specific real property to be partitioned.
The demurrer to the eighth cause of
action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
Motion To Strike
Meet
and Confer
Defendant’s counsel filed a form
meet and confer declaration indicating that Plaintiff’s counsel did not respond
in good faith to meet and confer efforts. This satisfies Civ. Proc. Code, §
435.5(a)(3)(B).
Discussion
Defendant Jeffrey Goh moves to
strike the following portions from the Complaint:
1. From Plaintiff’s prayer on page
17 of the Complaint: : “11. For punitive and
exemplary damages according to proof at time of trial;”
GRANTED
with leave to amend.
Based on
the ruling on the demurrer, there are currently no intentional torts to support
an award of punitive damages.
2. From Plaintiff’s Complaint on
page 14: “50. By reason of the said fraud and deceit perpetrated by Defendant
in deceiving Plaintiff into acting to her detriment in reliance on promises
which Defendant never intended to keep, Defendant acted with malice.”
MOOT given the ruling on the
demurrer as to the fifth cause of action.
3. From Plaintiff’s Complaint on
page 14: “51. By reason of the said malice, Defendant ought to suffer punitive
and exemplary damages in an amount to be determined according to proof of his
wealth.”
MOOT given the ruling on the
demurrer as to the fifth cause of action.
4. From Plaintiff's Complaint on
page 15: “57. In doing these acts, Defendant acted maliciously and without
probably cause and without regard for the rights, health and feelings of
Plaintiff, and with intent, design, scheme and purpose to injure Plaintiff.
Therefore, this Court should award Plaintiff exemplary and
punitive damages against Defendant in a sum to be determined according to proof
of his wealth.”
MOOT given the ruling on the
demurrer as to the sixth cause of action.
Plaintiff is given 30 days’ leave
to amend where indicated.