Judge Christopher K. Lui, Case Number: 24STCV11562, Date: 2025-05-09 Tentative Ruling

The following tentative ruling is issued pursuant to Rule of Court 3.1308 at 2:56 PM on May 8, 2025.

Notice of intent to appear is REQUIRED pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1). The Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein.

As required by Rule 3.1308(a)(1), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 by 4:00 p.m. on May 8, 2025.

Notice to Department 76 should be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org, with opposing parties copied on the email. The high volume of telephone calls to Department 76 may delay the Court’s receipt of notice, so telephonic notice to 213-830-0776 should be reserved for situations where parties are unable to give notice by email.

Per Rule of Court 3.1308, the Court may not entertain oral argument if notice of intention to appear is not given.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants acted as Plaintiff’s real estate agent and induced Plaintiff to sell the subject property for below market to an entity in which Defendant held an interest, without disclosing such to Plaintiff.

Defendant Jason Blaylock moves for reconsideration of this Court’s March 26, 2025 ruling regarding Plaintiff’s motion to quash Blaylock’s subpoena for production of business records to Ground Control Business Management.

Defendant 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC demurs to the Second Amended Complaint. Defendants Jason Blaylock and 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC move to strike portions thereof.

Defendants Jason Blaylock’s motion for reconsideration of this Court’s March 26, 2025 ruling regarding Plaintiff’s motion to quash Blaylock’s subpoena for production of business records to Ground Control Business Management is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Zane Hijazi’s motion to quash the business records subpoena served by Defendant Jason Blaylock upon third party Ground Control Business Management is DENIED as to Requests Nos. 1 – 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 32, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to Request Nos. 7, 20, 23, and GRANTED as to Requests Nos. 10 – 13, 16, 17, 25 - 31, 33 – 40.

Plaintiff did not request sanctions in the moving papers. In that Defendant’s opposition had mixed success, Defendant’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Defendant 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC’s demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the second, third and fourth causes of action.

Defendants Jason Blaylock and 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC’s motion to strike portions of the Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED without leave to amend as to ¶¶ 89, 95, 101 and Prayer, ¶ 3, except as to Blaylock relative to the sixth cause of action.

Defendants Jason Blaylock and 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC are to answer the remaining allegations of the Second Amended Complaint within 10 days.

Defendant argues that the Court based substantially all of its ruling on the erroneous assumption that Travis Guterman was an attorney for Plaintiff, when in reality, Guterman is not an attorney, and the Court assumed erroneously that numerous requests for documents and communications from or related to Guterman in the Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Ground Control Business Management were subject to the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine when, in reality, none of those privileges applied to the requests in the Subpoena. Defendant indicates that Guterman is not an attorney and Savitsky Satin Bacon & Bucci (“SSBB”), now Ground Control, is not a law firm. Instead, Guterman was Plaintiff's business manager at the relevant times in this action, and he worked for SSBB, an accounting and business management firm.

(a)When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.

Moving party is correct that the ruling relies upon an erroneous assumption that Guterman was Plaintiff’s attorney. As such, the motion to reconsider the motion to quash the business subpoena is GRANTED. The Court will proceed to address the merits with the understanding that Guterman is not an attorney.

Pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code, § 1987.1, Plaintiff Zane Hijazi moves to quash the business records subpoena served by Defendant Jason Blaylock upon third party Ground Control Business Management. According to Plaintiff, Ground Control is an accounting firm which provided business management services for Plaintiff until May 2021.

There is no meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 1987.1. As such, Defendant’s focus on Plaintiff’s meet and confer efforts is not dispositive or persuasive.

However, case law has imposed the “good cause” requirement for subpoena document requests propounded upon non-parties, that is, the propounding party must articulate specific facts relating to each category of materials sought to justify production:

In the course of the litigation, Thiem served a subpoena under section 2020 on Calcor's custodian of records demanding Calcor, a nonparty and Thiem's competitor, to, in effect, produce all materials in its possession relating to gun mounts, going back nearly 10 years. The subpoena fails to identify any specific document but merely describes broad categories of documents and other materials.

Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. . . . [Former] Section 2031, subdivision (l), which applies to document production requests served on a party, requires a party seeking to compel such production to "set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand . . . ." (Italics in original.) Section 2020, the statute at issue, contains no such specific requirement. However, since both sections are part of a single statutory scheme, and since it is unlikely the Legislature intended to place greater burdens on a nonparty than on a party to the litigation, we read a similar requirement into the latter section.

Even were we to ignore that the statements purporting to justify an order compelling Calcor to produce its documents and other materials are unverified, they still fail. There is an absence of specific facts relating to each category of materials sought to be produced; the justifications offered for the production are mere generalities. The very vice of the subpoena's promiscuity is well illustrated by Thiem's inability to provide focused, fact-specific justifications for its demands. The noted generality of the subpoena's definitions, instructions and categories which merely add up to a demand Calcor produce everything in its possession having anything to do with gun mounts, precludes Thiem from demonstrating any particular item or category in fact constitutes or contains matter which "is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (§ 2017, subd. (a).) The purported justification for imposing this great burden on Calcor necessarily suffers from the same generality as the subpoena itself.

Although appellate courts have frequently stated "fishing expeditions" are permissible in discovery, there is a limit. As noted in Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1539 [39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896], "These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery ( Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 785, 790), and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases." (Id. at p. 1546.) However, early in the development of our discovery law our Supreme Court recognized the limits on such "fishing expeditions." In [*225] Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355 [15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266], the seminal case in California civil discovery, the court gave examples of improper "fishing": "The method of 'fishing' may be, in a particular case, entirely improper (i.e., insufficient identification of the requested information to acquaint the other party with the nature of information desired, attempt to place the burden and cost of supplying information equally available to both solely upon the adversary, placing more burden upon the adversary than the value of the information warrants, etc.). Such improper methods of 'fishing' may be (and should be) controlled by the trial court under the powers granted to it by the statute." ( Id. at pp. 384-385.) The concerns for avoiding undue burdens on the "adversary" in the litigation expressed in Greyhound apply with even more weight to a nonparty.

Had the Greyhound court been able to anticipate the tremendous burdens promiscuous discovery has placed on litigants and nonparties alike, it might well have taken a stronger stand against such "fishing." Greyhound's optimism in noting the then new discovery system would be "simple, convenient and inexpensive," would "expedite litigation," and "expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial," has certainly proven to have been considerably off the mark. (56 Cal. 2d at p. 376.)

The issues in this litigation may essentially be reduced to the question whether Thiem's work met Delco's specifications. This may be determined without any reference to the contract between Delco and Calcor or the specifications which are part of that contract. Another issue which may exist is whether Delco may recover the excess of the cost of the gun mounts procured from Calcor as damages for "cover" under California Uniform Commercial Code section 2712. (See Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Assn. of Seventh Day Adventists (1971) 14 Cal. App. 3d 209, 217-218 [92 Cal. Rptr. 111].) If so, differences in specifications issued to Thiem and to Calcor may be relevant. However, discovery by Thiem from Delco should normally provide it with this evidence. As between parties to litigation and nonparties, the burden of discovery should be placed on the latter only if the former do not possess the material sought to be discovered. An exception to this may exist where a showing is made the material obtained from the party is unreliable and may be subject to impeachment by material in possession of the nonparty. Thiem has not even attempted to demonstrate why it cannot obtain the needed materials from Delco or why such materials might be unreliable.

(Calcor Space Facility, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 224-25 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

As such, the Court will consider whether Defendant has demonstrated good cause for production of the categories of documents sought in the subpoena before addressing the objections, if necessary.

¿ Requests Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 32: DENIED.

In connection with these categories, in the opposing separate statement, Defendant Blaylock has demonstrated a fact of relevance as to these categories pertaining to communications involving Defendants themselves and Plaintiff’s business manager Guterman. Defendant Blaylock denies that he was representing Plaintiff during the transaction at issue, and thus did not owe Plaintiff a fiduciary duty. These documents pertaining to communications any of the Defendants or related entities/persons had with Plaintiff’s business manager Guterman are relevant to such contention.

As to the email address with the domain”@kw.com” (Request No. 14), this appears to be Keller Williams email address. As to the email address with the domain “hheescrow.com” (Request No. 15), this appears to be for Hollywood Hills Escrow, which is alleged to be Defendant Keller Williams by another name. (2AC, ¶ 23.) As to the email address with the domain “@spilelaw.com” (Request No. 18), Defendant contends this is a lawyer for Defendant.

Plaintiff’s objections as to the scope, form and relevance of these categories are OVERRULED as without merit.

Plaintiff’s objection that the documents are equally available to Defendant through document production is OVERRULED.

A party is permitted to use multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide discovery under another method. ( Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 218-219 [23 Cal.Rptr. 393, 373 P.2d 457].)

Plaintiff’s objection on the ground of attorney-client privilege and attorney-work product is OVERRULED. The privileges are inapplicable because, as established in connection with the motion for reconsideration, Guterman is not an attorney.

Plaintiff’s objections on the ground of confidential and proprietary information are OVERRULED as inapplicable.

Plaintiff’s objection on the ground of privacy is OVERRULED, as the communications involve Defendants themselves, or Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the privacy interests implicated outweigh Defendant’s interest in discovering the information.

In ruling upon a privacy objection in the contact of discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552.) The party asserting a privacy right must also establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances. (Id.) Further, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.) The Court need not proceed to the fourth step of balancing competing interests if all three of the above are not satisfied. (Id. at 555.) If the Court reaches the fourth step, the Court must balance these competing considerations: The party seeking information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves. (Id. at 552.) The party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. (Id.) Courts may not require the party seeking discovery to demonstrate a “compelling state interest” or “compelling need[1]” simply because discovery of any facially private information is sought. (Id. at 556-57.)

Because this request would include Guterman’s communications with attorneys employed or associated with Hijazi, there is no good cause for production of documents which come within the attorney client and attorney work product privileges. The motion to quash is GRANTED as to these documents. However, as to all non-privileged documents, Defendant has demonstrated good cause for production. The motion to quash is DENIED as to these documents.

In the opposing separate statement, Defendant did not demonstrate good cause for production of these categories of documents. Good cause is not apparent from the email addresses why communications to these persons.

¿ Requests Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40: GRANTED.

In the opposing separate statement, Defendant has not demonstrated good cause for production of these documents, instead presenting a boilerplate argument that does not address the specific requests[2].

Plaintiff did not request sanctions in the moving papers. In that Defendant’s opposition had mixed success, Defendant’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following: (1) Second Amended Complaint, filed January 3, 2025; (2) Articles of Organization of 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC, a California limited liability company, showing a filing date of August 27, 2019, by the California Secretary of State; (3) Minute Order filed December 6, 2024.

Requests Nos. 1 and 3 are GRANTED per Evid. Code, § 452(d)(court records). Request No. 2 is GRANTED. The Court may take judicial notice of a business entity’s corporate status as reflected in the Secretary of State’s records. (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286; Pedus Bldg. Servs. v. Allen (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 152, 156 n.2.)

The Declaration of James M. Jiminez reflects that Defendant’s counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 430.41.

Defendant 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC demurs to the Second Amended Complaint as follows:

1. Second Cause of Action (Fraudulent Inducement); Third Cause of Action (Intentional Misrepresentation); Fourth Cause of Action (Negligent Misrepresentation).

Defendant argues that the alleged misrepresentations made by Defendant Blaylock on August 4, August 9 and August 18, 2019 (2AC, ¶¶ 34-36, 47-49, and 59-61.) were made before the LLC was even formed on August 27, 2019 (RJN, Exh. B.)

This argument fails because it does not take into consideration the doctrine of ratification by the LLC after it accepted the benefits of Blaylock’s alleged fraud.

A principal may implicitly “ratify” the conduct of an agent—and thereby become liable for that conduct under the law—by accepting the benefits of that conduct with “knowledge of the material facts.” (Rakestraw, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 73–74; see Reusche, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 737; Alvarado Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 476, 481 [219 Cal. Rptr. 52] [“a principal will be held to have ratified the agent's actions where he voluntarily accepts the benefits of the unauthorized transaction”]; Allied Mutual Ins. Co. v. Webb (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1194 [111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426] [“an agent's originally unauthorized act may be ratified by implication where the only reasonable interpretation of the principal's conduct is consistent with approval or adoption”]; Civ. Code, § 2310 [ratification reaches [*130] “accepting or retaining the benefit of the [agent's] act”].)

A principal ratifies an agent's acts when he knows of the acts, and accepts the benefits which flow from them (Rakestraw v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal.3d 67 [104 Cal.Rptr. 57, 500 P.2d 1401]; Common Wealth Insurance Systems, Inc. v. Kersten, 40 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1026 [115 Cal.Rptr. 653]; Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp., 21 Cal.App.3d 541 [98 Cal.Rptr. 588]).

"Whether an agent's act is binding upon his principal does not necessarily depend upon the existence of authority in the agent at the time the act was done, for an agency may be created, or an authority may be conferred, by a subsequent ratification as well as by a precedent authorization." (2 Cal.Jur.2d, "Agency," § 75.) (See Civ. Code, § 2312.)

Here, Defendant Blaylock allegedly made the misrepresentations in order to induce Plaintiff to sell the property to 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC, of which Blaylock became a member, at below market. (2AC, ¶ 21.) Based upon Blaylock’s alleged misrepresentations, Plaintiff sold the property to the LLC at a price at least hundreds of thousands of dollars less than Plaintiff would have received in an arms-length transaction on the open market. (Id., ¶ 22.) This is sufficient to allege that the LLC ratified Blaylock’s fraud which occurred prior to the LLC’s formation, but which the benefits of which the LLC accepted after it came into existence.

Defendants Jason Blaylock and 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC’s Motion To Strike Re: Second Amended Complaint

The Declaration of James M. Jiminez reflects that Defendant’s counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 435.5.

Defendants Jason Blaylock and 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC move to strike the following from the 2AC:

1. SAC ¶ 89: “The conduct of Defendants Blaylock […] the LLC […], and each of them, was fraudulent, malicious, oppressive and despicable and subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in a conscious and willful disregard of his known rights and, as such, warrants the imposition of punitive damages against each of them commensurate with their wealth as a deterrent and to make an example of them pursuant to Civil Code section 3294.”

Defendants argue that these moving Defendants were not joined to the seventh cause of action. Accordingly, the allegations in these paragraphs, as they relate to Mr. Blaylock and the LLC, should be stricken as irrelevant, false, and/or improper

GRANTED without leave to amend – moving Defendants are not named in the seventh cause of action as to which this paragraph pertains.

2. SAC ¶ 95: “The conduct of Defendants Blaylock […] the LLC […], and each of them, was fraudulent, malicious, oppressive and despicable and subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in a conscious and willful disregard of his known rights and, as such, warrants the imposition of punitive damages against each of them commensurate with their wealth as a deterrent and to make an example of them pursuant to Civil Code section 3294.”

Defendants argue that these moving Defendants were not joined to the eighth cause of action. Accordingly, the allegations in these paragraphs, as they relate to Mr. Blaylock and the LLC, should be stricken as irrelevant, false, and/or improper

GRANTED without leave to amend – moving Defendants are not named in the eighth cause of action as to which this paragraph pertains.

3. SAC ¶ 101: “The conduct of Defendants Blaylock […] the LLC […], and each of them, was fraudulent, malicious, oppressive and despicable and subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in a conscious and willful disregard of his known rights and, as such, warrants the imposition of punitive damages against each of them commensurate with their wealth as a deterrent and to make an example of them pursuant to Civil Code section 3294.”

Defendants argue that these moving Defendants were not joined to the ninth cause of action. Accordingly, the allegations in these paragraphs, as they relate to Mr. Blaylock and the LLC, should be stricken as irrelevant, false, and/or improper

GRANTED without leave to amend – moving Defendants are not named in the ninth cause of action as to which this paragraph pertains.

4. SAC, Prayer ¶ 3: “On Plaintiff’s Causes of Action numbers 1[…] and 6-9, for an award of punitive damages against Defendant[…] the LLC[…], commensurate with [its] wealth pursuant to Civil Code § 3294.” 5. SAC, Prayer ¶ 3: “On Plaintiff’s Causes of Action numbers […] 6-9, for an

award of punitive damages against Defendant[…] Blaylock, …]commensurate with [his] wealth pursuant to Civil Code § 3294.”

Defendants argue that the LLC is not a defendant in causes of action 1 or 6-9. (SAC, pp. 7:1-4, 18:3-5, 19:1-3, 20:1-3.) Mr. Blaylock is not a defendant in causes of action 6-9. (SAC, pp. 18:3-5, 19:1-3, 20:1-3.) Accordingly, those portions of Paragraph 3 of the Prayer that seek punitive

damages against Mr. Blaylock and the LLC for causes of action not pleaded against them should be stricken as irrelevant, false, and/or improper. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

GRANTED without leave to amend, except as to Blaylock relative to the sixth cause of action – 11211 Laurie Drive LLC is not named as a Defendant in the first or sixth through ninth causes of action and Blaylock is not named as Defendant in the seventh through ninth causes of action, although he is named as a Defendant as to the sixth cause of action.

Defendants Jason Blaylock and 11211 Laurie Drive, LLC are to answer the remaining allegations of the Second Amended Complaint within 10 days.

[1] In this regard, Plaintiff’s repeated argument that Defendants must show a compelling need for the discovery is based on authority which has been overruled.

[2] The Court could come up with good cause on its own, but that is not the Court’s responsibility.