Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 24STCV12256, Date: 2024-12-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV12256 Hearing Date: December 4, 2024 Dept: 76
Plaintiff
tenants alleges that Defendant landlords failed to remediate uninhabitable
conditions at the apartment complex.
Defendant
EAH, Inc. demurs to the First Amended Complaint and moves to strike portions
thereof.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant EAH, Inc.’s demurrer to the First
Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the fourth cause of action.
Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damage
allegations is DENIED in its entirety.
Defendant is ordered to answer the First Amended Complaint
within 10 days.
ANALYSIS
Demurrer
Meet and Confer
The form Declaration of Daniel R. Berke reflects that Defendant’s counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 430.41.
Discussion
Defendant EAH, Inc. demurs to the First Amended Complaint as follows:
1. Fourth Cause of Action (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).
Demurring Defendant is alleged to have owned and/or managed the subject property. (1AC, ¶ 39.)
Defendant argues that there are insufficient details pled as against demurring Defendant to demonstrate the intent required to an IIED cause of action, because the allegations are made generally by a group of Plaintiffs against a group of Defendants. Accordingly, Defendants argue that this cause does not constitute facts sufficient to state a cause of action for IIED, and that it is uncertain.
A demurrer for uncertainty is properly sustained where the complaint is so vague or uncertain that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, i.e., when the defendant cannot determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts are directed against the defendant. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 7:85.) Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and strictly construed “because ambiguities can reasonably be clarified under modern rules of discovery.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)
“The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. …” Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.]” (Citation omitted.) “It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” (Ibid.)
(Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 874-75.)
A landlord’s failure to correct uninhabitable conditions may support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921.) However:
The
right to recover for emotional distress without physical injury is recognized
in California in situations involving extreme and outrageous conduct.
(Citations omitted.) The modern rule is that there is liability for conduct
exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society, of a nature which
is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress (citation
omitted). "Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses
a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's
interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental
distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that
the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress."
(Citation omitted.)
(Stoiber
v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921.)
Here, the 1ACS alleges that Plaintiffs are in a landlord-tenant relationship with Defendants who are the alleged owners and managers of the subject property. (1AC, ¶¶ 44 – 47.) The various Plaintiffs allege that they notified the Property Manager and Defendants about the uninhabitable conditions are requested repairs, but despite numerous such requests, Defendants never remedied the conditions, some of which (i.e., cockroaches and/or bedbugs), caused extreme and severe emotional distress. (1AC, ¶¶ 58, 65 – 68, 71 – 80, 81 – 85, 86 – 91, 92 – 95, 108 – 110, 112, 114 – 120, 130 – 134, 165(b) – (c).)
As owner/manager, Defendant had the power and responsibility to address the alleged cockroach and bedbug infestation. The facts pled are sufficient to give Defendant notice of the nature of the allegations to which it must respond, and the details of the infestation, and of Plaintiff giving Defendant notice, are questions of fact and are properly the subject of discovery. There are sufficient facts pled to allege that Defendant abused a relation or position which gave it power to damage Plaintiffs’ interests by failing to remediate the cockroach and bedbug infestation. This is sufficient to plead the IIED cause of action for purposes of this demurrer.
In Stoiber
v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921 [162 Cal. Rptr. 194], the
appellate court concluded that the plaintiff tenant had stated a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress by alleging that she
had suffered “ ‘extreme emotional distress’ as a result of the [landlord's and
property manager's] ‘knowing, intentional, and willful’ failure to correct
defective conditions of the premises.” The Stoiber court observed that whether
the failure to act was extreme and outrageous “under the present allegations,
presents a factual question—it cannot be said as a matter of law that
[plaintiff] has not stated a cause of action.” (Id., at p. 922.)
(Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1069.)
The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.
Motion To Strike
Meet and Confer
The form Declaration of Daniel R. Berke reflects that Defendant’s counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 435.5.
Discussion
Defendant EAH, Inc. moves to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint as follows:
1.
Paragraph 150, FAC page 23, lines 18-19: “Allowing the Conditions to persist
was intentional, unreasonable and/or reckless and constituted conscious
disregard for the health and safety of Plaintiffs."
DENIED. As discussed in the demurrer, there are sufficient facts pled to present
a question of fact as to whether or not Defendant acted with malice or
oppression as those terms are defined in Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1) & (2) as
follows:
(1)“Malice” means conduct
which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2)“Oppression” means
despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
(Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1) & (2).)
A jury could find that Defendant
engaged in despicable conduct of knowingly permitting pest infestations with a
conscious disregard of the tenants’ rights.
2.
Paragraph 155, FAC page 24, lines 12-27: “Defendants’ actions were oppressive
and malicious within the meaning of California Civil Code section 3294 in that
they have intentionally, and in conscious disregard for
health
and safety, subjected Plaintiffs to cruel and unjust hardship by causing them
to unreasonably live with the
substandard and dangerous Conditions at the Subject Property, thereby entitling
Plaintiffs to an award of punitive damages as against Defendants, EAH, EAHI, H
& C and DOES 11-20.”
DENIED. See above at 1.
3.
Paragraph 168, FAC, page 26, lines 7-13:“Defendants’ actions were oppressive
and malicious within the meaning of California Civil Code section 3294 in that
they have intentionally, and in conscious disregard for
health
and safety, by causing them to unreasonably live with the substandard and
dangerous Conditions at the Subject Property, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to
an award of punitive damages as against Defendants, EAH, EAHI, H & C and
DOES 11-20. Defendants’ actions constituting malice and oppression were
authorized by an officer, director, or a managing agent of Defendants."
DENIED. See above at 1.
4.
Paragraph 154, FAC, Page 26, line 26 to page 27, line 2 "Defendants’
actions were oppressive and malicious within the meaning of Civil Code
section
3294 in that it subjected plaintiffs to cruel and unjust hardship in willful
and conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights, thereby entitling plaintiffs to
an award of punitive damages." [Italics in original.]
DENIED. See above at 1.
5.
Prayer, FAC, at page 27, line 15 “For punitive damages in an amount to be
proven at trial.”
DENIED. See above at 1.
Defendant
is ordered to answer the First Amended Complaint within 10 days.