Judge Christopher K. Lui, Case Number: 24STCV15522, Date: 2025-02-05 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff alleges various wage and hour violations, sexual harassment and discrimination, was not given workers’ compensation, and that she was terminated after giving up her apartment in Los Angeles to transfer intracompany to New York.

Defendant El Cristiano Tequila Company, LLC moves to strike portions of the Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Defendant El Cristiano Tequila Company’s motion to strike the following portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DENIED: Paragraphs 118, 128, 141, 153, 165, 184, and 212, and the request for punitive damages in the Prayer for Relief on page 40, lines 5-7, line, page 41, lines 5-6.

The Declaration of Tracy A. Alexander reflects that Defendant’s counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 435.5.

Defendant El Cristiano Tequila Company’s moves to strike the following portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint: Paragraphs 118, 128, 141, 153, 165, 184, and 212, and the request for punitive damages in the Prayer for Relief on page 40, lines 5-7, line, page 41, lines 5-6.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not plead facts establishing that Defendants Bill Shaffer (“Bill”) and Chris Shaeffer (“Chris”) are managing agents for purposes of imposing punitive damages against moving corporate defendant. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support the imposition of punitive damages.

Plaintiff alleges throughout the Complaint that individual Defendants Chris and Bill engaged in tortious conduct against her. The Complaint alleges at ¶ 11 that Defendants Bill and Chris were supervisory or managerial employees of Defendants. Further, ¶ 13 alleges:

13. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereupon alleges, that Defendants BILL and CHRIS were managers and/or supervisor of Defendants, acting as managing agents for Defendants; was acting within the course and scope of their employment, and on behalf of Defendants such that their acts or omissions are imputed to Defendants under the doctrine of respondeat superior; or, alternatively, at all times relevant to this action, Defendants cloaked BILL and CHRIS with the appearance of actual authority, such that Plaintiff was justified in relying thereon, and therefore their acts or omissions are imputed to Defendants under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

“An allegation of material facts upon information or belief is a sufficient allegation.” (Buxton v. International Indem. Co. (1920) 47 Cal.App. 583, 591.)

(b)An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

In White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, the Supreme Court clarified that the amount of actual authority over decisions affecting corporate policy is the key to determining whether a person is a “managing agent” for purposes of Civil Code § 3294:

We therefore conclude that in amending section 3294, subdivision (b), the Legislature intended that principal liability for punitive damages not depend [*577] on employees’ managerial level, but on the extent to which they exercise substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy. Thus, supervisors who have broad discretionary powers and exercise substantial discretionary authority in the corporation could be managing agents. Conversely, supervisors who have no discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy would not be considered managing agents even though they may have the ability to hire or fire other employees. In order to demonstrate that an employee is a true managing agent under section 3294, subdivision (b), a plaintiff seeking punitive damages would have to show that the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation’s business.

Plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery to ascertain whether Bill and Chris in fact qualify as managing agents of Defendant LLC for purposes of punitive damages.

This is a request for punitive damages at the end of the general allegations. There are sufficient facts pled earlier in the Complaint to show that Defendants Bill and Chris acted with malice or oppression as against Plaintiff.

CHRIS and BILL intentionally and repeatedly made demeaning and disparaging comments about her body, her appearance, and her ancestry and/or national origin. Additionally, CHRIS and BILL made derogatory, demeaning, belittling, and sexually-oriented statements about Plaintiff and other women, which they knew made Plaintiff feel uncomfortable and distressed. These instances include, but are not limited to, comments about Plaintiff’s weight, sexually explicit and inappropriate comments about other women in Plaintiff’s presence, comments about Plaintiff looking “sexy,” exposing Plaintiff to sexually explicit images, forcing Plaintiff to perform “traditionally feminine duties,” which fell outside the scope of regular responsibilities and for which Plaintiff was not compensated, and controlling Plaintiff’s appearance, behavior, and demeanor on the basis of her gender. Plaintiff is informed and believes that such conduct was engaged in for personal gratification and because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives or gratification.

(1)”Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2)”Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

It is a question of fact as to who made the decision to engage in the alleged retaliatory adverse employment action of terminating Plaintiff following her protected activity of reporting and complaining, and whether they acted with malice or oppression. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 146 – 149.)

It is a question of fact as to who made the decision to engage in the alleged decision to fail to prevent the alleged discrimination, harassment and retaliation, and whether they acted with malice or oppression.. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 162, 165.)

It is a question of fact as to who made the decision to engage in the alleged retaliatory adverse employment action of terminating Plaintiff, and whether they acted with malice or oppression. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 181 – 184.)

This pertains to the eleventh cause of action for solicitation by misrepresentation in violation of Labor Code, §970, which provides:

No person, or agent or officer thereof, directly or indirectly, shall influence, persuade, or engage any person to change from one place to another in this State or from any place outside to any place within the State, or from any place within the State to any place outside, for the purpose of working in any branch of labor, through or by means of knowingly false representations, whether spoken, written, or advertised in printed form, concerning either:

(d) The existence or nonexistence of any strike, lockout, or other labor dispute affecting it and pending between the proposed employer and the persons then or last engaged in the performance of the labor for which the employee is sought.

Here, the Complaint alleges that Defendants knew the representation of an available open position for Plaintiff to work for Defendants in New York City was false, but Plaintiff moved to New York City before Defendants told Plaintiff there was no longer any such position and terminated her employment. (Complaint, ¶¶ 101 – 106, 207 – 211.)

Plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery to ascertain who had such knowledge, who made the relevant decisions, and whether such person(s) acted with malice, oppression or fraud[1] for purposes of Civ.Code, § 3294(c).

¿ Request for punitive damages in the Prayer for Relief on page 40, lines 5-7, line, page 41, lines 5-6 – DENY

[1]

(3)“Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(3).)