Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 24STCV16193, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV16193 Hearing Date: June 10, 2025 Dept: 76
The following
tentative ruling is issued pursuant to Rule of Court 3.1308 at 10:52 AM on June 9, 2025.
Notice of intent
to appear is REQUIRED pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1). The Court does not desire oral argument on
the motion addressed herein.
As required by
Rule 3.1308(a)(1), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER
PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 by 4:00 p.m. on June 9, 2025.
Notice to Department 76 should be sent by
email to smcdept76@lacourt.org, with opposing parties copied on the email. The high volume of telephone calls to
Department 76 may delay the Court’s receipt of notice, so telephonic notice to
213-830-0776 should be reserved for situations where parties are unable to give
notice by email.
Per Rule of Court
3.1308, the Court may not entertain oral argument if notice of intention to
appear is not given.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Uber’s driver physically attacked Plaintiff and her companion after they exited the vehicle.
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. moves to compel arbitration.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The case is ordered STAYED pending arbitration.
ANALYSIS
Request For Judicial Notice
Defendant’s request that the Court take judicial notice of rulings on Uber’s motions to compel arbitration in other cases is DENIED. These are not binding opinions and thus are not relevant to this Court’s determination.
The Court need only take judicial notice of relevant materials. (Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled in part on other grounds noted in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) The Court may deny a request for judicial notice of material unnecessary to its decision. (Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 709, 713.)
Discussion
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. moves to compel arbitration.
Existence of Arbitration Agreement
California favors arbitration. (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 380.) Civ. Proc. Code, §1281.2 provides:
On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the
existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party
thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the
petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines
that:
(a) The right
to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or
(b) Grounds
exist for the revocation of the agreement.
Under California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1343; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.) A party petitioning to compel arbitration has the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence any fact necessary to its defense. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356.) The court may weigh the evidence by considering affidavits, declarations, documents and oral testimony. (Id. at 357.)
Defendant moves to compel arbitration on the following grounds: Plaintiff initially signed up for the Uber App on April 18, 2015, and therein agreed to be bound to the April 8, 2015 Terms of Use, which contained an arbitration agreement (Yu Decl., ¶ 7, Exs. A [Consent Records], B [April 8, 2015 Terms].) Thereafter, on November 14, 2016, May 13, 2021, January 15, 2022, May 11, 2022, January 20, 2023, and February 22, 2023, Uber provided Plaintiff with a notice that it had updated its Terms of Use, and Plaintiff assented to the updated Terms of Use. (Id., ¶ 7-14, Ex. A [Consent Records].) Specifically, for example, on February 22, 2023, Plaintiff expressly consented to the then-applicable updated terms (the January 2023 Terms) by clicking an in-app box which read: “By checking the box, I have reviewed and agree to the Terms of Use and acknowledge the Privacy Notice.” (Id., ¶ 11-13.) Plaintiff was not able to ignore this blocking pop-up screen and use the Uber app without clicking the checkbox and clicking the “Confirm” button. (Id.) These updated terms included an arbitration agreement.
Defendant submits the Declaration of Chenshan Yu, which states in pertinent part as follows:
5. In order
to utilize Uber’s platforms, a user must register for an account and agree to
certain terms—specifically, the Terms of Use (also referred to as “Terms of
Service” or “Terms & Conditions,” hereafter the “Terms”) then in effect
before the user can use the Uber app.
6. In the regular course of its business, Uber maintains electronic records in its databases regarding when and how users register for an account, when and how users manifest consent to Terms either when first registering for an account or when agreeing to amended Terms), and the Terms themselves. Specifically, at the time that a user registers for an account and accepts the Terms then in effect, the data related to that user’s registration and consent to the Terms is electronically transmitted to Uber and stored in Uber’s databases. This information is stored in a secure and permission based manner and cannot be accessed by unauthorized users. Authorized Uber personnel with the permissions to access and read this information, such as myself, may access this information in order to generate reports from Uber’s databases. However, such personnel cannot modify this information. Moreover, while the Terms in effect at any given time are accessible to the public on Uber’s website (https://www.uber.com/legal/document/?name=general-terms-of-use), Uber stores electronic copies of each version of Terms issued, including information regarding when any particular version was in
effect. As a
Data Scientist, I have access to these records and am personally familiar with
them.
. . .
11. On
January 9, 2025, I personally searched Uber’s database for Plaintiff’s account
by entering their unique identifying number and/or phone number. In reviewing
their account, I determined that, on May 13, 2021, January 15, 2022, May 11,
2022, January 20, 2023, and February 22, 2023, Plaintiff was presented with
an in-app blocking pop-up screen with the header “We’ve updated our terms.”
It also stated in large type, “We encourage you to read our Updated Terms in
full” and under that message had the phrases “Terms of Use” and “Privacy
Notice,” which were displayed underlined and in bright blue text, all of which
set the text apart from other text on the screen and indicated a hyperlink.
When a user clicked either hyperlink, the Terms of Use or Privacy Notice, that
were published on Uber’s website respectively, were displayed. The hyperlink
was linked to the following address:
https://www.uber.com/legal/document/?name=general-terms-of-use. The in-app blocking pop-up screen expressly
stated that: “By checking the box, I have reviewed and agreed to the Terms of
Use and acknowledge the Privacy Notice.” It also states that: “I am at least 18
years of age.”
12. Based upon my personal knowledge arising from my position and job duties at Uber, the in-app blocking pop-up screen precluded the use of the Uber app unless and until a user clicked the checkbox on the screen and clicked the large “Confirm” button at the bottom of the screen. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of a representation of the in-app blocking pop-up screen.
13. Based
upon my personal knowledge arising from my position and job duties at Uber,
when a user presented with the in-app blocking pop-up screen, described in the
prior paragraph of this declaration, clicks the checkbox and clicks the
“Confirm” button a record of this consent is simultaneously and electronically
captured, recorded, maintained, safeguarded, and stored in the regular course
of Uber’s business at the time of the events being recorded. This record is
linked to the user’s unique identifier associated with the user’s account,
which is located through the email address and/or mobile telephone number used
to access the Uber platform.
14. I personally searched Uber’s database for Plaintiff’s account by entering their unique identifying number and/or phone number. I located Uber’s record of Plaintiff’s consent to the April 14, 2021, December 16, 2021, April 4, 2022, and January 17, 2023 Terms. I am personally familiar with the contents of the April 14, 2021, December 16, 2021, April 4, 2022, and January 17, 2023 Terms. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Uber’s record of Plaintiff’s consent to the April 14, 2021, December 16, 2021, April 4, 2022, and January 17, 2023 Terms. That record confirms that, on May 13, 2021, January 15, 2022, May 11, 2022, January 20, 2023, and February 22, 2023, Plaintiff accessed their Uber app, was presented with the in-app blocking pop-up screen regarding the April 14, 2021, December 16, 2021, April 4, 2022, and January 17, 2023 Terms described above, and clicked the checkbox and tapped the “Confirm” button.
15. Based upon my personal knowledge arising from my position and job duties at Uber, Uber maintains and stores all prior versions of Terms that have been in effect at various points of time in the past and which were published on its website. On January 9, 2025, I accessed Uber’s business records to obtain the Terms which were in effect for United States users on or about April 14, 2021, December 16, 2021, April 4, 2022, and January 17, 2023. I am personally familiar with the contents of the April 14, 2021, December 16, 2021, April 4, 2022, and January 17, 2023 Terms. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the April 14, 2021, December 16, 2021, April 4, 2022, and January 17, 2023 Terms. The April 2021, December 2021, April 2022, and January 2023 Terms contain an Arbitration Agreement.
(Declaration of Chenshan Yu, ¶¶ 5, 6, 11 – 15 [bold emphasis added].)
Despite a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement, it is for the court to decide the threshold issue of whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate. (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transp. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 772.)
The Second Circuit interpreting
California law found that the arbitration clause in an Uber App agreement is
enforceable, because a reasonable user would know that by clicking the
registration button he or she would be agreeing to the terms and conditions
accessible via the hyperlink, which would govern the forward looking
relationship:
A. The Facts
The facts are undisputed and are summarized as follows:
Uber offers a software application for smartphones (the
"Uber App") that allows riders to request rides from third-party
drivers. On October 18, 2014, Meyer registered for an Uber account with the
Uber App on a Samsung Galaxy S5 phone running an Android operating system.
After registering, Meyer took ten rides with Uber drivers in New York,
Connecticut, Washington, D.C., and Paris.
In support of its motion to compel arbitration, Uber
submitted a declaration from Senior Software Engineer Vincent Mi, in which Mi
represented that Uber maintained records of when and how its users registered
for the service and that, from his review of those records, Mi was able to
identify the dates and methods by which Meyer registered for a user account.
Attached to the declaration were screenshots of the two screens that a user
registering in October 2014 with an Android-operated smartphone would have
seen during the registration process.1
The first screen, at which the user arrives after downloading
the application and clicking a button marked "Register," is labeled
"Register" and includes fields for the user to enter his or her name,
email address, phone number, and a password (the "Registration
Screen"). The Registration Screen also offers the user the option to
register via a Google+ or Facebook account. According to Uber's records, Meyer
did not sign up using either Google+ [*71] or Facebook and would
have had to enter manually his personal information.2
After completing the information on the Registration Screen
and clicking "Next," the user advances to a second screen labeled
"Payment" (the "Payment Screen"), on which the user can
enter credit card details or elect to make payments using PayPal or Google
Wallet, third-party payment services. According to Uber's records, Meyer
entered his credit card information to pay for rides. To complete the process,
the prospective user must click the button marked "REGISTER" in the
middle of the Payment Screen.
Below the input fields and buttons on the Payment Screen
is black text advising users that "[b]y creating an Uber account, you
agree to the TERMS OF SERVICE & PRIVACY POLICY." See Addendum
B. The capitalized phrase, which is bright blue and underlined, was a
hyperlink that, when clicked, took the user to a third screen containing a
button that, in turn, when clicked, would then display the current version of
both Uber's Terms of Service and Privacy Policy.3 Meyer recalls
entering his contact information and credit card details before registering, but
does not recall seeing or following the hyperlink to the Terms and Conditions.
He declares that he did not read the Terms and Conditions, including the
arbitration provision.
When Meyer registered for an account, the Terms of Service contained the following mandatory arbitration clause:
Dispute Resolution
You and Company agree that any dispute, claim or controversy
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, termination,
enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof or the use of the Service or
Application (collectively, "Disputes") will be settled by
binding arbitration, except that each party retains the right to bring an
individual action in small claims court and the right to seek injunctive or
other equitable relief in a court of competent jurisdiction to prevent the
actual or threatened infringement, misappropriation or violation of a party's
copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, patents or other intellectual property
rights. You acknowledge and agree that you and Company are each waiving
the right to a trial by jury or to participate as a plaintiff or class User in
any purported class action or representative proceeding. Further, unless both
you and Company otherwise agree in writing, the arbitrator may not consolidate
more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of
any class or representative proceeding. If this specific paragraph is held
unenforceable, then the entirety of this "Dispute [*72]
Resolution" section will be deemed void. Except as provided in the
preceding sentence, this "Dispute Resolution" section will survive
any termination of this Agreement.
Appellants' App. at 111-12.4 The Terms of Service
further provided that the American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
would hear any dispute, and that the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules would
govern any arbitration proceeding.
(Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc. (2017) 868 F.3d 66, 70-72 [bold emphasis added].)
2. Manifestation of assent
Although Meyer's assent to arbitration was not express, we are convinced that it was unambiguous in light of the objectively reasonable notice of the terms, as discussed in detail above. See Register.com, 356 F.3d at 403 ("[R]egardless whether [a user] did or did not say, "I agree" . . . [the user's] choice was either to accept the offer of contract, taking the information subject to the terms of the offer, or, if the terms were not acceptable, to decline to take the benefits."); see also Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 128 ("[A]cceptance need not be express, but where it is not, there must be evidence that the offeree knew or should have known of the terms and understood that acceptance of the benefit would be construed by the offeror as an agreement to be bound."). As we described above, there is ample evidence that a reasonable user would be on inquiry notice of the terms, and the spatial and temporal coupling of the terms with the registration button "indicate[d] to the consumer that he or she is . . . employing such services subject to additional terms and conditions that may one day affect him or her." Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 127. A reasonable user would know that by clicking the registration button, he was agreeing to the terms and conditions accessible via the [*80] hyperlink, whether he clicked on the hyperlink or not.
The fact that
clicking the register button had two functions -- creation of a user account
and assent to the Terms of Service -- does not render Meyer's assent ambiguous.
The registration process allowed Meyer to review the Terms of Service prior to
registration, unlike web platforms that provide notice of contract terms only
after the user manifested his or her assent. Furthermore, the text on the
Payment Screen not only included a hyperlink to the Terms of Service, but
expressly warned the user that by creating an Uber account, the user was
agreeing to be bound by the linked terms. Although the warning text used the
term "creat[e]" instead of "register," as the button was
marked, the physical proximity of the notice to the register button and the
placement of the language in the registration flow make clear to the user that
the linked terms pertain to the action the user is about to take.
The transactional
context of the parties' dealings reinforces our conclusion. Meyer located and
downloaded the Uber App, signed up for an account, and entered his credit card
information with the intention of entering into a forward-looking relationship with
Uber. The registration process clearly contemplated some sort of
continuing relationship between the putative user and Uber, one that would
require some terms and conditions, and the Payment Screen provided clear notice
that there were terms that governed that relationship.
Accordingly, we
conclude on the undisputed facts of this case that Meyer u4nambiguously
manifested his assent to Uber's Terms of service as a matter of
California law.
(Meyer, supra, 868 F.3d at 79-80 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)
California case law recognizes that the forward looking relationship established with Uber users provides a context where the sign-in wrap agreement is enforceable:
In this respect, “the transactional context is an important
factor to consider and is key to determining the expectations of a typical
consumer.” (Sellers, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 481.) Thus, “when
the transaction is one in which the typical consumer would not expect to enter
into an ongoing contractual relationship,” such as buying a single flower
arrangement or pair of socks, downloading free software, or signing up for a
free trial, the consumer “is less likely to be looking for” contractual terms.
(Id. at p. 476; see Long, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p.
866 [online purchase of flower arrangement]; Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp. (2d Cir. 2002) 306 F.3d 17, 32 (Specht)
[free software download].) “By contrast, the majority of the federal
cases finding an enforceable sign-in wrap agreement involve continuing,
forward-looking relationships.” (Sellers, at p. 476; see,
e.g., Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2d Cir. 2017) 868
F.3d 66, 80 (Meyer) [“The registration process clearly
contemplated some sort of continuing relationship between the putative user and
Uber, one that would require some terms and conditions, and the Payment Screen
provided clear notice that there were terms that governed that
relationship.”].)
(B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 931, 947 [bold emphasis added].)
The Yu Declaration, cited above, establishes that Plaintiff Tripp is deemed to have agreed to the terms of the arbitration agreement by using the Uber App, which required her to consent to the Terms and Conditions by virtue of the in-app blocking pop-up screen expressly stated that: “By checking the box, I have reviewed and agreed to the Terms of Use and acknowledge the Privacy Notice.”
Plaintiff alleges that the incident occurred July 3, 2022. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) Notably, after the incident occurred, Plaintiff subsequently agreed to the January 17, 2023 Uber Terms, which contains the following Arbitration Agreement:
2.
Arbitration Agreement
By agreeing
to these Terms, you agree that you are required to resolve any claim that
you may have against Uber on an individual basis in arbitration as set
forth in this Arbitration Agreement, and not as a class, collective,
coordinated, consolidated, mass and/or representative action. You and Uber are
each waiving your right to a trial by jury. . . .
(a) Agreement
to Binding Arbitration Between You and Uber.
(1) Covered
Disputes: Except as expressly provided below in Section 2(b), you and Uber
agree that any dispute, claim, or controversy in any way arising out of or
relating to (i) these Terms and prior versions of these Terms, or the
existence, breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation, scope, waiver, or
validity thereof; (ii) your access to or use of the Services at any time;
(iii) incidents or accidents resulting in personal injury to you or anyone else
that you allege occurred in connection with your use of the Services
(including, but not limited to, your use of the Uber Marketplace Platform or
the driver version of the Uber App), regardless whether the dispute,
claim, or controversy occurred or accrued before or after the date you agreed
to these Terms, and regardless whether you allege that the personal
injury was experienced by you or anyone else; and (iv) your relationship
with Uber, will be settled by binding individual arbitration between you and
Uber, and not in a court of law. This Arbitration Agreement survives after your
relationship with Uber ends.
§. . .
(4)
Delegation Clause: Only an arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local
court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute arising
out of or relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or
formation of this Arbitration Agreement, including without limitation any claim
that all or any part of this Arbitration Agreement is void or voidable. An
arbitrator shall also have exclusive authority to resolve all threshold
arbitrability issues, including issues relating to whether these Terms are
applicable, unconscionable, or illusory and any defense to arbitration,
including without limitation waiver, delay, laches, or estoppel. . . .
(Declaration of Chenshan Yu, Exh. G, 2023-01-17 UBER TERMS [bold emphasis and underlining added].)
As such, Plaintiffs is deemed to have agreed to arbitrate the personal injury claims she asserts against Uber based on Plaintiffs’ use of Uber’s services. The burden shifts to Plaintiffs to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement should not be enforced against her.
By failing to file an opposition, Plaintiff has not met that burden.
Accordingly, the motion to compel
arbitration is GRANTED. The case against is ordered STAYED pending arbitration.