Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 24STCV19785, Date: 2024-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV19785    Hearing Date: November 21, 2024    Dept: 76

            Plaintiff purchased the subject property and filed an unlawful detainer action, after which Defendants executed a purported conveyance of title to the subject property. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title along with related causes of action.

Defendants Joel Lopez Mercado, Maria Beronica Lopez and Amaya Karla Rivera demur to the Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING          

Defendants Joel Lopez Mercado, Maria Beronica Lopez and Amaya Karla Rivera’s demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED as to the second, third, fifth, sixth and eighth causes of action, and SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the first and fourth causes of action and without leave to amend as to the seventh cause of action.

Plaintiff is given 30 days’ leave to amend.

ANALYSIS

Demurrer

Meet and Confer

            It appears (because the declarant’s name is not set forth) that Defendants’ counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 430.41.

 Discussion

Defendants Joel Lopez Mercado, Maria Beronica Lopez and Amaya Karla Rivera demur to the Complaint as follows:

1.         First Cause of Action (Fraud and Deceit).

            Defendants argue that the elements of this cause of action are not pled with the requisite specificity.

           “To establish a claim for deceit based on intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove seven essential elements: (1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff. (Citations omitted.)” (Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498 [italics omitted].)

Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with “ ‘general and conclusory allegations.’ “ (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184 [132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 65 P.3d 1255].)  The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made. (Lazar v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)

We enforce the specificity requirement in consideration of its two purposes. The first purpose is to give notice to the defendant with sufficiently definite charges that the defendant can meet them. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216 [197 Cal. Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660].) The second is to permit a court to weed out meritless fraud claims on the basis of the pleadings; thus, “the pleading should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.” ‘ “ (Id. at pp. 216–217.)

(West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.)

            Here, Plaintiff does not allege exactly what was said, by whom, when and in what manner (orally or in writing), why such representation was known to be false when made, and Plaintiff’s reasonable reliance to his damage.

            The demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

2.         Second Cause of Action (Quiet Title).

            Defendants argue that this cause of action is inconsistent with the fraud claim.

            This argument is not persuasive because “a party may plead in the alternative and may make inconsistent allegations. (Citations omitted.)” (Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 592.)

            The demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.

3.         Third Cause of Action (Slander of Title).

            Defendants argue that only the recording of a trust deed is alleged, which is a privileged act under Civil Code, § 47(d) [now (c)].

            Defendants also argue that a quitclaim deed merely abandons any claim the grantor may have, but makes not claims or warranties about the state of title.

To state a claim for slander of title, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a publication, (2) which is without privilege or justification,” (3) which is false, and (4) which “causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss.” (Citations omitted.)

(Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal. App. 5th 1331, 1336.)

            Recording untrue documents to cloud title constitutes slander of title, and implied malice is all that is required:

Buyer also claims that there was no evidence to support a finding of malice which is necessary in actions for slander of title. Implied malice is all that is required. ( Phillips v. Glazer, 94 Cal.App.2d 673 [211 P.2d 37].) Buyer’s rights under the agreement of September 8, 1956, gave her 30 days to put the balance of the purchase price into escrow. . . .  [*67]  . . .. Knowledge of the fact that recording of a document would cloud the title supports a recovery for slander of title if the allegations in the document are untrue. (Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 29 [272 P. 1045].)

(Contra Costa County Title Co. v. Waloff (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 59, 66-67.)

            The privilege set forth in Civil Code, § 47(c) is qualified, and thus is overcome by a showing of malice:

For the purposes of section 47’s qualified privilege, “malice” means that the defendant (1) “‘was motivated by hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff,’” or (2) “‘lacked reasonable grounds for [its] belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.’” (Citations omitted.)

(Schep, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at 1337.)

            Here, ¶ 29 alleges that Defendants recorded a grant deed to delay the unlawful detainer proceedings against Defendant Lopez. ¶ 32 alleges that Defendants acted with malice.

            This cause of action is sufficiently pled.

            The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

4.         Fourth Cause of Action (Conversion).

            Defendants argue that real property cannot be the subject of conversion. This argument is well-taken. “The tort of conversion applies to personal property, not real property. (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 699, p. 1023.)” (Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1295.)

            The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend to specify any personal property over which Defendants have asserted control.

5.         Fifth Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief).

            Defendants argue that this claim fails because the other claims fail.

            For the reasons discussed above, this argument is not persuasive.

            The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.

6.         Sixth Cause of Action (Cancellation of Quitclaim Deed).

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff is asking the court to do a futile or trivial act by canceling a quit claim deed that only conveys what the grantor had at the time of its execution. If the grantor has no interest, then the deed has no effect. If the grantor had an interest, then the nature and existence of the interest may need to be determined by the court, but it would never require cancellation of a quitclaim deed, since the deed only transferred what interest existed. If there was none, there was none.

            Cancellation of the quitclaim/grant deed is proper if it is fraudulent and constitutes a cloud on record title.

A written instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or canceled.

     (Civ. Code, § 3412.)

            The alleged fraudulent quitclaim deed was recorded on July 23, 2024. (Complaint, ¶ 45.) As such, cancellation of such instrument may be proper.

            The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.

7.         Seventh Cause of Action (Notary Misconduct).

            Defendants argue that this cause of action cannot be asserted against a non-notary and no such cause of action is recognized in California.

            Only non-demurring Defendant Castro is alleged to be a notary public. (Complaint, ¶ 48). The demurring Defendants Lopez and Rivera are not alleged to be notaries public, so there is no basis to assert this cause of action against them.

            The demurrer to the seventh cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

8.         Eighth Cause of Action (Recovery of Notary Public Bond).

            Defendants argue this cause of action is only asserted against Doe Defendants and should be dismissed until Plaintiff can name at least one Defendant to potentially answer.

            This is not how causes of action asserted against Doe defendants work.

“A plaintiff ignorant of the identity of a party responsible for damages may name that person in a fictitious capacity, a Doe defendant, and that time limit prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations is extended as to the unknown defendant. A plaintiff has three years under section 581a, subdivision (a) n6 after the commencement of the action to discover the identity of the unknown defendant and effect service of the complaint. [Citation.] When the complaint is amended to substitute the true name of the defendant for the fictional name, the defendant is regarded as a party from the commencement of the suit, provided the complaint has not been amended to seek relief on a different theory based on a general set of facts other than those set out in the original complaint. [Citations.] The statute (§ 474) must be liberally construed to enable a plaintiff to avoid the bar on the statute of limitations where he is ignorant of the identity of the defendant. [Citation.]” ( Munoz v. Purdy (1979) 91 Cal. App. 3d 942, 946 [154 Cal. Rptr. 472], fn. omitted.)

(Winding Creek v. McGlashan (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 933, 940.)

            The demurrer to the eighth cause of action is OVERRULED, especially in that Defendants lack standing to demur to this cause of action as non-Doe defendants.

            Plaintiff is given 30 days’ leave to amend.