Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 24STCV21795, Date: 2025-05-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV21795    Hearing Date: May 29, 2025    Dept: 76

The following tentative ruling is issued pursuant to Rule of Court 3.1308 at 1:55 PM on May 28, 2025. 

Notice of intent to appear is REQUIRED pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1).  The Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein. 

As required by Rule 3.1308(a)(1), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 by 4:00 p.m. on May 28, 2025.

Notice to Department 76 should be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org, with opposing parties copied on the email.  The high volume of telephone calls to Department 76 may delay the Court’s receipt of notice, so telephonic notice to 213-830-0776 should be reserved for situations where parties are unable to give notice by email.

Per Rule of Court 3.1308, the Court may not entertain oral argument if notice of intention to appear is not given.

            Plaintiff alleges wage and hour violations, and termination after he suffered numerous injuries at work, rendering him disabled without reasonable accommodations.

            Defendant Network Auto Body Inc. moves to strike portions of the Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Network Auto Body Inc. moves to strike punitive damage allegations is GRANTED with leave to amend as to pages 9-10, Paragraphs 41-42; Page 12, Paragraphs 56-57; Page 14, Paragraphs 71-72;  Page 16, Paragraphs 86-87; Page 18, Paragraph 102; Page 20, Paragraph 118; Pages 21-22, Paragraph 126; Page 23, Paragraph 133; Page 24, Paragraph 143; Page 30, line 11 prayer for punitive and exemplary damages.

Plaintiff is given 30 days’ leave to amend.

ANALYSIS

Meet and Confer

            The form Declaration of Christian Kernkamp reflects that Defendant’s counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 435.5.

Discussion

Defendant Network Auto Body Inc. moves to strike the following portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages:  

Pages 9-10, Paragraphs 41-42; Page 12, Paragraphs 56-57; Page 14, Paragraphs 71-72;  Page 16, Paragraphs 86-87; Page 18, Paragraph 102; Page 20, Paragraph 118; Pages 21-22, Paragraph 126; Page 23, Paragraph 133; Page 24, Paragraph 143; Page 30, line 11 prayer for punitive and exemplary damages.

Defendant argues that the allegations are conclusory and do not support an award of punitive damages against Defendant Network.

The motion to strike the above portions is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts against Defendant Network Auto Body Inc. for the imposition of punitive damages against a corporate employer, as set forth in Civil Code, § 3294(b):

(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

     (Civ. Code,  § 3294(b).)

In White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, the Supreme Court clarified that the amount of actual authority over decisions affecting corporate policy is the key to determining whether a person is a “managing agent” for purposes of Civil Code § 3294:

We therefore conclude that in amending section 3294, subdivision (b), the Legislature intended that principal liability for punitive damages not depend  [*577]  on employees' managerial level, but on the extent to which they exercise substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy. Thus, supervisors who have broad discretionary powers and exercise substantial discretionary authority in the corporation could be managing agents. Conversely, supervisors who have no discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy would not be considered managing agents even though they may have the ability to hire or fire other employees. In order to demonstrate that an employee is a true managing agent under section 3294, subdivision (b), a plaintiff seeking punitive damages would have to show that the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation's business. 

Id. at 576-77 (bold emphasis added).

Plaintiff identifies manager Richard LNU at ¶ 16, but does not plead facts sufficient to show that he is a “managing agent” for purposes of Civil Code, 3294(b). Nor does he identify a person who acted on behalf of Defendant Network as to the actions alleged against it.

Plaintiff is given 30 days’ leave to amend.