Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 24STCV24655, Date: 2025-01-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV24655 Hearing Date: January 22, 2025 Dept: 76
The following
tentative ruling is issued pursuant to Rule of Court 3.1308 at 2:57 PM on January 21,
2025.
Notice of intent
to appear is REQUIRED pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1). The Court does not desire oral argument on
the motion addressed herein.
As required by
Rule 3.1308(a)(1), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER
PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 by 4:00 p.m. on January 21,
2025.
Notice to
Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically
at 213-830-0776.
Per Rule of Court
3.1308, the Court may not entertain oral argument if notice of intention to
appear is not given.
Plaintiff tenant alleges that Defendant rented a room to Plaintiff without obtaining a certificate of occupancy.
Defendant Yolanda Arana demurs to the Complaint and moves to strike portions thereof.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant
Yolanda Arana’s demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to
the first, second, third, fourth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth causes
of action and OVERRULED as to the sixth cause of action.
Defendant’s motion to strike is MOOT as to Paragraph no. 20 of the First Cause of Action, paragraph no. 31 and the phrase and exemplary damages” in paragraph no. 30 of the Third Cause of Action, paragraph no. 56 of the Eighth Cause of Action, paragraph no. 67 of the Tenth Cause of Action, paragraph no. 76 of the Twelfth Cause of Action, and paragraph no. 10 of the Prayer; and ¶¶ 28 and 62.
Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to amend as to the request for attorney fees [Prayer, ¶ 8];
Defendant’s
motion to strike is DENIED as to ¶¶ 10, 13, 41 and 48.
Plaintiff is given 30 days’ leave to amend where specified.
ANALYSIS
Demurrer
Meet and Confer
The form Declaration of Steven E. Weit reflects that Defendant’s counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 430.41.
Discussion
Defendant Yolanda Arana demurs to the Complaint as follows:
1. First Cause of Action (Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability).
Defendant
argues that this cause of action is not supported by factual allegations, only conclusions.
The elements of such an affirmative claim are the existence
of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to
the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery
of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency,
and resulting damages. (Quevedo v. Braga (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7–8
[140 Cal. Rptr. 143] (Quevedo), disapproved on other grounds in Knight,
supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 55, fn. 7; see Friedman et al., supra, ¶ 3:100,
p. 3-40.5 (rev. # 1, 2013).)
(Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)
The California Supreme Court has held that because “under
contemporary conditions, public policy compels landlords to bear the primary responsibility
for maintaining safe, clean and habitable housing in our state,” there is
a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California. (Green,
supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 627.) In Green, the court explained that “[t]his
[*1297] implied warranty of habitability
does not require that a landlord ensure that leased premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but
it does mean that ‘bare living requirements’ must be maintained. In most cases
substantial compliance with those applicable building and housing code standards
which materially affect health and safety will suffice to meet the landlord’s obligations
under the common law implied warranty of habitability we now recognize.” (Id.
at p. 637, fns. omitted.)
(Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296-97 [bold emphasis added].)
Here, the Complaint does not allege what conditions were materially defective so as to affect the premises’ habitability, i.e., below bare living requirements or not in compliance with applicable building and housing code standards, and Defendant’s failure to correct such conditions after notice and a reasonable opportunity to do so.
The demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
2. Second Cause of Action (Negligence).
Defendant
argues that this cause of action is not supported by factual allegations, only conclusions.
A landlord has a duty to use ordinary
care to keep common areas over which control is retained in safe condition, with
a duty to reasonably inspect those areas. (Beeston
v. Lampasona (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 519, 522-23; Mora v. Baker Commodities (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 782.) Moreover, a landlord may not be charged with responsibility
for a defective condition unless the landlord has actual knowledge thereof or it
has existed for such a time that the landlord reasonably should have known of its
existence in time to make repairs. (Busby v. Silverman (1947)
82 Cal.App.2d 393, 396-97.) If a landlord undertakes to repair a defective condition
on the leased premises, then ordinary care must be exercised. (Uccello v. Laudenslayer
(1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 511.) The landlord must also use ordinary care to eliminate
a dangerous condition where the landlord has actual knowledge of defects which are
undisclosed, unknown and non-apparent to the tenant, where a nuisance exists at
the time the lease is made or renewed, or where a safety law was violated. (Id.)
Plaintiff simply alleges in a conclusion that
Defendants breached their duty of care by failing to take reasonable steps to ensure
the safety of Plaintiff and prevent him from being exposed to dangerous conditions.
(Complaint, ¶ 22.) The Complaint does not specify the dangerous conditions and Defendants’
actual or constructive knowledge thereof and failure to repair such dangerous condition.
The demurrer to the second cause of action
is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
3. Third
Cause of Action (Negligent Hiring).
Defendant
argues that this cause of action is not supported by factual allegations, only conclusions.
“ In California, an employer can be held liable for negligent
hiring if he knows the employee is unfit, or has reason to believe the employee
is unfit or fails to use reasonable care to discover the employee’s unfitness before
hiring him. [Citations.]” (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992)
8 Cal. App. 4th 828, 843 [10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748].) “The theory of negligent hiring
here encompasses the particular risk of molestation by an employee with a
history of this specific conduct.” (Id. at p. 837.) Furthermore, there can
be no liability for negligent supervision “in the absence of knowledge by the principal
that the agent or servant was a person who could not be trusted to act properly
without being supervised.” (Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1973) 33 Cal.
App. 3d 654, 664 [109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 73 A.L.R.3d 1164].)
(Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 395.)
Plaintiff
alleges:
26. Defendants
had a duty to hire managers and contractors who were knowledgeable in the area and
could address genuine concerns in a reasonable manner and timeframe.
27. Defendants
failed or refused to properly hire, screen, train, and/or supervise those members
of their team to carry out their duties in a manner that was well-trained, orderly,
and/or competent.
28. Defendants
did not adequately respond to Plaintiff’s concerns.
29. As a direct
and proximate result of Defendants’ failure to properly hire, screen, train and/or
supervise their employees, Plaintiff has been injured as explained more fully above.
(Complaint, ¶¶
26 – 29.)
Plaintiff
does not specify any employees hired by Defendant who caused Plaintiff injuries.
The demurrer to the third cause of action
is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
4. Fourth Cause of Action (Breach of Contract).
Defendant
argues that a review of the Rental Agreement (attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint)
reveals that there is no provision in the agreement requiring a “habitable dwelling”
which is the only allegation (paragraph no. 34) regarding breach contained in the
fourth cause of action.
Defendant
also argues that there are no factual allegations regarding damages.
To state a cause of action for breach of contract, [plaintiff] must plead
the contract, his performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, [defendant]’s
breach and the resulting damage. ( Lortz v. Connell (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 286, 290
[78 Cal.Rptr. 6].) Further, the complaint must indicate on its face whether the
contract is written, oral, or implied [*459] by conduct. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (g).) n4 If the action is based on an alleged
breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of
the complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated
by reference. (Wise v. Southern Pacific Co. (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 50, 59 [35 Cal.Rptr.
652].)
(Otworth v. Southern
Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458-59.)
Facts alleging a breach, like all essential
elements of a breach of contract cause of action, must be
pleaded
with specificity.
(See generally 4 [*6] Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Pleading,
§ 4495, pp. 585–586; Bentley v. Mountain (1942) 51
Cal.App.2d 95, 98 [124 P.2d 91] [general averments that defendants violated contract
insufficient; pleader must allege facts demonstrating breach]; Thompson v. Purdy (1931) 117 Cal.App. 565, 567 [4 P.2d
282] [general averments that defendant failed to perform duties or comply with contract
insufficient].)
(Levy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th
1, 5-6.)
The Complaint
alleges at ¶ 34 that: “Defendants breached the terms of the residential lease agreement,
as set forth herein by, among other things, not providing a habitable dwelling.”
Plaintiff does not allege the terms of the contract, nor does Plaintiff specify
which contract term was breached in a way which constituted a failure to provide
a habitable dwelling.
The demurrer
to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
5. Sixth
Cause of Action (Nuisance).
Defendant
argues that the only factual allegation touching on an interference by defendant
Arana with plaintiff s use or enjoyment of his rented room is that defendant allegedly
entered the dwelling, without notice, at various times throughout the day, although
it is not specified (anywhere in the Complaint) as to whether plaintiff is referring
to the house generally or plaintiff’s rented room. Defendant argues that a substantial
and unreasonable interference is not pled.
To prevail on an action for private nuisance, a plaintiff must first prove an interference
with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her property. (San Diego Gas
& Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938 [55 Cal. Rptr.
2d 724, 920 P.2d 669] … .) Second, ‘the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in
the use and enjoyment of the land [must be] substantial, i.e., that it cause[s]
the plaintiff to suffer “substantial actual damage.”‘ (Ibid.) Third, ‘“[t]he
interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must
also be unreasonable” [citation], i.e., it must be “of such a nature, duration
or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment
of the land.”‘ (Ibid.; accord, Mendez[(v. Rancho Valencia Resort
Partners, LLC] 3 Cal.App.5th [248,] 262–263 [207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532].)” (Chase
v. Wizmann (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 244, 253 [286 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183].)
(Lynch v. Peter
& Associates (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1197.)
Plaintiff alleges
at ¶ 43:
43. Defendants, by harassing and threatening
Plaintiff, and by repeatedly
demanding that Plaintiff vacate, as
expressed more fully above, obstructed the free use of the Property, so as to interfere
with Plaintiff’s comfortable enjoyment of the Property.
Such conduct would suffice to constitute
a nuisance if a jury finds it substantially and unreasonably interfered with Plaintiff’s
use and enjoyment of the property. This cause of action is sufficiently pled.
The
demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.
6. Eighth
Cause of Action (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff does not factually allege conduct so extreme as to exceed
all bounds of that usually tolerated in civilized society. Nor does Plaintiff factually
allege severe or extreme emotional distress.
“The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
are: ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress;
(2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual
and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous
conduct. …” Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds
of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.]” (Citation omitted.)
“It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff,
or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” (Ibid.)
(Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
856, 874-75.)
Here,
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants enter the dwelling at all times of day and night
without proper 24-hour notice and have state[d] to Ms. Ahmed that “they can do whatever
they like” because she is “only renting a room.” (Complaint, ¶ 11.) However, entering
a “dwelling” is different from entering the room Plaintiff was renting as her private
room. There are insufficient facts pled that Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous
conduct for purposes of this tort.
The
demurrer to the eighth cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
7. Ninth
Cause of Action (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress).
Defendant
argues that this is not an independent cause of action but is only the tort of negligence
with emotional distress damages being sought, so this cause of action fails for
the same reason that the negligence cause of action fails.
[B]ecause the [*156]
only injury Wilson claimed in her lawsuit was emotional distress, she was
required to show that Edison’s breach threatened physical injury to her. (See Potter
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984–985 [25 Cal. Rptr.
2d 550, 863 P.2d 795] (Potter) [“[T]here is no independent tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.] The tort is negligence, a cause of
action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element. [Citations.] That
duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a
special relationship.”].) “[U]nless the defendant
has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff
is an object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of
the defendant’s breach of some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately
caused by that breach of duty. Even then, with rare exceptions, a breach of the
duty must threaten physical injury, not simply damage to property or financial interests.”
(Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 985.)
(Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123,
155-56 [bold emphasis added].)
Here, Plaintiff
does not allege that she was threatened with physical injury as a result of Defendant’s
breach of a duty owed regarding Plaintiff’s emotional condition.
The demurrer
to the ninth cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
8. Tenth
Cause of Action (Fraudulent Misrepresentation).
Defendant
argues that this cause of action is not pled with the requisite specificity.
Defendant
also argues that the allege misrepresentation made before execution of the rental
agreement on July 7, 2016 is more than eight years before this action was filed
on September 23, 3024, and thus, this cause of action is barred by the 3-year statute
of limitations set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 338(d).
Plaintiff
alleges at ¶ 62:
62. Defendants
misrepresented to Plaintiff that the Property safe for human habitation. This was
done in order to take advantage of unsuspecting tenants, and to insulate Defendants
from relevant tenant protection laws.
“To establish
a claim for deceit based on intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove
seven essential elements: (1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an
important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew
that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made
the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant
intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation;
(6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s
representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff. (Citations
omitted.)” (Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498 [italics omitted].)
Fraud must be
pleaded with specificity rather than with “ ‘general and conclusory allegations.’
“ (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184 [132 Cal. Rptr. 2d
490, 65 P.3d 1255].) The specificity requirement
means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what
means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant,
the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations,
their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what
they said or wrote, and when the representation was made. (Lazar v. Superior Court,
supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)
We enforce the
specificity requirement in consideration of its two purposes. The first purpose
is to give notice to the defendant with sufficiently definite charges that the defendant
can meet them. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216 [197 Cal. Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660].) The second is to
permit a court to weed out meritless fraud claims on the basis of the pleadings;
thus, “the pleading should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether,
on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge
of fraud.” ‘ “ (Id. at pp. 216–217.)
(West v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.)
A cause of action for relief on the ground of fraud
or mistake is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338(d). “The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have
accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake.”(Id.). However, if the facts pled in the complaint show
that discovery occurred outside of the limitations period, the plaintiff must allege
the date and manner of such discovery and why the delay in discovery is excused:
Plaintiff must allege exactly
what was said to Plaintiff, when and in what manner (orally or in writing), why
such representation was known to be false when made, and Plaintiff’s reliance thereon.
Moreover, Plaintiff must allege when she discovered that the property was not safe for human habitation. This date is not specified at ¶ 8.
This will impact whether the cause of action is barred by the 3-year statute of
limitations.
The
demurrer to the tenth cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
9. Eleventh
Cause of Action (Negligent Misrepresentation).
Defendant
argues that this cause of action is not pled with the requisite specificity.
Defendant
also argues that the allege misrepresentation made before execution of the rental
agreement on July 7, 2016 is more than eight years before this action was filed
on September 23, 3024, and thus, this cause of action is barred by the 3-year statute
of limitations set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 338(d).
“The
elements of negligent misrepresentation are ‘(1) the misrepresentation of a past
or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for believing it to be
true, (3) with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4)
justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.’ (Citation
omitted.)” (National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cambridge Integrated Services
Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
35, 50.)
The same analysis applies here as with
the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, except that Plaintiff must show that the
specific representation was made without reasonable basis for believing it to be
true, rather than knowledge that it was not true.
The demurrer to the eleventh cause of
action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
10. Twelfth Cause of Action (Violation of Civil Code 1940.2).
Defendant
argues that this cause of action does not specify the unlawful conduct engaged in
by Defendant.
Plaintiff
does not specify the provision of Civil Code, § 1940.2 which Defendant allegedly
violated, nor the manner in which such violation occurred. “[S]tatutory causes of
action must be pleaded with particularity.” (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.)
The
demurrer to the twelfth cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
Motion To Strike
Meet and Confer
The form Declaration
of Steven E. Weit reflects that Defendant’s counsel satisfied the meet and confer
requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 435.5.
Discussion
Defendant
Yolanda Arana moves to strike the following portions of the Complaint as follows:
1.
Paragraph no. 20 of the First Cause of Action,
paragraph no. 31 and the phrase and exemplary damages” in paragraph no. 30 of the
Third Cause of Action, paragraph no. 56 of the Eighth Cause of Action, paragraph
no. 67 of the Tenth Cause of Action, paragraph no. 76 of the Twelfth Cause of Action,
and paragraph no. 10 of the Prayer;
MOOT
given the ruling on the demurrer to these causes of action.
2. The request
for attorney fees [Prayer, ¶ 8];
GRANTED
with leave to amend.
“[A]s a general rule, attorney fees
are not recoverable as costs unless they are authorized by statute or agreement.”
(People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee
Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 429.)
Plaintiff
must specify a contractual and/or statutory basis for the recovery of attorney’s
fees.
3. The entirety
of paragraph nos. 10, 13, and 28, and portions of paragraph nos. 41, 48, and 62,
as irrelevant and improper.
DENIED
as to ¶¶ 10, 13, 41 and 48. These allegations
are relevant and proper.
MOOT as to ¶¶ 28 and 62 by virtue
of the ruling on the demurrer.
Plaintiff is given 30 days’ leave to
amend where specified.