Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 19STCV02964, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV02964    Hearing Date: June 11, 2025    Dept: 74

Vasile Properties Airport Plaza, LLC et al. v. FAA Beverly Hills, Inc.

Defendant FAA Beverly Hills, Inc.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

BACKGROUND 

This motion arises from a Consumers Legal Remedies Act action.

Plaintiffs Vasile Properties Airport Plaza, LLC and Charles Vasile (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against FAA Beverly Hills, Inc. dba Beverly Hills BMW (Defendant).

After a jury trial, a special verdict for Defendant was reached on January 19, 2024.  Judgment was entered for Defendant on February 9, 2024.

Defendant now moves for attorney’s fees.

LEGAL STANDARD

The California Code of Civil Procedure provides for attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a contract action only if the contract includes an attorney’s fees provision.  (Cal. Civ. Proc., § 1717.)  The “prevailing party” is the party who obtained grater relief in the action.  (Cal. Civ. Proc., § 1717, subd. (b)(1).)

DISCUSSION

             Defendant was the prevailing party in the action.  Defendant moves for Attorney’s Fees on the grounds that Section 22 and 23 of the purchase contract between the parties provides for attorneys’ fees.  (Berberich Decl., Ex. 61.)  Plaintiff argues that the two provisions that provide for attorneys’ fees are inapplicable.  Section 22 provides for attorneys’ fees in the case where Plaintiff incurs any “fines, traffic tickets, parking tickets, toll violations, towing fees, storage fees or repair bills” which Plaintiff fails to reimburse.  Section 23 provides for attorney fees in the case of default.  Defendant argues that these provisions permit it to seek attorneys’ fees for prevailing on Plaintiff’s action.  Neither party alleges that Plaintiff defaulted on the contract or incurred any fees or fines which Plaintiff did not reimburse. 

            Defendants cite Reyes v. Beneficial State Bank (2022), in which plaintiff was able to benefit from a one-sided attorney fees collection provision because Civil Code section 1717 subsection (a) applies an attorney’s fee provision to the entire contract when the contract provides for attorney’s fees to enforce the contract.  (76 Cal.App.5th 596, 617-618.)  Section 1717 applies to any “action on a contract.” Defendant argues that the scope of “on a contract’ is sufficiently broad to cover Plaintiff’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) cause of action. In Reyes, the plaintiff’s actions under CLRA and Song-Beverly were actions on a contract.  (Id. at 620.)  More recently, the Second Appellate District analyzed the conflict between Civil Code section 1717 and section 1780.  In Martinez v. Sai Long Beach B, Inc. (2025), the appellate court found that the dealership was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the CLRA, reasoning that when two statutes conflict, such as the one-sided fee provision under CLRA and the reciprocal provision of section 1717, the more specific statute prevails over the more general.  (108 Cal.App.5th 367, 373, 377 [citations omitted].) Finding Martinez’s reasoning more apt, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s action under the CRLA does not entitle Defendant to attorneys’ fees without showing that Plaintiff’s prosecution was in bad faith.  (Civ. Code, § 1780, subd. (e).)  Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff’s prosecution was in bad faith; therefore, Defendant is not entitled to attorney’s fees.

CONCLUSION

            The Court denies Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees.