Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 19STCV14751, Date: 2023-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV14751    Hearing Date: May 23, 2023    Dept: 74

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT 

DEPARTMENT 74 

MOVING PARTY:                   Plaintiff Ivonne Torres

RESPONDING PARTIES:    Defendants Ford Motor Company, Ted Jones Ford, Inc., Ken Grody Ford.

Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs.

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

            Overruled: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11.

            Sustained: 7, 8, 12.

BACKGROUND 

            This action arises from a dispute over a defective 2016 Ford Edge.

            On April 29, 2019, Plaintiff Ivonne Torres (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Ford Motor Company, Ted Jones Ford, Inc., and Ken Grody Ford (Defendants). In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act- Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act-Breach of Implied Warranty, (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2, and (4) Negligent Repair.

            On August 12, 2022, Plaintiff accepted Defendants’ offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, and the parties settled.

            On April 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorney fees and costs.

LEGAL STANDARD           

            Under Civil Code § 1794, subdivision (d), a buyer who prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act can recover costs and expenses, including attorney fees. The attorney fees requested should be based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the action’s commencement and prosecution. (Civ. Code § 1794.)

             “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) The lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION 

            Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Hourly Rate.

            “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Ibid.) An award of attorney fees may also be based on counsel’s declarations. (Raining v. Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) Here, Plaintiff’s counsel requests attorney fees at hourly rates ranging from $200 to $595 and provides a declaration in support. (Kirnos Decl., ¶¶ 33-48; Ex. A.) The court finds these rates reasonable.

             Hours Expended by Plaintiff’s Counsel.

            The attorney bears the burden of proof as to reasonableness of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

            “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

            Plaintiff’s counsel has substantiated their request for attorney fees with billing entries. (Kirnos Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A.) Defendants’ counsel, for their part, argue that many of the billed tasks were duplicative or unnecessary. The court finds that Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees based on work performed by a paralegal are not warranted. Thus, the court will deduct $3,525.00 from the attorney fees requested. Additionally, Defendants’ counsel argue that Plaintiff’s counsel “may be attempting to obtain a double fee recovery by failing to reimburse their own client.” (Opposition, at p. 17.) However, Defendants’ counsel base their contention on a contingency fee agreement from 2019, not the agreement between Plaintiff’s counsel and Plaintiff. The court will not deduct from the requested attorney fees on these grounds.

            Lodestar Multiplier

            “[T] the statutory language of [Civil Code] section 1794, subdivision (d), is reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees, including use of fee multipliers. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818.) “The . . . figure may be augmented or diminished by taking various relevant factors into account, including . . . the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits of establishing eligibility for the award. (Id. at p. 819.) Plaintiff’s counsel requests a 1.5 multiplier in light of their risk of not prevailing and Defendants’ counsel’s delay in providing the 998 offer. (Motion, at p. 12.) Defendants’ counsel argues that Plaintiff’s counsel has not demonstrated “[…] what percentage of cases the firm undertakes results in no recovery” and “ […] knew from its experience in litigating these cases that there was little, if any, risk of recovering less than the amount of Plaintiff’s purchase price for their vehicle.” (Opposition, at pp. 18-19.) Even so, Plaintiff’s counsel took on the risk of representing Plaintiff on a contingency basis, which warrants the attorney fee multiplier of 1.5.

            Costs.

            Under Civil Code § 1794, subdivision (d), a buyer who prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act can recover costs and expenses. Plaintiff is entitled to costs and has substantiated her request with a memorandum. The court notes, however, that Defendants have filed a motion to tax costs.

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the court grants Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees of $122,633.25 (($85,280.50 - $3,525) x 1.5). The court defers ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for costs until the September 29, 2023 hearing on Defendant’s motion to tax costs.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED:  ¿May 23, 2023 

_____________________________ 

Colin Leis 

Judge of the Superior Court