Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 19STCV33960, Date: 2023-09-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV33960 Hearing Date: September 15, 2023 Dept: 74
Tatro
Tekosky Sadwick LLP v. Douglas MacLean, et al.
Motion
for Attorney Fees
The court
considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply. 
In January 2020, Defendant served Plaintiff with requests for
admission (RFAs). Plaintiff served responses containing multiple denials on
March 11, 2020. In January 2023, the court entered judgment for Defendant.
Defendant thereafter filed this motion under Code of Civil Procedure section
2033.420 to recover the attorney’s fees and costs it incurred in needing to
prove matters that Plaintiff purportedly wrongfully denied in response to the
RFAs.
Section 2033.420 states in pertinent part, “If a party fails to admit
. . . the truth of any matter . . . and if the party requesting that admission
thereafter proves . . . the truth of that matter, the party requesting the
admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the
request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that
proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420,
subd. (a).) Section 2033.420 is a cost-shifting statute intended to compensate
a party for the additional costs it incurred in proving a matter that the party
should not have needed to incur because the party’s opponent should have admitted
those matters during discovery. (City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable
Associates, LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 344, 354, 359.)
            Section
2033.420 limits recovery to the attorney’s fees and costs incurred from the
time of the wrongful denial. (Yoon v Cam IX Trust (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
388, 395.) Here, Plaintiff served its denials on March 11, 2020. Thus,
Defendant at most may recover attorney’s fees and costs incurred only on or
after March 11, 2020. Defendant’s motion seeks a lodestar recovery, calculated
as an hourly rate multiplied by total hours. (See Mtn. pp. 12-13; Decl. Matthew
Eanet p. 2 ¶14.) Defendant’s lodestar calculation does not make clear, however,
whether the total hours involved only legal work on or after March 11, 2020.
But even if one assumes the hours are only for work on or after March 11, Defendant’s
motion misapprehends the expenses that the statute makes recoverable. The
statute allows recovery only for expenses incurred in proving the wrongfully
denied matter. But Defendants’ motion seeks recovery for expenses that Defendant
did not incur in proving a wrongfully denied matter (e.g. preparing post-closing
trial briefs, which black letter law establishes are not evidence or proof).
Winning at trial is not necessarily the same as proving “the truth of the
matter” that one’s opponent wrongfully denied during discovery, and a motion to
recover expenses under section 2033.420 must show more than victory at trial.
In short, Defendant’s motion does not meet the threshold of showing the
expenses it incurred on or after March 11, 2020, “in making . . . proof” (§ 2033.420,
subd. (a)) that entitled Defendant to recover those expenses. Given the fatal
defect in Defendant’s motion, the court need not reach Plaintiff’s contention
that Plaintiff had a reasonable basis for Plaintiff’s denials.
The court denies
the motion.
Defendant shall
give notice.