Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 20STCV05524, Date: 2024-01-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV05524    Hearing Date: January 3, 2024    Dept: 74

Charles Mendoza, et al. v. FCA, US, LLC, et al.

Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs.

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND 

            This action arises from a dispute over a defective 2010 Chrysler Town and Country minivan.

            On February 11, 2020, Plaintiffs Charles Mendoza and Julie Mendoza (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against FCA US, LLC (Defendant) and others. The complaint alleges violations of the Civil Code section 1793.2, breach of express written warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, fraudulent inducement – concealment, and negligent repair.

            In September 2022, the parties settled.

            On December 28, 2022, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed this motion for attorney fees.

            On August 14, 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed an amended motion for attorney fees. Plaintiffs’ counsel seek $196,701.72, which consists of the following: (1) $132,224.00 in attorney fees, (2) a 1.35 multiplier on the attorney fees, (3) $14,699.32 in costs and expenses, and (4) an additional $3,500 for review of the opposition, preparation of reply, and attendance at hearing.

LEGAL STANDARD           

            Under Civil Code § 1794, subdivision (d), a buyer who prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act can recover costs and expenses, including attorney fees. The attorney fees requested should be based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the action’s commencement and prosecution. (Civ. Code § 1794.)

DISCUSSION 

            Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Hourly Rates

            Multiple attorneys represented Plaintiffs in this case. Those attorneys propose hourly rates ranging from $295 to $595. (Motion, pp. 9-10; Shahian Decl., ¶¶ 37-76.) Defendant’s counsel in turn argues that these rates are too high. But the court finds the rates reasonable. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [“The experienced trial judge is the best judge of value of professional services rendered in his court.”].)

            Lodestar

            “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) The attorney bears the burden of proof as to reasonableness of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

            “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

            Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel requests attorney fees for 302.40 hours of work. (Motion, p. 11.) To that end, Plaintiffs’ counsel has provided billing records. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 78; Ex. 32.) In opposition, Defendant’s counsel first argues Plaintiffs’ counsel should not recover fees incurred from pursuing the fraud claim. (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of San Francisco (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133 [“When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.”].) True, Code of Civil Procedure section 1794, subdivision (d), does not provide for attorney fees for fraud claims. But the court need not apportion fees when they are incurred for representation on an issue common to a cause of action in which fees are proper and a cause of action in which fees are not proper. (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687.) In this context, though, the fraud claim depends on evidence prior to Plaintiffs’ purchase of the subject vehicle, whereas the Song-Beverly claims depend on evidence during the warranty period. (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 347.)

            According to Defendant’s counsel, then, Plaintiffs’ counsel should not recover for all the work they performed on their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the opposition, the court finds that ten pages of the twenty-page opposition (50%) are exclusively devoted to Plaintiff’s fraud claim. The court will therefore deduct $12,664 from the $25,328 requested for work performed on Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Defendant’s counsel also argues Plaintiffs’ counsel should not recover for fees incurred from the deposition of James Bielenda. (Fadeff Decl., ¶ 7; Ex. C.) That is, Defendant’s counsel claims Plaintiffs’ counsel only took the deposition in furtherance of their fraud claim. To that end, Plaintiffs’ counsel questioned the deponent about Defendant’s knowledge of defects before Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle, not during the warranty period. (Santana v. FCA US, LLC, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 347.) Thus, the court will deduct the fees incurred preparing for and taking this deposition: $4,959.

            Next, Defendant’s counsel makes the case that Plaintiffs’ counsel overbilled. In support, Defendant’s counsel has furnished a chart with objections to disputed billing entries. (Fadeff Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A.) Given the objections, the court will deduct the following:

            2.2 hours at a rate of $425 to review and finalize Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s             motion to transfer venues on June 16, 2020. (Sum: $935.)

            5.2 hours at a rate of $435 to revise and finalize Plaintiff’s supplemental discovery             responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, Requests for       Admission, and Requests for Production on April 28, 2021. (Sum: $2,262.)

            4.7 hours at a rate of $460 to continue drafting Plaintiff’s motion to compel PMQ             deposition on November 30, 2021. (Sum: $2,162.)

            1.8 hours at a rate of $435 to revise and finalize Plaintiff’s motion to compel PMQ             deposition for filing on December 1, 2021. (Sum: $783.)

            2.4 hours at a rate of $435 to review and finalize Plaintiff’s reply in support of Plaintiff’s             motion to compel PMQ deposition on June 27, 2022. (Sum: $1,044.)

            1.2 hours at a rate of $295 to draft Plaintiff’s notice of deposition of James Bielenda and      demand to produce documents on August 9, 2022. (Sum: $354.)

            4.9 hours at a rate of $350 to continue drafting fee motion and supporting documents on             December 20, 2022. (Sum: $1,715.)

            1.8 hours at a rate of $350 to review and finalize fee motion and supporting documents             on December 21, 2022. (Sum: $630.)

            Given the foregoing, the court will deduct $27,508 from Plaintiff’s counsel’s award of attorney fees.

            Lodestar Multiplier

            The court may adjust the lodestar based on factors including, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 154.) Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel requests a lodestar multiplier of 1.35. In support, Plaintiffs’ counsel points out that it represented Plaintiffs on a contingency basis. Defendant’s counsel in turn argues that such a multiplier is not warranted because the contingency risk was minimal. Given the nature of this case, though, the court finds that a 1.25 multiplier is warranted.

            Costs and Expenses

            Plaintiffs’ counsel also seeks $14,699.32 costs and expenses and has substantiated his request to that end. (Shahian Decl., ¶ 78; Ex. 32, pp. 9-12.) Defendant in turn argues costs must not be considered in this motion because Plaintiffs’ counsel has not submitted a memorandum of costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (a).) However, the parties’ 998 settlement provides that Plaintiffs may recover costs by a noticed motion under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). (Mkrdech Decl., ¶ 99; Ex. 10, ¶ 3.) Thus, the court will award Plaintiffs’ counsel his requested costs and expenses.

            Total

            Plaintiffs’ counsel requests $132,224.00 in attorney fees. The court will deduct $27,508 and apply a 1.25 multiplier ($130,895). In addition, the court will award Plaintiffs’ counsel $14,699.32 in costs and expenses ($145,594.32). Last, the court will award Plaintiffs’ counsel $3,500 for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s review of the opposition, reply, and attendance at the hearing for this motion. Thus, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s award of attorney fees and costs amounts to $149,094.32.

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the court grants Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion for attorney fees. Defendant’s counsel shall pay Plaintiff’s counsel $149,094.32 by February 3, 2024.

 Plaintiffs’ counsel is ordered to give notice.