Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 20STCV11914, Date: 2022-08-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV11914    Hearing Date: August 19, 2022    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTHEAST DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT 3

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Jane CS Doe

Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply filed in connection with this motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jane CS Doe filed this action in 2020 against Defendants South Pasadena Unified School District (“SPUSD”) and Anthony DeGuzman (“DeGuzman”). Plaintiff alleges DeGuzman, a volunteer basketball coach at South Pasadena Middle School, sexually abused her repeatedly. Among the causes of action Plaintiff alleges against SPUSD is a sexual harassment claim in violation of Civil Code section 51.9, of which SPUSD seeks summary adjudication. Because a good deal of Plaintiff’s opposition to SPUSD’s motion rests on authority and argument turning on negligence, it bears noting that SPUSD does not seek summary adjudication of any of Plaintiff’s negligence-based causes of action; SPUSD seeks summary adjudication only of Civil Code section 51.9.

EVIDENCE

            The court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits A, B, and C.  

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (q), the court declines to rule on any objections to evidence submitted by the parties.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.)

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

DISCUSSION

As a threshold procedural matter, the court does not find that this motion is untimely because it was originally filed within 30 days of the date set for trial. In response to SPUSD’s ex parte application to specially set the hearing date for the motion for summary adjudication, the court denied the ex parte application. Finding good cause, however, to allow SPUSD’s motion for summary adjudication to proceed, the court instead continued the trial date so that the hearing was not within 30 days of trial while simultaneously protecting Plaintiff’s full statutory period to respond to SPUSD’s motion. (Beroiz v. Wahl (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 485, 493, fn. 4 [noting that the trial court may permit summary judgment motions to be filed within the 30-day limit].)

Civil Code section 51.9, subdivision (a) creates a cause of action for sexual harassment against a defendant with whom the plaintiff holds a business, service, or professional relationship, including a teacher-student relationship. Civil Code section 52 authorizes the imposition of damages for violations of Civil Code section 51.9 against the perpetrator as well as anyone who “aids, incites or conspires” in the sexual harassment. (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (b).)

The California Tort Claims Act provides that ‘[a] public entity is not liable for an injury,’ ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.’” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179, quoting Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) “As that language indicates, the intent of the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not expand it.” (Ibid.) SPUSD contends that it cannot be directly liable for violation of Civil Code section 51.9 because the statute does not expressly authorize the assertion of a claim against public entities.[1] The court agrees. Section 51.9 applies to a “person” (subd. (a)) who is a “Teacher” (subd. (a)(1)(E)); SPUSD is not a “teacher” nor is it a “person” – it’s a public school district and governmental entity.

A public entity may, however, be vicariously liable for “injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment….” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) SPUSD argues vicarious liability does not apply here because sexual harassment of students lies outside the course and scope of DeGuzman’s employment. The court agrees. (See John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 447.) In opposition, Plaintiff cites C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861 for the proposition that a public school district can be held vicariously liable for injuries caused by its employees. But Plaintiff’s discussion of C.A. reveals a key distinction between C.A. and Plaintiff’s case. In C.A., the California Supreme Court held that a public school district may be vicariously liable for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising, and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses a student. But here, in contrast, SPUSD does not seek summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s purported negligence. (Id. at p. 879; see Opp’n, p. 9:16-18.) The claim for which SPUSD seeks summary adjudication involves DeGuzman’s alleged acts of sexual harassment, for which Plaintiff hopes to hold SPUSD vicariously liable under Civil Code section 51.9. (See Compl., ¶¶ 138-139.) Vicarious liability does not apply, however, because DeGuzman’s alleged sexual harassment of Plaintiff was outside the course and scope of his employment.

Next, SPUSD argues that it cannot be indirectly liable for DeGuzman’s conduct under a ratification theory. “As an alternate theory to respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for an employee’s act where the employer either authorized the tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort.” (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1110.) “The theory of ratification is generally applied where an employer fails to investigate or respond to charges that an employee committed an intentional tort, such as assault or battery.” (Ibid.) A corporation may be indirectly liable for violations of Civil Code section 51.9 on a ratification theory. (Id. at p. 1111.) But here, because Government Code section 815 circumscribes liability against public entities, and because Plaintiff points to no statute that imposes liability on public entities based on ratification principles, the court finds that ratification is not available to impose liability on SPUSD.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court grants SPUSD’s motion for summary adjudication.

SPUSD is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  August 19, 2022

_____________________________

Colin Leis

Judge of the Superior Court