Judge Colin Leis, Case Number: 20STCV19549, Date: 2023-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 20STCV19549, Date: 2023-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV19549 Hearing Date: February 28, 2024 Dept: 74

Jessica Croce, et al. v. Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc.

Cross-Defendant Estate of Mark D. Croce’s Demurrer to Cross-Complainant Robinson

Helicopter Company’s Cross-Complaint.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from a helicopter accident.

On May 21, 2020, Jessica R. Croce, Dominic Louis Croce, and Dante Gregory Croce (Croce Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Robinson Helicopter Company, Incorporated. (Robinson).

On November 9, 2023, Robinson filed a cross-complaint (CC) against the Administrator of the Estate of Mark D. Croce (The Estate). The CC alleges the following causes of action: (1) total equitable indemnity, (2) comparative indemnity, (3) equitable apportionment of fault; (4) contractual indemnity, (5) contribution, (6) declaratory relief.

On December 28, 2023, the Estate filed this demurrer.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (¿¿Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318¿¿.) “¿To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.¿” (¿¿C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872¿¿.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (¿Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967¿.) A demurrer “¿does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.¿” (¿¿Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713¿¿.)

The court declines to rule on Robinson’s request that the court strike the Estate’s “factual additions” to the CC because that request lies beyond a demurrer’s scope.

DISCUSSION

Whether the Cross-Complaint is Time-Barred

In support of its demurrer, the Estate first argues the entire CC is time-barred. The Estate cites Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2, subdivision (a) in support: “If a person against whom an action may be brought on a liability of the person […] dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period […] an action may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the limitations period that would have been applicable does not apply.” Here, Decedent died on January 9, 2020, yet Robinson did not seek leave to file its CC until November 22, 2022. In the CC, though, Robinson alleges the Estate holds one or more insurance policies that apply to Robinson’s claims. (CC, ¶ 6.) Thus, Robinson aims to establish Decedent’s (and by extension the Estate’s) liability for which Decedent was protected by insurance, meaning Probate Code section 550 governs. In this context, the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2 does not apply. (Prob. Code, § 551 [“Notwithstanding Section 366.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if the limitations period otherwise applicable to the action has not expired at the time of the decedent's death, an action under this chapter may be commenced within one year after the expiration of the limitations period otherwise applicable.”].) Thus, Robinson had to bring its claims for indemnity and declaratory relief within one year after the statute limitations had expired for those claims. The Estate has not demonstrated that Robinson missed the applicable deadlines. The court overrules this portion of the Estate’s demurrer.

Whether the Court Should Dismiss the Cross-Complaint Because Robinson Failed to Make a Timely Creditor’s Claim.

The Estate contends Robinson did not file a timely creditor’s claim, as required in an action against a decedent’s estate. (Prob. Code, § 9351; Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 530, 536.) But Robinson seeks to establish Decedent’s liability for which he was protected by insurance under Probate Code section 550. (CC, ¶ 6.) Consequently, Robinson did not need to file a creditor’s claim so long as Robinson only seeks damages within the limits or coverage of the insurance. (Prob. Code, § 9390, subs. (a) & (b).) Thus, the court overrules this portion of the Estate’s demurrer.

The First and Third Causes of Action Duplicate the Second Cause of Action

The Estate claims Robinson’s causes of action for equitable indemnity and equitable apportionment of fault should be dismissed because they duplicate Robinson’s cause of action for comparative indemnity. The Estate cites two cases in support. But Prince v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1151, 1158-1159, does not stand for the proposition that these causes of action should be dismissed because they are redundant. And the other case the Estate cites is a federal court decision not binding on this court. Thus, the court overrules the Estate’s demurrer for the first and third causes of action.

The Fourth Cause of Action – Contractual Indemnity

The Estate argues this claim fails because Decedent did not sign the contract at issue in his personal capacity. Rather, Decedent signed it in his representative capacity as a member of Redmark Capital, LLC. (See Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811; Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 503-504.) However, Robinson alleges in the CC that Decedent himself agreed to the terms of the contract. (CC, ¶ 10.) This is sufficient. (¿Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist., supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967¿ [finds that for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded].)

The Estate also argues the CC fails to sufficiently allege the contractual language under which the Estate would be required to indemnify Robinson. (Prince v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 45 Cal.4th 1151, 1158 [“In the context of noninsurance indemnity agreements, if a party seeks to be indemnified for its own active negligence, or regardless of the indemnitor's fault, the contractual language on the point “must be particularly clear and explicit […].”].) But the CC quotes the contract’s indemnification clause and alleges that Decedent agreed to the term. (CC, ¶ 10.)

The court overrules the Estate’s demurrer for this cause of action.

Fifth Cause of Action – Contribution

The Estate contends this cause of action fails because the right of contribution requires a money judgment rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 875, subd. (a); General Electric Co. v State of California (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 918, 925-926.) There has been no money judgment in this action and Robinson does not allege it is a joint tortfeasor. Thus, the court sustains the Estate’s demurrer with leave to amend.

Sixth Cause of Action – Declaratory Relief

The Estate contends this cause of action fails because Robinson does not seek a declaration to guide its future conduct. (American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. California Bank (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 46, 55 [“One test of the right to institute proceedings for declaratory judgment is the necessity of present adjudication as a guide for plaintiff's future conduct in order to preserve his legal rights.”].) But in an action for declaratory relief, the complaint is sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the duties of the parties under a contract and requests that the duties be adjudged. (Strozier v. Williams (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 528, 531.) Here, the parties dispute their obligations under the indemnification clause of the contract and Robinson seeks a declaration that the Estate is obligated to indemnify Robinson. (CC, ¶ 10, p. 8:20-26.) This is sufficient. The court overrules the demurrer for this cause of action.

CONCLUSION

The court overrules the demurrer for the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action. The court sustains the demurrer for the fifth cause of action with leave to amend.

The Estate shall give notice.

Jessica Croce, et al. v. Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc.

Cross-Defendant Estate of Mark D. Croce’s Motion to Strike Cross-Complaint

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from a helicopter accident.

On May 21, 2020, Jessica R. Croce, Dominic Louis Croce, and Dante Gregory Croce (Croce Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Robinson Helicopter Company, Incorporated. (Robinson).

On December 28, 2023, the Estate filed this motion to strike.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court may strike any “¿irrelevant, false or improper matter¿inserted in any pleading¿” or any part of a pleading “¿not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 436¿.) “¿The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437¿.)¿

DISCUSSION

The Estate seeks to strike the portions of the CC that request attorney fees: namely, page 9, line 15 and page 8, line 22. Attorney fees are recoverable if authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) According to the Estate, Robinson’s CC does not state any law, statute, or contractual term that would support Robinson’s request for attorney fees. In opposition, Robinson does not direct the court to any portion of the CC that provides grounds for Robinson’s request.

CONCLUSION

The court grants Cross-Defendant’s motion to strike the following portions of the cross-complaint: page 9, line 15 and page 8, line 22. The court grants Cross-Complainant leave to amend.

The Estate shall give notice.