Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 20STCV23252, Date: 2023-04-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV23252    Hearing Date: April 12, 2023    Dept: 74

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT 

DEPARTMENT 74 

MOVING PARTY:                Plaintiffs Oscar D. Peralta and Maria D. Ramos Duran

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant FCA US, LLC

Motion for Attorney Fees.

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            The court denies Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice as irrelevant.

DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

            Overruled: 1.

            Sustained: 2, 3, 4.

BACKGROUND 

            This dispute arises from a defective car.

            On May 16, 2019, Plaintiffs Oscar Peralta and Maria D. Ramos Duran (Plaintiffs) bought a car from Defendant FCA US, LLC (Defendant).

            On June 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging violations of the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

            The parties settled the matter for $173,470.92 in March 2021.

            On December 5, 2022, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed this motion, seeking $35,406.40 from Defendant ($27,485.00 in attorney fees + $2,921.40 in costs + $5,000 in fees for drafting the motion, reviewing the opposition, drafting a reply, and oral argument.)

            In Plaintiffs’ counsel’s reply, the demand has been modified to $33,826.40 ($27,485 in attorney fees + $2,921.40 in costs + $3,420 in fees for drafting the motion, reviewing the opposition, drafting a reply, and oral argument.)

LEGAL STANDARD         

            Under Civil Code § 1794, subdivision (d), a buyer who prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act can recover costs and expenses, including attorney fees. The attorney fees requested should be based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the action’s commencement and prosecution. (Civ. Code § 1794.)

             “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) The lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION 

            Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Hourly Rate.

            “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Ibid.) An award of attorney fees may also be based on counsel’s declarations. (Raining v. Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) The request for attorney fees is supported by an attorney declaration. (Moore Decl., ¶ 19.) In it, Plaintiffs’ counsel states he is an associate attorney with nearly twenty years of experience, at least five devoted to Song Beverly matters. (Moore Decl., ¶ 19.) The court finds Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly rate for an attorney of his experience is reasonable for the Los Angeles metropolitan region.

            Hours Expended by Plaintiffs’ Counsel.

            The attorney bears the burden of proof as to reasonableness of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

            “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

            Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel has provided the relevant billing records to prove its fees were necessarily incurred. (Moore Decl., ¶ 40; Ex. 24.) Defendant’s counsel has furnished a list of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing entries that it finds “unreasonable, vague, duplicative, and excessive.” (Opp., at pp. 5-8.) For the most part, though, Defendant’s counsel did not provide argument as why it finds any of these entries excessive. (Lunada Biomedical, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at 488 [holding that party challenging attorney fees as excessive must not only point to the specific items challenged, but also provide a sufficient argument].)

            However, Defendant’s counsel does argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel should not recover fees for its motion to set aside dismissal, which was only necessary because Plaintiffs’ counsel missed a hearing on September 19, 2022. The court agrees, as does Plaintiffs’ counsel. The billing records reflect that the hours devoted to the motion to set aside dismissal were unbilled. (Moore Decl., ¶ 40; Ex. 24.) But Plaintiffs’ counsel has not removed these entries from the records submitted to the court, suggesting work on the motion to set aside dismissal still factored into its calculations. Accordingly, the court will deduct $602.10 from Plaintiffs’ counsel’s recovery. Moreover, Defendant’s counsel argues that the hours Plaintiffs’ counsel devoted to this motion were excessive, as were hours that Plaintiff’s counsel expected to spend on the reply. (Opp., at pp. 8-9). But Plaintiffs’ counsel has reduced his request for attorney fees for this work from $5,000 to $3,420, a number the court finds reasonable. (Reply, at pp. 3-4.)

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the court grants attorney fees in the reduced amount of $33,224.30 ($30,905 in attorney fees + $2,921.40 in costs - $602.10).

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 DATED:  ¿April 12, 2023 

_____________________________ 

Colin Leis 

Judge of the Superior Court