Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 20STCV25313, Date: 2024-07-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV25313    Hearing Date: July 1, 2024    Dept: 74

Brenda Tobar et al. v. NGP Motors, Inc. et al.

Defendants Ford Motor Company and NGP Motors, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

BACKGROUND 

This is a lemon law case. Plaintiffs Brenda Tobar and Ana Jaime sued defendants NGP Motors, Inc., Ford Motor Company, and Ford Motor Credit Company LLC on July 7, 2020, asserting a single cause of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

The case was tried to a jury from April 23 to April 26, 2024.

The jury issued its verdict in Plaintiffs’ favor on April 26, 2024.

The Court entered judgment on May 9, 2024 and mailed notice to both parties the same day.

On May 24, 2024, defendants NGP Motors, Inc. and Ford Motor Company (“Defendants”) filed a “Notice of Intention to Move for Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.” On June 3, 2024, filed their “Notice of Motion and Motion” for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).

On June 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition.

On June 18, 2024, Defendants replied.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

            The Court mailed notice of entry of judgment on May 9, 2024. Defendants filed a “Notice of Intention to Move” for JNOV fifteen days later. Ten days after that, Defendants filed their “Notice of Motion and Motion”.

            Plaintiffs contend Defendants filed their motion outside the window permitted by the Code of Civil Procedure, divesting the Court of jurisdiction.

            Code of Civil Procedure section 629(b) states the deadline for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict:

“A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict shall be made within the period specified by Section 659 for the filing and service of a notice of intention to move for a new trial. The moving, opposing, and reply briefs and any accompanying documents shall be filed and served within the periods specified by Section 659a ... .”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 629(b), emphases added.)

There are two operative cross-references in section 629: one to section 659, and one to section 659a.

            The “period specified by Section 659” referred to in section 629(b) reads as follows, in pertinent part:

“The party intending to move for a new trial shall file with the clerk and serve upon each adverse party a notice of his or her intention to move for a new trial ... (2) Within 15 days of the date of mailing notice of entry of judgment by the clerk ... .”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 659(a).)

Read in isolation, subdivision (a) suggests a party must file a motion for JNOV (see § 629, subd. (b)) within fifteen days, rather than filing a notice of intention as before a motion for new trial. This is the reading advanced by Plaintiffs.

But subdivision (a) cannot be read in isolation.

To begin with, the following subdivision section 659, subdivision (b), states:

“[The] notice of intention to move for a new trial shall be deemed to be a motion for a new trial on all the grounds stated in the notice.”

(Id., subd. (b).)

And the subsequent section 659a, also cross-referenced in section 629 pertaining to motions for JNOV, reads in pertinent part:

“Within 10 days of filing the notice [of intent to move for new trial], the moving party shall serve upon all other parties and file any brief and accompanying documents ... .”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 659a.)

            When sections 629 and 659(a) are read in conjunction with section 659(b) and 659a, it follows that a moving party may give notice of the grounds of its motion for JNOV within fifteen days of mailing of entry of judgment, preserving the trial court’s jurisdiction, then file its supporting memorandum within ten days, as it would for a motion for new trial. This is particularly so when one also considers section 629(b), which subjects JNOV to exactly the same procedures as a motion for new trial for all intents and purposes. In the face of the ambiguity outlined above, there is no reason why only the fifteen/ten day deadline should be treated differently, when the statute otherwise treats the two motions identically for procedural purposes.

            Plaintiffs could colorably argue that because Defendants captioned their first filing a “Notice of Intention” and their second a “Notice of Motion,” Defendants failed to satisfy the Code. The point is well-taken, but the Court finds it a matter of form, rather than substance, and rejects it.

            The Court may hear the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

¿¿            A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) ordinarily challenges whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the claims or defenses asserted by the opposing party and now embodied in the jury’s verdict. (Moore v. San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733-34; see Martin v. Ideal Packing Co. (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 232, 235 [a JNOV motion is “in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence”].) It thus has the same function as a motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, the only difference being that the JNOV motion lies after a verdict for the opposing party has been rendered. (Beavers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 310, 327; CC-California Plaza Assocs. v. Paller & Goldstein (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1050.)¿¿¿ 

All evidence supporting the verdict is presumed true, so the issue is whether the facts then constitute a prima facie case or defense as a matter of law.¿ (Fountain Valley Chateau Blanc Homeowner's Ass’n v. Department of Veterans Affairs (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 743, 750.) “The court may not weigh evidence, draw inferences contrary to the verdict, or assess the credibility of witnesses. The court must deny the motion if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict.” (Begnal v. Canfield & Assocs., Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 66, 72.)

DISCUSSION 

            Defendants move for partial JNOV, arguing substantial evidence does not support two findings: (1) that intermittent light failure substantially impaired Plaintiff Brenda Tobar’s use of the Vehicle; and (2) that Ford owed an obligation to repurchase Tobar’s car, or that Ford willfully failed to meet any such obligation.

            The Court discusses these grounds in turn.

1. Substantial evidence supports a finding that intermittent light failure substantially impaired use.

            Ms. Tobar adduced considerable evidence, including video evidence, that the taillight in her Vehicle did not function at night, and as a result she was concerned for her and her children’s safety and did not drive at night. This evidence is presumed true upon JNOV. Case law has permitted jury findings of substantial impairment to stand on defects of considerably less significance and impact on a vehicle’s use. (E.g. Patel v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1009 [malfunctioning navigation system]; Brand v. Hyundai Motor America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1547 [opening and closing sunroof].) Substantial evidence permitted the jury here to find that the malfunctioning light constituted a substantial impairment.

Also, Ms. Tobar’s election to drive the vehicle after the defect was discovered does not rule out the jury’s finding of substantial impairment “as a matter of law”, as Defendants contend. A lemon law plaintiff may continue to use her vehicle after discovering a defect without waiving her claim. (See Jiagbogu v. Mercedes-Benz USA (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1244.) Plaintiffs’ evidence, presumed true, shows substantial impairment regardless of her continued use of the Vehicle.

            Defendants are not entitled to JNOV on the issue of substantial impairment.

2. Substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Ford owed an obligation to repurchase Tobar’s vehicle and willingly failed to do so.

Civil Code section 1794(c) provides that “[i]f [a] buyer establishes that [a manufacturer’s] failure to comply [with the SBA] was willful, the judgment may include ... a civil penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual damages.” The jury here awarded civil penalties under subdivision (c), and Defendants contend they could not have done so based on the evidence adduced at trial.

            Defendants rely on the principle that the law should not impos forfeitures or penalties against parties for their good faith, reasonable actions. (See e.g., Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 185.) But, as Plaintiffs point out, Defendants did not establish as a matter of law Defendants’ good faith or reasonability. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, produced evidence that the vehicle was inspected and repairs attempted several times, and Ford refused to replace it. In fact, Ms. Tobar testified that the salesperson witnessed the defect on the day she purchased the vehicle.

(To the extent Ford argues it was unaware of defects, this is unpersuasive; Kwan also notes that a manufacturer should not be rewarded where it remains deliberately ignorant of relevant facts. (Ibid.))

            Substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding of willful violation. JNOV on this point is not warranted.

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion.

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.