Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 21GDCV00803, Date: 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21GDCV00803    Hearing Date: September 8, 2022    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTHEAST DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT 3

MOVING PARTY:                Defendants Bobbie Lee and Fletcher Lee

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Briana E. Anderson

Demurrers of Defendants Bobbie Lee and Fletcher Lee to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint;

Defendant Bobbie Lee and Fletcher Lee’s Motions to Strike Damages from First Amended Complaint

The court considered the moving papers and oppositions filed in connection with these motions. No replies were filed.

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiff Briana E. Anderson filed this action on June 7, 2021 against Defendants Bobbie Lee, Fletcher Lee, and Thomas H. Ma. The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on May 17, 2022, and asserts causes of action for (1) undue influence, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) negligence. Only the first two causes of action are asserted against Defendants Bobbie and Fletcher Lee (jointly, the “Lees”).

            The Lees now demur to the first and second causes of action on the basis that each fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The Lees also move to strike portions of the FAC.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

DISCUSSION

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that the Lees exerted undue influence over Plaintiff’s mother, Bobbie Sue Anderson, in convincing Ms. Anderson to execute a quitclaim deed transferring ownership of her home to the Lees five days before she died. In February 2018, Ms. Anderson had been diagnosed with stage four small cell lung cancer. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Ms. Anderson was admitted to the hospital in November 2018 and was there until she died on December 9, 2018. (FAC, ¶¶ 32, 38.) While in the hospital, Ms. Anderson began experiencing hallucinations and lost control of her cognitive abilities. (FAC, ¶ 33.) On or about December 4, 2018, the Lees (Bobbie Lee was Ms. Anderson’s sister; Fletcher Lee is Bobbie Lee’s husband) visited the hospital at a time when Ms. Anderson was alone, and while there, Ms. Anderson executed the quitclaim deed transferring her home to the Lees for no consideration. (FAC, ¶ 37.) On December 13, 2018, the Lees recorded the quitclaim deed and subsequently kicked Plaintiff out of the home (where she had been living with her mother prior to her mother’s death). (FAC, ¶ 42.) Because Ms. Anderson had no will, Plaintiff stood to take a 50% interest in the home upon Ms. Anderson’s passing. (FAC, ¶ 43.)

The first cause of action for “undue influence” is based on the above facts. Plaintiff essentially alleges that the Lees used undue influence to disinherit Plaintiff from taking title to the home and by taking title in themselves for free. (FAC, ¶ 45.) But as noted by the Lees, the cause of action for “undue influence” is not cognizable. The cases cited by Plaintiff in opposition do not state that a civil cause of action for “undue influence” exists. The theory of “undue influence” typically arises in probate cases challenging a testamentary instrument. (See, e.g., Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1349.) To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a claim for elder abuse, Plaintiff has not alleged the requisite facts to state such a claim (including that Ms. Anderson was an “elder” as defined by the Welfare and Institutions Code at the time of the undue influence). And to the extent, plaintiff may believe she might have a claim for intentional interference with expected inheritance, she has not said so. (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1057.) The demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained.

The second cause of action is for unjust enrichment, but “California does not recognize unjust enrichment as a separate cause of action.” (Castillo v. Toll Bros., Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1210; but see O’Grady v. Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5t 771, 791-792.) The demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained.

Because the demurrer is sustained as to both causes of action, the Lees’ motion to strike is denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court sustains the Lees’ demurrers to the first and second causes of action of the FAC, with leave to amend. The court denies the Lees’ motions to strike as moot.

The court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days, the court orders the Lees to file and serve a proposed judgment of dismissal within 30 days of the date of this order.

The Lees are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  September 8, 2022

_____________________________

Colin Leis

Judge of the Superior Court