Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 21STCV14598, Date: 2023-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV14598    Hearing Date: March 14, 2023    Dept: 74

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – CENTRAL District

Department 74

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Equity Residential Management, LLC

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Joyce Eisman

Motion for Summary Judgment

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion. The court denies the motion for summary judgment because a triable issue exists whether non-operational smoke detectors were a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s burn injuries.

BACKGROUND

On April 16, 2021, Plaintiff Joyce Eisman (“Plaintiff”) brought this negligence and premises liability action against Defendants Equity Residential Properties, LLC and Equity Residential Management, LLC. This case arises from a January 11, 2021, fire at 4157 Via Marina, Marina Del Rey, California (“Subject Property”). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Defendants negligently owned and managed the Subject Property by failing to install an adequate number of functional smoke detectors. According to Plaintiff, her detection of the fire in her apartment was delayed by the lack of functional smoke detectors, and she was unable to escape her apartment in time to avoid being severely burned.

On December 29, 2022, Equity Residential Management, LLC (“Defendant”) filed this motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed two oppositions—one in her capacity as the Plaintiff in this action, and another in her capacity as a cross-defendant in a related case. Defendant has filed a reply with evidentiary objections.

PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES

            Plaintiff has filed two oppositions—one in her capacity as the Plaintiff in this action, and another, ostensibly, in her capacity as a cross-defendant in a related case.

The Court did not grant Eisman, in her capacity as a cross-defendant in a related case, leave or permission to file an opposition to this motion for summary judgment. The Court will therefore disregard the opposition filed on March 1, 2023. The Court will also disregard the declaration of Marisa Sarti, which appears to have been filed in support of Eisman’s March 1, 2023 opposition.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).)

Defendant raises 25 objections. The court overrules objections 20, 23, and 25. The court declines to rule on the remainder of the objections as they are not material to the disposition of Defendant’s motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) The motion shall be granted if there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Id. § 437c(c).)

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element or to establish a defense.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)  Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

If the defendant meets this burden, then the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1077.)  “[T]he plaintiff must produce ‘substantial responsive evidence.’  [Citation.]”  (Miller v. Fortune Commercial Corp. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 214, 221.)  However, “the role of the court in summary judgment proceedings is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there exists a triable issue of material fact.” (Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 1306, 1342.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts causes of action for negligence and premises liability. The elements of a negligence claim are (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) “The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)

Defendant brings this motion on grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish causation. According to Defendant, the evidence demonstrates that: (1) Defendant did not cause the fire and (2) the alleged lack of functioning smoke detectors within Plaintiff’s apartment and the Subject Property did not cause the incident or Plaintiff’s injuries.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that causation is question of fact which cannot be resolved at summary judgment. Plaintiff further argues that Defendants’ failure to maintain functioning smoke detectors at the Subject Property was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injury. According to Plaintiff, the evidence shows that functioning smoke detectors would have detected the fire sooner, allowing Plaintiff to extinguish the fire or exit her apartment before being burned.

In reply, Defendant first points out that Eisman’s March 1, 2023 opposition to this motion is procedurally defective. Defendant then contends that Plaintiff’s argument that functional smoke detectors would have allowed Plaintiff to extinguish the fire or exit her apartment safely is pure speculation and unsupported by admissible evidence.

A.    Defendant does not meet its initial burden of negating the element of causation.

“ ‘[C]ausation ... is ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be resolved by summary judgment. The issue of causation may be decided as a question of law only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.’ [Citations.]” (Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, 212.)

Defendant first argues that there is no evidence that Defendants caused the January 11, 2021 fire at the Subject Property—that the evidence points to the fire being caused by Plaintiff’s burning incense. Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion in her opposition, and her own expert acknowledges that the most likely source of the fire was burning incense. (Khedry Decl., Ex. 9 [Rappaport Decl., ¶ 9].) The Court will therefore assume that Plaintiff’s burning incense started the fire and proceed to determine whether Defendant has shown that the alleged lack of functioning smoke detectors could not have been a substantial factor in Plaintiff’s injury.

"A defendant's negligent conduct may combine with another factor to cause harm; if a defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm, then the defendant is responsible for the harm; a defendant cannot avoid responsibility just because some other person, condition, or event was also a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm; but conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would have occurred without that conduct." (Yanez v. Plummer (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 180, 187, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 309.) However, causation must be established by nonspeculative evidence. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 774; Montague v. AMN Healthcare, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1525, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 123 [“speculative inferences do not raise a triable issue of fact”].)

Defendant argues there is no evidence that Defendants’ allegedly defective or inadequate number of smoke detectors were a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries. According to Defendant, any argument by Plaintiff that a functioning smoke detector would have alerted her to the fire sooner is based on pure speculation. Other than Plaintiff’s complaint in this action, Defendant only offers two exhibits in support: Excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition, and a diagram of an apartment that is “nearly identical to the layout of Plaintiff’s apartment.” (Smith Decl., ¶ I.)

Defendant’s evidence does not establish that a lack of functional smoke detectors could not have been a substantial factor in Plaintiff’s injury. According to Defendant, Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition that she could have walked through the front door and left her apartment after noticing the fire and does not know why she did not. (Smith Decl., Ex. B [Plaintiff’s Deposition, 68:5-10].) Defendant insists this establishes that Plaintiff is solely to blame for her injuries and a functional smoke detector would not have made a difference.

Defendant misconstrues Plaintiff’s statements. When asked why she did not leave the apartment before returning to her balcony Plaintiff did in fact answer “I don’t know.” (Ibid.) But Plaintiff was not asked if she could have walked out the front door after noticing the fire; she was instead asked if the area between her computer table—where the fire started—and her front door was clear from fire. (Ibid.) She answered she believed so. (Ibid.) But that answer does not prove Plaintiff believed she could have exited her apartment at the time. In fact, in the same deposition transcript offered by Defendant, Plaintiff clarifies that she retreated to her balcony and did not walk out her front door because she was frightened by the flame. (Id. at 100:6-10.)

Plaintiff also testifies that she was out on her balcony for ten minutes before becoming aware of the fire. (Id. at 66:10-12.) Plaintiff asserts a functional smoke detector would have alerted her to the fire sooner, which would have allowed her to exit her apartment safely. Defendant offers no evidence that a functional fire detector would not have alerted Plaintiff sooner. Indeed, Defendant notes that “[a] smoke detector may or may not have sounded prior to Plaintiff observing the flame. The probabilities of the smoke detector sounding before or after Plaintiff observed the flame are even at best…” (Motion, pg. 8, lines 15-17.) The effectiveness of the smoke detector’s alarm is a triable issue of fact.

As for Defendant’s second exhibit —the diagram of an apartment nearly identical to Plaintiff’s apartment—it’s not clear how the diagram supports Defendant’s argument. Defendant does not reference the diagram in its memoranda, and only references the diagram once in its separate statement to make the point that Plaintiff was in her living room sitting at her desk before the fire started. It’s undisputed that Plaintiff was on her balcony when she noticed the fire. Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the diagram shows that a fire on Plaintiff’s living room desk would have impeded her path to the front door. (Smith Decl., Ex. C.)

Liberally construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant fails to show that the lack of functional smoke detectors could not have been a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injury.

B.     Plaintiff creates a triable issue of material fact

Assuming Defendant had met its prima facie burden of negating the element of causation, the burden would shift to Plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Donohue, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at 1077.)  Plaintiff meets this burden.

Plaintiff offers the declaration of Robert Rappaport—an expert in fire origin and cause investigation, scene analysis, and reconstruction. (Khedry Decl., Ex. 9 [Rappaport Decl., ¶ 1].) Mr. Rappaport opines that the failure of the expired smoke alarms in Plaintiff’s apartment to properly activate delayed Plaintiff’s observation of the fire in her living room. (Id., ¶ 9.4.) Mr. Rappaport further opines that a 2 foot by 3 foot fire would be unsafe to navigate, but that if the smoke alarms had activated Plaintiff would have noticed the fire when it was smaller, and she more likely than not would have been able to safely escape through her front door and/or put the fire out. (Id., ¶¶ 9.7, 9.9.)

The Court need not consider the additional declarations and exhibits, as the Court does not weigh evidence at summary judgment. It only looks for whether Plaintiff has created a triable issue of material fact, and Plaintiff has done so with respect to causation. Defendant does not attempt to negate any other element of Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims, and therefore Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Equity Residential Management, LLC’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  March 14, 2023

_____________________________

Colin Leis

Judge of the Superior Court