Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 21STCV24833, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV24833 Hearing Date: March 28, 2024 Dept: 74
Courtney Patterson v.
PIH Health Downey Hospital
Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication
BACKGROUND
This action arises from an employment
dispute.
In February 2021, Plaintiff Courtney
Patterson (Plaintiff) sent her co-worker Claudia Aguilar (Aguilar) sexually
explicit photographs via text message.
On May 2, 2021, Defendant PIH Health
Downey Hospital (Defendant) received a complaint from an employee about
Aguilar.
Defendant conducted an investigation
against Aguilar. To that end, Defendant interviewed Plaintiff.
On May 6, 2021, Defendant questioned
Aguilar about the allegations against her. During the interview, Aguilar informed
Defendant about the sexually explicit photographs she had received from
Plaintiff. Plaintiff believes Aguilar volunteered the information due to
Plaintiff’s participation in the investigation.
On May 19, 2021, Defendant placed
Plaintiff on an investigatory suspension.
On May 20, 2021, Plaintiff emailed
Defendant to complain that Aguilar and Defendant had retaliated against
Plaintiff for participating in the Aguilar investigation.
On May 27, 2021, Defendant
terminated Plaintiff’s employment.
On July 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a
complaint against Defendant. The complaint alleges the following causes of
action: (1) workplace disparate treatment, (2) retaliation under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), (3) failure to prevent discrimination and
retaliation, and (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
On April 12, 2023, Defendant filed
this motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
EVIDENCE
The court preserves Defendant’s
evidentiary objections.
LEGAL
STANDARD
“¿[A] motion for summary judgment
shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.¿” (¿¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c)¿¿.) The
moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie
showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (¿¿Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850¿¿.) If the moving party
carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima
facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (¿¿Ibid.¿¿) Courts “¿liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in
favor of that party.¿” (¿¿Dore v. Arnold
Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389¿¿.)
DISCUSSION
First Cause of Action – Workplace
Disparate Treatment
Defendant argues this cause of
action fails because Defendant did not suspend and terminate Plaintiff because
of her race. “Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination on prohibited
grounds.” (DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549, fn.
10.) To prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must establish the following: (1) she
was a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position she
held, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some other
circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)
In support of its motion for summary
adjudication, Defendant offers evidence that Plaintiff’s suspension and
termination served to prevent workplace harassment, as required by Government
Code section 12940, subdivision (k). That is, Aguilar reported to Defendant
that Plaintiff had shown her sexually explicit photographs that made her
uncomfortable while she was at work. (Avila Decl., ¶ 21; Rivas Decl., ¶ 13.)
Defendant then investigated the incident and determined Plaintiff had violated
Defendant’s harassment and discrimination policy. (Avila Decl., ¶ 37; Rivas
Decl., ¶ 28; Morando Decl., ¶ 36.) This evidence suggests Plaintiff’s race did
not motivate Defendant to suspend and terminate Plaintiff. Thus, Defendant has
met its prima facie burden, meaning the burden shifts to Plaintiff to create a
triable issue of material fact.
Plaintiff, for her part, does not
oppose dismissal of her claim for disparate treatment. The court grants
Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication for this cause of action.
Second Cause of Action – FEHA
Retaliation
Defendant seeks summary
adjudication of this cause of action because there is no causal connection
between Plaintiff’s participation in the Aguilar investigation and Plaintiff’s May
19 suspension or May 27 termination. In addition, Defendant argues it suspended
and terminated Plaintiff for legitimate reasons that were not pretextual.
Government Code section 12940,
subdivision (h) prohibits an employer from terminating an employee because the
employee has opposed any practices forbidden under FEHA or because the employee
has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding.
For FEHA retaliation claims, the
plaintiff must first show that (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity,
(2) the defendant subjected him or her to an adverse employment action, and (3)
there is a causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s
action. (Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467,
476.) If the plaintiff does so, the defendant must then articulate a
legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for its acts. (Ibid.) If the defendant
does so, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s proffered explanation is
merely a pretext for the termination. (Ibid.)
First, Defendant argues this cause
of action fails because there is no causal connection between Plaintiff’s
participation in the Aguilar investigation and Plaintiff’s suspension or
termination. But Defendant does not address the potential causal connection
between the May 27 termination and Plaintiff’s May 20 email to Defendant, which
Defendant itself provides. (Motion, p. 13:15-24; Avila Decl., ¶ 30; Rivas
Decl., ¶ 23; Morando Decl., ¶ 30; Ex. 6, Ex. 18; Complaint, ¶ 15.) In the
email, Plaintiff complained that Aguilar retaliated against her for
participating in the Aguilar investigation. That is, Aguilar retaliated by
sharing the sexually explicit photographs with Defendant. Plaintiff further
complained that Defendant’s human resources department supported the
retaliation by suspending Plaintiff. The trier of fact could construe the email
as expressing Plaintiff’s good faith belief that Defendant had retaliated
against her.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s May 20 email about her
alleged retaliatory suspension may serve as a protected activity for the
purposes of her claim that the May 27 termination was retaliatory. An employee
may bring a retaliation claim when the employee has complained of conduct that
the employee believes is unlawful under FEHA, even if a court later determines
FEHA does not actually prohibit the conduct. (Miller v. Department of
Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 473-474.) And given the temporal proximity
between the May 20 email and May 27 termination, the trier of fact could infer
that Defendant terminated Plaintiff because of her complaint. (Morgan v.
Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69.) Thus,
Defendant has not met its prima facie burden on the issue of causation.
Second, Defendant contends it
terminated Plaintiff for legitimate reasons that were not pretextual. That is,
Defendant based its decision on an investigation and its conclusion that
Plaintiff had violated Defendant’s harassment and discrimination policy. (Avila
Decl., ¶ 37; Rivas Decl., ¶ 28; Morando Decl., ¶ 36.) Again, though, the
temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s May 20 email and the May 27 termination
suggests Defendant could have fired Plaintiff because of her complaint that
Defendant had engaged in unlawful conduct under FEHA. Indeed, “many employment
cases present issues of intent [and] motive, issues not determinable on paper.
Such cases […] are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment,
however liberalized summary judgment standards may be.” (Moore v. Regents of
University of California (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216, 236.) Thus, Defendant
has not met its prima facie burden on this issue, either.
Given the foregoing, the court
denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of this cause of action.
Third Cause of Action – Failure
to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation
Defendant argues this cause of
action must fail because Plaintiff cannot prevail on the underlying claims. But
the court has found that there are triable issues of material fact for
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Thus, Defendant has not met its prima facie
burden and the court denies the motion for summary adjudication of this cause
of action.
Fourth Cause of Action – Wrongful
Termination in Violation of Public Policy
The elements of a claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee
relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff’s employment, (3) the
termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and
(4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm. (Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford,
Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154.)
Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot
prove she was terminated in violation of Government Code section 12940,
subdivision (h). According to Defendant, there is no causal nexus between Plaintiff’s
protected activities and her termination. However, the court has found that
there is a triable issue of material fact whether Defendant terminated
Plaintiff on May 27 because she complained to Defendant about suspected
retaliation in an email dated May 20. Thus, Defendant has not met its prima facie
burden. The court denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of this
cause of action.
Punitive Damages
Under Civil Code section 3294,
punitive damages are recoverable if the plaintiff proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice.
An employer cannot be liable for
punitive damages based on the misconduct of an employee unless the employer (1)
had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her
with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, (2) authorized or
ratified the employee’s misconduct, or (3) was personally guilty of oppression,
malice, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)
For corporate employers, the advance
knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or act of
oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or
managing agent of the corporation. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)
Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot
prove her claim for punitive damages for two reasons. First, the employees who
allegedly retaliated against Plaintiff were not Defendant’s corporate officers,
directors, or managing agents. (Undisputed Material Facts, 339-345.) Second, Defendant
asserts Plaintiff cannot prove that one of Defendant’s corporate officers,
directors, or managing agents knew about and ratified the alleged retaliation
against Plaintiff. In support, Defendant directs the court to 51 undisputed material
facts. But Defendant does not articulate how those facts show a corporate
officer could not have ratified Defendant’s employees alleged misconduct. Thus,
Defendant has not met its prima facie burden and the court denies the motion
for summary adjudication for the issue of punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
The
court grants Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication for the first cause of
action. The court denies Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication for the
second, third, and fourth causes of action. The court denies Defendant’s motion
for summary adjudication for the issue of punitive damages.
Defendant shall give notice.