Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 21STCV31928, Date: 2023-05-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV31928    Hearing Date: May 8, 2023    Dept: 74

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT 

DEPARTMENT 74 

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Monir Homeowners Association

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff Anvar Sadeghpour

Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND 

            This action arises from a dispute revolving around Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs).

            In 1981, the Monir Homeowners Association (Defendant) was formed along with applicable CCRs. According to Plaintiff Anvar Sadeghpour (Plaintiff), the CCRs referred to and incorporated an Exhibit that was not originally attached. The CCRs were then amended to incorporate the Exhibit in 1985 (85 Amendment). The 85 Amendment provided that each of the six condominium owners owned an undivided one-sixth interest in the common area and that each owner would contribute a one-sixth share to the annual maintenance budget on a monthly basis.

            There was another Amendment in 1988 (88 Amendment). The 88 Amendment changed the share that each condominium owner would contribute to the annual maintenance budget of the common area.

            Plaintiff argued that the 88 Amendment was contrary to the CCRs and sought to have it voided so that the original CCRs would be enforced.

            To that end, Plaintiff filed a complaint on August 30, 2021. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following causes of action: declaratory relief, reform written instrument, cancel written instrument, breach of contract, restitution, and accounting.

            On June 17, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s causes of action were time-barred. The court granted the motion in its entirety.

            On December 2, 2022, Defendant filed this motion for attorney fees.

DISCUSSION 

            Attorney Fees Under Civil Code Section 5975, Subdivision (c).

            “The Davis-Stirling Act governs an action to enforce the recorded covenants and restrictions of a common interest development. Civil Code section 5975 provides that the CC&Rs may be enforced as equitable servitudes and that in an action to enforce the governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” (Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 773; Civ. Code, § 5975, subd. (c).)

            “The Davis-Stirling Act does not define ‘prevailing party’ or provide a rubric for that determination.” (Ibid.) Rather, California courts have found that the test for prevailing party is “a pragmatic one, namely whether a party prevailed on a practical level by achieving its main litigation objectives.” (Ibid.)

            Defendant makes the case that Plaintiff “cannot escape the mandatory award of attorney’s fees under the Davis-Stirling Act.” (Motion, at p. 3.) Plaintiff in turn argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 5975 is inapplicable because the purpose of the action was not to enforce the governing documents. Rather, Plaintiff merely sought to void the 88 Amendment. (Opp., at pp. 4-5.) By seeking to void the 88 Amendment, though, the Plaintiff also sought to enforce the CCRs. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges, “[…] the [88 Amendment] is contrary to the [CCRs] as violative of Articel [sic] VI Section 5 . . .” (Complaint, ¶ 36.) Moreover: “The [88 Amendment] clearly is not consistent with and violates . .. the [CCRs] UNIFORM RATE ASSESSMENT PROVISION.” (Complaint, ¶ 42.) Plaintiff goes on to argue that Civil Code section 5975 is inapplicable because Plaintiff is a voluntary director but fails to cite any authority for this proposition. Next, Plaintiff argues that Article X, Section 4 of the CCRs precludes Defendant’s proposed recovery. But the provision is silent as to attorney fees from Plaintiff’s counsel. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that attorney fees are inappropriate because Defendant is not a prevailing party for purposes of Civil Code section 5975. That is, Defendant’s main litigation objective was only to raise the defense of statute of limitations. But Defendant raised this defense to dismiss Plaintiff’s case, meaning it could continue enforcing the CCRs with the 88 Amendment.

            Thus, attorney fees under Civil Code section 5975 are appropriate.

Reasonableness of Attorney Fees Sought.

            “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)

            “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Ibid.) An award of attorney fees may also be based on counsel’s declarations. (Raining v. Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) The court finds Defendant’s counsel’s hourly rates reasonable.

            The attorney bears the burden of proof as to reasonableness of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) Defendant has substantiated its attorney fees request with an hourly breakdown of work performed. (Safarian Decl., ¶ 9; Ex. D). The court will also award costs in the amount of $1,324.54, as calculated in the memorandum of costs. (Safarian Decl., ¶ 12.)

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the court grants Defendant’s motion for attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendant $93,031 in attorney fees and $1,324.54 in costs.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED:  ¿May 8, 2023 

_____________________________ 

Colin Leis 

Judge of the Superior Court