Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 21STCV35596, Date: 2024-01-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV35596    Hearing Date: February 1, 2024    Dept: 74

Ernest J. Franceschi, Jr. v. Christopher Baldwin, et al.

Defendant Christopher Baldwin’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

            This action arises from a dispute between an attorney and his former client.

            On September 28, 2021, Plaintiff Ernest J. Franceschi Jr. filed a complaint against Defendant Christopher Baldwin (Defendant) and others.

            On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC). In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: (1) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (2) tortious interference with contract, and (3) extortion.

            On May 26, 2022, the court sustained Defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend for the first and second causes of action.

            On November 15, 2023, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment of the third cause of action for extortion.

LEGAL STANDARD 

            “¿[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.¿” (¿¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c)¿¿.) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (¿¿Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850¿¿.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (¿¿Ibid.¿¿) Courts “¿liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.¿” (¿¿Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389¿¿.)

DISCUSSION 

            Defendant requests summary judgment because Plaintiff never paid the money Defendant demanded, as required for a civil extortion claim. In support, Defendant cites Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 408, disapproved on other grounds in Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212. In Fuhrman, the court equated civil extortion to a claim for the recovery of money received by a defendant under the influence of duress. (Id. at pp. 426, 428.) To prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must sustain cognizable damages. (Id. at p. 428.) The court held that the plaintiff did not sustain such damages for the purposes of extortion because the plaintiff never paid the money the defendants demanded. (Ibid.) Moreover, the plaintiff’s alleged damages for severe emotional distress did not support the claim. (Ibid.) Thus, the civil extortion claim failed. (Ibid.)

            Here, Defendant offers evidence that Plaintiff did not pay Defendant any money because of the allegedly extortionate email. (Leigh Decl., ¶¶ 3, 7, 8; Ex. B, 118:6-8, 176:18-177:12; Ex. F, p. 3; Ex. G, p. 2.) Nor did Plaintiff give Defendant anything of value because of the allegedly extortionate email. (Leigh Decl., ¶¶ 3, 7, 8; Ex. B, 119:15-18, 176:18-177:12; Ex. F, p. 3; Ex. G, p. 2.) Given the foregoing, Defendant has met his prima facie burden, meaning Plaintiff must create a triable issue of material fact.

            Plaintiff agrees he never paid Defendant or gave him anything of value because of the email. Rather, Plaintiff contends that his civil extortion claim can be based on the mere attempt to extort. Plaintiff relies on Penal Code section 523, which provides that individuals who intend to extort property from another by way of threatening letter may be punished as if property were actually obtained through the threat. The statute thus criminalizes attempted extortion. But Plaintiff does not cite any authority for the proposition that Penal Code section 523 gives rise to a private right of action, or that section 523 legislatively abrogated Fuhrman. Plaintiff also argues that attempted extortion is a lesser included offense of the general crime of extortion, but again fails to show how this creates a private right of action. Thus, Plaintiff has not created a triable issue of material fact.

            Defendant also argues the civil extortion claim fails because Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress and loss of income are not cognizable damages.[1] Once again, Defendant invokes Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 428 to support his argument. In that case, the court held that alleged severe emotional distress does not support a cause of action for civil extortion. (Ibid.) Plaintiff in turn points to his deposition as evidence of his emotional distress. (Franceschi Decl., ¶¶ 18, 21; Leigh Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. B, p. 122:16-123:15, 125:15-21.) However, Fuhrman makes Plaintiff’s evidence immaterial to a cause of action for civil extortion.[2] Plaintiff also appears to claim he can recover under a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. But Plaintiff does not allege that cause of action in the operative complaint. (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 [“[T]he burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint […].”)

CONCLUSION

                The court grants Defendant Chrisopher Baldwin’s motion for summary judgment.

            Defendant Christopher Baldwin shall file and serve a proposed judgment of dismissal.

            Defendant shall give notice.