Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22AHCV00244, Date: 2022-08-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV00244    Hearing Date: August 26, 2022    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTHEAST DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT 3

MOVING PARTY:                Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Antoine Becks

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant and Cross-Complainant Charlotte Martin

Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike Cross-Complaint

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiff Antoine Becks (“Becks”) filed this action to partition real property on April 28, 2022, against Defendant Charlotte Martin (“Martin”). The property at issue is located at 127 North Canyon Blvd., Monrovia, California 91016. Becks alleges that he and Martin each own an undivided interest in the property as joint tenants.

            On June 2, 2022, Martin filed a cross-complaint against Becks, alleging fraud, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On June 23, 2022, Martin filed a first amended cross-complaint (“FACC”), which adds causes of action for wrongful acquisition of deed by fraud and undue influence and quiet title.

Becks now moves to strike portions of the first amended cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

EVIDENCE

            The court rules on Martin’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Antoine Becks as follows:

            Objection 1: sustained

            Objection 2: sustained

            Objection 3: overruled

            Objection 4: overruled

            Objection 5: overruled

            Objection 6: overruled

            Objection 7: overruled

            Objection 8: sustained

LEGAL STANDARD

The anti-SLAPP statute is “a mechanism through which complaints that arise from the exercise of free speech rights can be evaluated at an early stage of the litigation process and resolved expeditiously.” (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 [internal quotations omitted].) Courts use a two-step process for determining whether an action is a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or a SLAPP. First, the court determines whether the defendant has established that the challenged claim arises from protected speech. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) If such a showing has been made, the court “determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION

A.   Prong One: Protected Activity

“[T]he only thing the defendant needs to establish to invoke the protection of the SLAPP statute is that the challenged lawsuit arose from an act on the part of the defendant in furtherance of her right of petition or free speech.” (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 307.)          

An act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech includes the following:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

In determining whether a cause of action arises from protected conduct, the court focuses on “the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct that provides the foundation for the claims.” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 490-491.) “[T]he critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 [emphasis in original].) “Assertions that are ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ are not subject to section 425.16.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 394.) “Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Ibid.)

Becks contends that all of the references in the first amended cross-complaint to his partition action are subject to being stricken. Becks’s filing of his lawsuit is protected activity under section 425.16, so the question is whether any of Martin’s causes of action arise from or are based on Becks’s partition action. (Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1087 [“It is well established that filing a lawsuit is an exercise of a party’s constitutional right of petition.”].)

Martin’s first cause of action for fraud is based on representations Becks allegedly made about wanting to marry Martin and build a life with her, including buying and renovating a home together. (FACC, ¶ 26.) As Martin notes, Becks completed his alleged fraud before Becks filed his partition action, so the partition action was not the basis for Martin’s fraud claim. Martin’s allegation that Becks put Martin “in a precarious situation” by leaving her and filing a partition lawsuit is merely incidental to the fraud claim. (FACC, ¶ 29; see also ¶ 57.)

Martin’s second cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing alleges Becks and Martin entered into an agreement to buy a family home together. (FACC, ¶ 34.) Martin alleges that Becks breached the implied duty to act fairly and in good faith by filing his partition lawsuit to force the property’s buy-out or sale after moving out of the property, thus frustrating the purpose of their agreement to buy the house. (FACC, ¶ 35.) Moreover, Martin alleges Becks’s conduct harmed her by forcing her “to go into more debt to save the house….” (FACC, ¶ 38.) These allegations indicate the wrongful conduct at issue is Becks’s filing of the partition action.

Martin’s third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty alleges Martin and Becks entered into a joint venture or partnership to buy a family home. (FACC, ¶ 41.) Martin alleges that Becks breached his fiduciary duty as a partner or joint venturer by essentially lying to her about his true motivations. (FACC, ¶¶ 43-44.) While filing the partition action may have hinted at Becks’s true motivations, the breach of fiduciary duty does not itself rest on filing the partition lawsuit.

Martin’s fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fifth cause of action for wrongful acquisition of deed by fraud and undue influence, and sixth cause of action for quiet title track Martin’s claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. For each of them, Becks’s filing of his partition action is merely collateral to Martin’s allegation that Becks harmed Martin by lying to her about his intentions. (FACC, ¶¶ 48, 54, 65.)

Consequently, the court finds that Becks has only met his burden on prong one as to the second cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

B.    Prong Two: Probability of Prevailing

“Under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, plaintiffs have the burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on their claims.” (MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 167, 183.) “Put another way, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].)  

            The court finds that Martin has failed to meet her burden of showing that the cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is legally sufficient and supported by competent evidence.

             As an initial matter, the court notes that Martin has not provided an analysis of the elements of a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant (nor has she provided an analysis of the elements of any of her other causes of action). Martin has also failed to provide an analysis of the evidence submitted (in the form of her declaration) as it pertains to any specific cause of action. A plaintiff cannot meet her burden on prong two without providing this analysis. (MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 185-186.) 

            In any event, “[a] plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if the litigation privilege precludes the defendant’s liability on the claim.” (MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 183.) Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) states: “[a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . [i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2.” The litigation privilege applies to statements made prior to legal proceedings, or afterwards, if the statements are made in furtherance of the objects of the proceedings. (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1272.) In other words, the statements must “be connected with, or have some logical relation to, the [proceeding].” (Ibid., citing Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 283.)

            Here, the court notes that the parties primarily discuss the litigation privilege in relation to prong one. But whether conduct is protected by the litigation privilege is an issue that is irrelevant to the prong one analysis. (Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 284.) Nevertheless, Becks does generally argue that Martin cannot meet her prong two burden because the alleged wrongful conduct is the filing of the partition action, which cannot give rise to tort liability. (Mot., p. 18:9-11.) The court agrees. “Pleadings and process in a case are generally viewed as privileged communications.” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 770.) Martin offers no argument in rebuttal.

            Additionally, Becks argues that the cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is barred by the Anti-Heart Balm Statute (Civil Code section 43.4 [“A fraudulent promise to marry or to cohabit after marriage does not give rise to a cause of action for damages.”]). Martin alleges that the she and Becks entered into a contract or agreement to purchase a family home, “as they were to be married.” (FACC, ¶ 34.) Becks contends that this allegation places the claim within the bounds of a breach of promise action, which courts have recognized are barred by the Anti-Heart Balm statute. Again, the court notes that Martin offers no rebuttal to this argument other than to state that she “did not sue [Becks] because he decided not to marry her. His romance was part of his scam.” (Opp’n, p. 9:21-23.) But this kind of “scam” is exactly what is barred by the Anti-Heart Balm statute. (Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 952-953.)

Lastly, with regard to the issue of attorney fees, because of the mixed outcome of the anti-SLAPP motion, the court reserves its determination on the question of fees pending a noticed motion on the issue of which party is the prevailing party and what fees and costs are recoverable. However, the court does not find that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous, and so the court denies Martin’s request for fees on that basis.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court grants in part and denies in part Becks’s special motion to strike. The court grants Becks’s motion as to the second cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court otherwise denies Becks’s special motion to strike. The court also denies Martin’s request for attorney’s fees.

Becks is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  August 26, 2022

_____________________________

Colin Leis

Judge of the Superior Court