Judge Colin Leis, Case 22AHCV00384 2023-01-12 Tentative Ruling

RESPONDING PARTIES: Defendants FCA US LLC; Bravo Dodge Jeep Ram of Alhambra; and Does 1 through 100

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

Plaintiff William Perez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants FCA US LLC, Bravo Dodge Jeep Ram of Alhambra, and one hundred Doe defendants (“Defendants”) on June 21, 2022, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and (3) negligent repair.

On November 8, 2022, the court issued an order granting dismissal of Defendant Bravo Dodge Jeep Ram of Alhambra. Plaintiff now moves as the prevailing party for recovery of his attorneys’ fees.

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. … The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citations omitted].) “[T]he court's discretion in awarding attorney fees is … to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Id. at p. 396.) The trial court may reduce the award where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the attorneys’ efforts are unorganized or duplicative. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.)

The court sustains Defendants’ objection to Exhibit D to Declaration of Mark Charles.

Plaintiff contends that he is the prevailing party in this action and is entitled to recover his costs per Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). (Motion, 6:6-15.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party. Defendants contend, however, that the attorney’s fees requested are excessive. Defendants assert “the only work performed by [plaintiff’s counsel] was the filing of a template (7) page complaint and the service of form discovery demands recycled from previous lemon law cases.”[1] (Italics and underlining original.)

Plaintiff’s billing records and supporting declaration show otherwise. To support his fee request, plaintiff submits counsel’s billing records. From March 2022 to October 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel billed 30.7 hours for services rendered at $550.00 per hour and incurred $725.00 in costs. (Charles Decl., Ex. C.) Based on the time billed, Plaintiff seeks a lodestar total of $16,885 in attorney’s fees (plus costs, which Defendants do not address).

Defendants argue that the fee request is excessive and unreasonable, pointing in particular to Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate. Defendants state “Plaintiff’s counsel does not provide any evidentiary support as to why he should be allowed to bill at the excessive rate of $550 per hour, and he fails to acknowledge what the local fee rates for attorneys of the same skill and experience are.” (Opp., 4:17-19.) The court finds however, based on its own knowledge and experience, that the requested hourly rate is reasonable in the Los Angeles-area legal community. “[T]he trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-437 [internal citations omitted].) “In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market . . . .” (Id. at 437.)

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s counsel overbilled, citing as examples Plaintiff’s counsel billing 1.5 hours to draft a two-page demand letter and 3.5 hours to draft a seven-page form complaint. (Opp., 5:12-13.) Defendants also challenge Plaintiff’s counsel billing 2.8 hours to draft form discovery demands after the case had already settled. (Opp., 5:15-16.) Plaintiff reports the discovery was necessary because numerous delays arose in getting a final settlement agreement. (Reply, 6:14-28, 7:1-23, 8:4.) The court does, however, find that 3.5 hours to complete a form complaint is excessive, and reduces the time billed to one hour.

Defendants additionally note that there is not a single hour billed by a paralegal or assistant, and claims that “all of these tasks could have been performed by either, given the nature of this work.” (Opp. 5:20-21.) Defendants do not, however, point to any examples of such tasks.

Defendants also object to plaintiff billing five hours to draft the subject fee motion and recommend the court reduce the time awarded for drafting the motion “at least in half.” (Opp., 5:26, 6:8.) The court declines to do so because five hours is a reasonable amount of time.

Based on the foregoing, the court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The court orders that Defendants shall pay Plaintiff’s counsel within 30 days of this order $15,510 ($550/hr x 28.2 hrs.) for attorney’s fees plus $725 in costs, for a total of $16,235.

[1] The court takes pause to note the tone of Defendant’s opposition. The opposition describes plaintiff’s counsel as “avaricious” engaging in “gross excess and impropriety,” and, among other things, asserts the existence of a “distorted trend” seeking “extortionate attorneys’ fees.” (Oppos. pp. 1-2.) Name calling is not legal analysis. Name calling does not help the court.

william perez ; Plaintiff, v. fca us llc , et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	22AHCV00384

	Hearing Date:	January 12, 2023

	Time:	8:30 a.m.

	[Tentative] Order RE: Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees