Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCP04254, Date: 2023-10-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCP04254    Hearing Date: October 6, 2023    Dept: 74

In the Matter of Paul William Pilger

Demurrer

The court considered the moving papers. No opposition was timely filed with the court, although Plaintiff evidentially served an opposition on Defendants. (See Reply p. 4)

TENTATIVE RULING

            The court sustains this demurrer with leave to amend.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE.

            The court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice.

BACKGROUND 

            This action arises from a contractual dispute.

            On November 30, 2022, Plaintiff Paul William Pilger (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Monica Potter, Sabrina Coryell, and Kevin Dwight (Defendants). The complaint alleges intentional and/or negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

            On March 23, 2023, Defendants filed this demurrer.

LEGAL STANDARD

            A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (¿¿Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318¿¿.) “¿To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.¿” (¿¿C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872¿¿.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (¿Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967¿.) A demurrer “¿does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.¿” (¿¿Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713¿¿.)

            A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.  (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (¿Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616¿.)

DISCUSSION 

            The Releases Plaintiff Signed Bar His Claims for Intentional and Negligent    Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.

            In support of their demurrer, Defendants direct the court’s attention to a settlement agreement and a separation agreement, which Plaintiff signed in 2018. (Klein Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3; Ex. A; Ex. B.) Under the agreements, Plaintiff releases and discharges trustees and, among others, their agents, representatives, and attorneys from all causes of action arising out of their actions involving the Administrative Trust, Survivor’s Trust, and the Revocable Trust. (Klein Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3; Ex. A, § 7; Ex. B, § 7.) This release covers Defendant Sabrina Coryell, who is listed in the agreements as a trustee, and Defendant Monica Potter, who is listed in the agreements as the CEO of a co-trustee. The release also covers Defendant Kevin Dwight, an attorney acting on behalf of the trust. (Complaint, pp. 21-23.) And most important, the release also applies to Plaintiff’s causes of action here.

            Plaintiff alleges Defendants coerced him to enter the agreements. (Complaint, pp. 23, 30-31.) First, Defendants allegedly told Plaintiff that if he did not sign the agreements, he would receive nothing from the trust. (Complaint, pp. 19, 23.) But as Defendants note, “it does not constitute duress or coercion to threaten to do that which a party has a legal right to do.” (Marshall v. Packard-Bell Co. (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 770, 774.) Second, Defendants allegedly told Plaintiff that if he further disputed his entitlement to trust assets, Defendants would conduct discovery and investigate the disappearance of items from the estate’s properties to which Plaintiff had access. (Complaint, p. 20.) However, the threat of taking legal action generally does not constitute coercion or duress. (Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 204.) Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged conduct by Defendants that renders the settlement agreement void or voidable.

            Plaintiff Has Not Alleged Facts Sufficient to Support His Causes of Action      Intentional and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.

            The elements for these causes of action are as follows: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional or negligent acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant. (Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404.) In addition, the alleged interference must have been wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. (Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 392-393.)

            Here, Plaintiff alleges he and Gwynneth Weiss entered a contract, which guaranteed him lifetime employment, a condominium, and a bequest of $150,000. (Complaint, p. 7-8.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants interfered with this contract by coercing him into entering a settlement and separation agreement with the Estate of Gwynneth Weiss. (Complaint, pp. 19, 20, 23, 30, 31.) Moreover, the agreements excluded what the prior contract promised—namely, lifetime employment and the condominium. (Complaint, p. 17.) But Defendants note Plaintiff has not alleged that the interference was wrongful because their threats that (1) Plaintiff would receive nothing from the trust if he did not sign the agreements and (2) they would aggressively pursue discovery in litigation, were not unlawful. (Complaint, pp. 19, 20, 23; (Marshall v. Packard-Bell Co. supra, 106 Cal.App.2d at p. 774 [“[I]t does not constitute duress or coercion to threaten to do that which a party has a legal right to do.”]; Leeper v. Beltrami, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 204.)

            Next, Defendants note a cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage cannot lie against a party to the contract. (Kelly v. General Telephone Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 278, 288; Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 514.) Plaintiff alleges a contractual relationship with Gwynneth Weiss. (Complaint, p. 25.) Upon Weiss’s death, Plaintiff would have been in a contractual relationship with the Weiss Estate. Defendant Sabrina Coryell is a trustee of the Gwynneth Weiss Administrative Trust. (Klein Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A.) Moreover, Defendant Monica Potter is the CEO of a co-trustee of the Gwynneth Weiss Administrative Trust. (Klein Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A.) And Defendant Kevin Dwight is an attorney acting on behalf of the trust. (Complaint, pp. 21-23.) As such, they are agents of the Weiss Estate and cannot be third parties to the alleged contract between Plaintiff and the Weiss Estate. (See Kelly v. General Telephone Co., surpa, 136 Cal.App.3d at p. 288.)

            Plaintiff’s Causes of Action Against Defendant Kevin Dwight Are Time-Barred

            Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting attorney Defendant Kevin Dwight provided his services anywhere other than California, thus California’s statute of limitations applies. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a): “An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission . . . arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers or . . . should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.” Plaintiff does not allege Wright committed any misconduct after the June 14, 2018 signing of the settlement agreement. (Complaint, p. 22-24; Klein Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A.) Plaintiff filed his complaint on November 30, 2022. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Kevin Dwight are barred.

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the court sustains Defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend.

Defendants are ordered to give notice.