Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV06573, Date: 2023-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV06573    Hearing Date: September 8, 2023    Dept: 74

Diego Francisco-Andreas v. Avalon Cold Storage, LLC, et al.

Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

TENTATIVE RULING

            The court overrules the demurrer because the parties can clarify the ambiguities in the operative complaint in discovery.

BACKGROUND 

            This action arises from an employment dispute.

            On February 23, 2022, Plaintiff Diego Francisco-Andreas (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant Avalon Cold Storage, LLC (Defendant) and iStaffing, Inc. (iStaffing).

            On June 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC). In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), retaliation, failure to provide meal periods, failure to maintain records, failure to provide personnel records, failure to issue accurate itemized wage statements, and violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200.

            On July 26, 2022, Defendant filed this demurrer.

LEGAL STANDARD         

            A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (¿¿Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318¿¿.) “¿To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.¿” (¿¿C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872¿¿.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (¿Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967¿.) A demurrer “¿does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.¿” (¿¿Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713¿¿.)

            A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.  (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (¿Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616¿.)

DISCUSSION 

Joint Employer Liability

            In support of its demurrer, Defendant first contends the FAC does not state facts sufficient to support joint employer liability. To determine whether an organization is a joint employer, courts look to the facts surrounding the employment relationship. (Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 124-125). Factors considered include payment of salary to the employee, the location where the employee performed the work, the employer’s authority to hire and discharge the employee, and the employer’s overall control over the means and manner of the employee’s performance. (Id. at p. 125.)

            Here, the FAC alleges that Defendant and iStaffing hired Plaintiff and controlled his wages, hours, and working conditions. (FAC, ¶ 7.) The FAC also alleges that Plaintiff reported to both Defendant and iStaffing. (FAC, ¶ 7.) Most importantly, the FAC alleges that Defendant and iStaffing terminated Plaintiff on October 11, 2021. (FAC, ¶¶ 5, 13.) Taken together, these allegations support joint employer liability. The court will not sustain the demurrer because some of the allegations lack detail. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 616¿ [“[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”].)

First Cause of Action (Violation of CFRA) and Second Cause of Action (Retaliation)

            Next, Defendant argues the allegations supporting these causes of action are uncertain and ambiguous. To that end, Defendant targets paragraph eleven of the FAC, where Plaintiff claims he informed his managers, Diaundra Terell and Roxana Rosa, he needed to take leave under the CFRA to care for his newborn daughter. (FAC, ¶ 11.) Defendant maintains Plaintiff has failed to specify how and when he provided the leave request. But the parties can clarify these issues in discovery. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 616¿) Defendant further objects to Plaintiff’s ambiguous use of “Defendants” in paragraph eleven. But Plaintiff defined the term elsewhere in the operative complaint. (FAC, ¶ 5.)

            Moreover, Defendant contends that paragraph twelve of the FAC is ambiguous. There, Plaintiff alleges Defendant acknowledged Plaintiff’s CFRA leave in writing but terminated him during his protected leave of absence. (FAC, ¶ 12.) Defendant points out that Plaintiff has not alleged when he received a doctor’s note and provided it to Defendant. However, the parties can resolve these issues in discovery.

CONCLUSION 

            Based on the foregoing, the court overrules Defendant’s demurrer.

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Diego Francisco-Andreas v. Avalon Cold Storage, LLC, et al.

Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

TENTATIVE RULING

            The court denies the motion to strike portions of the first amended complaint because Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts that support his request for punitive damages.

BACKGROUND 

            This action arises from an employment dispute.

            On February 23, 2022, Plaintiff Diego Francisco-Andreas (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant Avalon Cold Storage, LLC (Defendant) and iStaffing, Inc. (iStaffing).

            On June 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC). In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), retaliation, failure to provide meal periods, failure to maintain records, failure to provide personnel records, failure to issue accurate itemized wage statements, and violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200.

            On July 26, 2022, Defendant filed this motion to strike portions of the FAC.

LEGAL STANDARD

            A court may strike any “¿irrelevant, false or improper matter¿inserted in any pleading¿” or any part of a pleading “¿not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 436¿.) “¿The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437¿.)¿           

DISCUSSION 

            In its motion, Defendant seeks an order striking paragraphs 15, 28, 41, 42, and paragraph 8 of the prayer for relief in the FAC. Each paragraph requests punitive damages. Defendant contends that the FAC’s allegations do not support any such request. Under Civil Code section 3294, if a plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was guilty of malice or oppression, the plaintiff may recover punitive damages. In this context, malice can mean despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, ¶ 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.)

            In the FAC, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges malice on the part of Defendant. That is, Plaintiff claims Defendant knew he needed to go on leave to take care of his newborn daughter, who required surgery to treat her health condition. (FAC, ¶ 11.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest Defendant acknowledged that Plaintiff had a right to take such leave under the CFRA. (FAC, ¶ 12.) Nevertheless, Defendant fired Plaintiff during the leave to which he was legally entitled. (FAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff emphasizes that the termination occurred when he was taking care of his sick, newborn daughter. (FAC, ¶ 13.) Given these circumstances, a trier of fact could find Defendant’s alleged conduct despicable for the purposes of punitive damages.

CONCLUSION 

            Based on the foregoing, the court denies Defendant’s motion to strike.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.