Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV10967, Date: 2024-10-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV10967    Hearing Date: October 3, 2024    Dept: 74

Edwards v. The Estate of Francis Dudley

Defendant Fermin Santiago Toral’s Motion for Summary Judgement

BACKGROUND 

            On March 30, 2022, plaintiff Deanna Edwards (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against defendants the Estate of Francis Dudley (Decedent), Toral Fermin Santiago (Santiago) and Does 1-10 over ownership of 20950 Souder St., Perris, California 92570 (the Property).

            Plaintiff alleges that Decedent had become increasingly worried about the well-being of Plaintiff’s grandmother Elinor Alexander (Ms. Alexander) and another family member (Mr. Brown) who both resided at the Property.  In exchange for Plaintiff’s long-term care of Ms. Alexander and Mr. Brown, upon Decedent’s death and when both Ms. Alexander and Mr. Brown left the Property, the Property would pass to Plaintiff free and clear from Decedent’s estate

            Upon Decedent’s death in February of 1994, Plaintiff cared for Ms. Alexander and Mr. Brown and paid the property taxes and maintained the Property.  In 2006, Plaintiff filed a Change in Ownership Statement.  In 2008, Ms. Alexander had died, and Mr. Brown left the property, completing Plaintiff’s obligations under the contract.  On or about April 19, 2021, the Administrator of the Estate (Administrator) sold the Property to Santiago.

            Plaintiff alleges that Santiago had actual and inquiry notice of Plaintiff’s possession and claim of ownership. Plaintiff alleges four causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Common Count; (3) Reimbursement; and (4) Quiet Title.

            Defendant Santiago filed a cross-claim against defendants Perona -Howard (Perona-Howard), Karen Castillo, Maxres Inc, and Roes 1-10 alleging four claims: (1) Negligent Misrepresentation; (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (3) Breach of Contract; and (4) Rescission.

            Santiago filed a Motion for Summary Judgement against Plaintiff on the Quiet Title cause of action.

LEGAL STANDARD

¿¿The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense.  (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)  Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

DISCUSSION 

            Santiago moves for summary judgement on the basis that Plaintiff cannot meet the elements for quiet title by adverse possession.  Santiago alleges that Plaintiff (1) did not occupy the Property adverse to the true owner, (2) never exercised exclusive control over the Property, and (3) never paid the property taxes for her own benefit for the statutory five-year period.

Quite Title by Adverse Possession

            The elements of an adverse possession cause of action are (1) open and notorious use, (2) hostile to the true owner, (3) for a period of five years, (4) continuous and uninterrupted, (5) under claim of right, and (6) plaintiff paid taxes on the land.  (Mehdizadeh v. Mincer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1305; Silacci v. Abramson (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.)  Santiago disputes that the occupation was hostile and adverse, that the possession was exclusive, and that Plaintiff did not pay taxes for the statutorily required 5 years.

Hostile and Adverse Possession

            Santiago claims that Plaintiff had permission to occupy the property.  Plaintiff occupied the property from 1974 until 1994 with the permission of the Decedent.  (UMF - Coe Decl., Exhibit 1, 12; Edwards Depo., p.23:11-13, 24:8-17, 51:2-13.)  From 1994 onwards, Plaintiff acted on behalf of the Decedent’s estate, allowing herself to live on the property.  (UMF - Coe Decl., Exhibits 5, 6, 12; Edwards Depo., p.62:18-63:9, 67:25;68:13; Edwards 494-497.).  October 2, 2020, Perona-Howard filed a Petition of Administration and was granted on April 1, 2021.  (UMF - Coe Decl., Exhibits 1, 7-9.).  The earliest “hostile” possession could be established would be April 1, 2021, when administration of the estate changed from de facto Plaintiff to Perona-Howard.  A five year period would end on April 1, 2026.  Santiago provided sufficient evidence to establish that Plaintiff has not occupied the property hostilely for the statutory five-year period, therefore, the burden shifts to plaintiff.

            Plaintiff did not file an opposition to create a triable issue of material fact.

Payment of Taxes

            Santiago claims, and Plaintiff admits, that in 2008, Plaintiff stopped paying taxes on the property.  (UMF - Coe Decl., Exhibits 1, 12, 14, 15; Edwards Depo., p. 57:13-19, 89:18-90:7.) Santiago also asserts that Plaintiff’s payments on the property before 2008 were paid for the Estate, not for Plaintiff’s adverse possession.  (UMF - Coe Decl., Exhibits 5, 6, 12; Edwards Depo., p.62:18-63:9, 67:25;68:13; Edwards 494-497.)  Santiago provided sufficient evidence that Plaintiff has not paid taxes on the property for herself for the statutory five-year period, therefore, the burden shifts to plaintiff.

            Plaintiff did not file an opposition to create a triable issue of material fact.

Exclusive Use

            Exclusive use is a subsection of the actual possession element. Adverse possession requires that the claimant’s possession of the property be exclusive.  (Strauss v. Canty (1915) 169 Cal. 101, 105.)  The period of exclusive possession must occur at the same time as the period of payment of taxes.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 325(b).) 

            Santiago argues that Plaintiff was not in exclusive possession while paying taxes for any five-year period.  Plaintiff paid taxes on the property, whether for herself or for the estate, from 1994 until 2008.  (UMF - Coe Decl., Exhibits 1, 12, 14, 15; Edwards Depo., p. 57:13-19, 89:18-90:7.)  Mr. Brown, a non-family member, occupied the Property from around 1980 until either 2008 or 2013.  (UMF - Coe Decl., Exhibit 12; Edwards Depo., p.118:14-25.)  At no point during the 1994 to 2008 tax-paying period did Plaintiff have exclusive possession of the property.  Santiago met his burden providing sufficient evidence that Plaintiff did not have exclusive possession of the property for the tax-paying period, therefore, the burden shifts to plaintiff.

            Plaintiff did not file an opposition to create a triable issue of material fact.

            Accordingly, there are no remaining triable issues of material fact in Plaintiff’s cause of action for Quiet Title by Adverse Possession.

CONCLUSION 

The court grants Defendant Santiago’s motion for summary judgement.

Defendant shall give notice.