Judge Colin Leis, Case Number: 22STCV12238, Date: 2023-10-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV12238, Date: 2023-10-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV12238 Hearing Date: October 11, 2023 Dept: 74

Rania Almasri v. Ihsan Jamil Nizam

Demurrer

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2022, Plaintiff Rania Almasri (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant Ihsan Jamil Nizam (Defendant).

On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) against Defendant. The FAC alleges the following causes of action: (1) nonpayment of wages, (2) failure to pay minimum wages, (3) failure to pay overtime wages, (4) meal break violations, (5) rest period violations, (6) waiting time penalties, (7) failure to provide itemized wage statements, (8) damages for fraud and deceit, (9) unlawful business practices, (10) declaratory relief, (11) breach of oral contract, (12) quantum meruit/implied-in-fact contract, (13) fraud and deceit, (14) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (15) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On May 11, 2023, Defendant filed this demurrer.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (¿¿Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318¿¿.) “¿To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.¿” (¿¿C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872¿¿.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (¿Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967¿.) A demurrer “¿does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.¿” (¿¿Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713¿¿.)

A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (¿Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616¿.)

DISCUSSION

Eleventh Cause of Action – Breach of Oral Contract

The elements for this cause of action are as follows: (1) a contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages. (Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (19680 68 Cal.2d 822, 830.) Defendant contends the FAC’s allegations are too vague and uncertain to support the first and third elements. But the FAC alleges that the parties entered an oral agreement in 2016 where Plaintiff would take care of Defendant in exchange for payment. (FAC, ¶¶ 89, 90.) The FAC further alleges the nature of Plaintiff’s responsibilities under the contract. (FAC, ¶ 89.) Moreover, Defendant failed to ever pay Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 93.) These facts sufficiently demonstrate the terms of an agreement, which in turn would inform the trier of fact whether a breach occurred. To the extent the terms are uncertain, Defendant may seek further clarification via discovery. (¿Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 616¿.) The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer for this cause of action.

Twelfth Cause of Action – Quantum Meruit/Implied-in-Fact Contract

Defendant next argues this claim is based on the same allegations that support Plaintiff’s claims for Labor Code violations. Consequently, the quantum meruit claim must “fall with [the] causes of action under the Labor Code.” (Demurrer, p. 6; Zumbrun v. University of Southern California (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 14 [“[I]f plaintiff is not entitled to recover under one count in a complaint wherein all the facts upon which his demand is based are specifically pleaded, it is proper to sustain a demurrer to a common count set forth in the complaint, the recovery under which is obviously based on the set of facts specifically pleaded in the other count.”].) However, Defendant has not demonstrated that Plaintiff’s claims under the Labor Code are subject to demurrer in the first place. Nor has Defendant persuaded the court that Plaintiff cannot plead an alternate theory of liability.

In addition, Defendant makes the case that the FAC does not allege facts that would give rise to an implied-in-fact contract. An implied-in-fact contract is a contact whose existence and terms are manifested by the parties’ conduct. (Civ. Code, § 1621; Maglica v. Maglica (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 442, 455.) But the FAC alleges that Plaintiff rendered services for Defendant and reasonably expected compensation. (FAC, ¶¶ 10, 97, 98.) And given the parties prior interactions, Defendant accepted these services knowing they were not a gift. (FAC, ¶¶ 10, 97, 98.) Thus, the FAC alleges facts sufficient to suggest that an implied-in-fact contract was in place. The court overrules Defendant’s demurrer for this cause of action.

Thirteenth Cause of Action – Fraud and Deceit

The elements for this cause of action are as follows: (1) misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Defendant argues the FAC’s allegations are too general to support a claim for fraud. But Plaintiff has alleged facts supporting such a claim. First, Defendant told Plaintiff he would pay her for services but never did so. (FAC, ¶¶ 102, 103.) Second, Defendant knew his statements to Plaintiff were false. (FAC, ¶¶ 103, 104.) Third, Defendant’s alleged conduct was intentional. (FAC, ¶ 104.) Fourth, Plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentations was justified given her vulnerability and Defendant’s assurances of payment. (FAC, ¶¶ 103, 105.) And fifth, Plaintiff has alleged resulting damages. (FAC, ¶ 106.) To the extent these allegations are uncertain, Defendant may seek further clarification via discovery. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 616¿.) Thus, the court overrules Defendant’s demurrer for this cause of action.

Fourteenth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant goes on to argue this cause of action is not available to Plaintiff. The Labor Code provides that worker’s compensation is an employee’s sole remedy against her employer when the employee sustained her injury by acting within the scope of her employment. (Lab. Code, §§ 3600, subd. (a)(2), 3602, subd. (a).) Moreover, courts have held that claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are preempted by the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation law. (Livitsanos v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 747.) Plaintiff in turn argues that this cause of action does not rely on paragraph of 5 of the complaint, which alleges an employment relationship. (FAC, ¶ 5.) However, the cause of action does incorporate paragraphs 7 through 23. Paragraph 12 alleges that Plaintiff accepted a job offer from Defendant. (FAC, ¶ 12.) The worker’s compensation exclusivity rule therefore applies here.

As Plaintiff notes, though, the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule will not preempt a claim where an employer’s conduct implicates considerations of substantial public policy. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1418-1419.) Plaintiff bases her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on Defendant’s failure to pay her, his disparaging remarks directed at her, and his cancellation of her return flight from Syria, where she was visiting family. (FAC, ¶¶ 19, 111, 112.) Additionally, Defendant evicted Plaintiff from his home when he terminated her employment or ended their cohabitation arrangement. (FAC, ¶ 113.) However, Plaintiff has not alleged how this conduct runs afoul of public policy. Nor has Plaintiff persuaded the court that this conduct during the employment relationship (if such a relationship existed) and its termination was outrageous and outside the bounds of decency. (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 904.) Thus, the FAC does not allege facts sufficient to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

Given the foregoing, the court will sustain Defendant’s demurrer for this cause of action with leave to amend.

The court notes that Defendant’s additional contention that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is time-barred is unavailing because the claim relates back to the original complaint, which was timely filed on April 12, 2022. (Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 146, 151 [“An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint […] if it: (1) rests on the same general set of facts as the original complaint; and (2) refers to the […] same injuries as the original complaint.”].)

Fifteenth Cause of Action – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant also argues that this cause of action is time-barred. But the court has already found the FAC relates back to the original complaint, which was timely. In addition, Defendant points out that negligent infliction of emotional distress is a form of negligence, which in this context requires facts supporting the elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 124, 129.) Although the FAC alleges Plaintiff’s damages, it does not specify the duty Defendant owed Plaintiff. Nor does the FAC show how Defendant’s alleged misconduct amounted to a breach of that particular duty. Thus, the court sustains Defendant’s demurrer of this cause of action with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court overrules Defendant’s demurrer for the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action. The court sustains Defendant’s demurrer for the fourteenth and fifteenth causes of action with leave to amend.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2022, Plaintiff Rania Almasri (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant Ihsan Jamil Nizam (Defendant).

On May 11, 2023, Defendant filed this motion to strike portions of the FAC.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court may strike any “¿irrelevant, false or improper matter¿inserted in any pleading¿” or any part of a pleading “¿not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 436¿.) “¿The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437¿.)¿

DISCUSSION

Defendant first aims to strike page 20, line 9 and page 26, lines 18-19 of the FAC, which seek punitive damages for the fraud and deceit cause of action. To that end, Defendant claims Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support such an award. Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), punitive damages are recoverable if plaintiff has proven Defendant is guilty of fraud. In this context, fraud means, “an intentional misrepresentation of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c).) The FAC first alleges Defendant told Plaintiff he would pay for her services but never did so. (FAC, ¶¶ 102, 103.) Second, Defendant knew his statements to Plaintiff were false. (FAC, ¶¶ 103, 104.) And third, damages resulted because Plaintiff was never compensated for her services. (FAC, ¶ 106.) But these allegations, if true, reflect a breach of contract. Consequently, punitive damages are not available. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 516 [“[P]unitive or exemplary damages . . . are available only in actions for breach of an obligation not arising from contract.”].) Thus, the court will grant the motion to strike for page 20, line 9 and page 26, lines 18-19 of the FAC with leave to amend.

Next, Defendant targets page 21, lines 23-24 and page 26, line 25 of the FAC, which seek punitive damages under the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under the FAC’s allegations, though, the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule preempts this claim. (Lab. Code, §§ 3600, subd. (a)(2), 3602, subd. (a); Livitsanos v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 747.) Nor has Plaintiff persuaded the court that Defendant’s conduct during the employment relationship (if such a relationship existed) and its termination was outrageous and outside the bounds of decency, as required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 904.) Unless Plaintiff amends the FAC as necessary, she cannot recover punitive damages under this cause of action. Thus, the court will grant the motion to strike for page 21, lines 23-24 and page 26, line 25 of the FAC with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court grants Defendant’s motion to strike page 20, line 9, page 26, lines 18-19, page 21, lines 23-24, and page 26, line 25 of the first amended complaint with leave to amend.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.