Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV13239, Date: 2024-12-06 Tentative Ruling

 



 





Case Number: 22STCV13239    Hearing Date: December 6, 2024    Dept: 74

Atkinson et al. v. Lari Gershwin, LLC et al.

Defendant Lari Gershwin LLC’s Motion to Strike

 

BACKGROUND 

            This motion arises from a habitability complaint.

            On July 29, 2024, Plaintiffs Charles Atkinson, Malika Stovall, Vatche Markarian, Marlyn Owens, Ubaldo Luis Venegas, and David Gonzalez II filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against defendants Lari Gershwin, LLC and Gershwin Ventures, LLC.

            On September 9, 2024, defendant Lari Gershwin, LLC (Defendant) filed this motion to strike.

 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Granted.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

A court may strike any “¿irrelevant, false or improper matter¿inserted in any pleading¿” or any part of a pleading “¿not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 436¿.) “¿The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437¿.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive-damages allegations, courts assume the truth of the pleading allegations.  (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 696, 699, fn.1.)  “[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context….”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

 

DISCUSSION

            Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts supporting the statutory elements of fraud, oppression, or malice.  Malice is defined as “conduct which is intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).)  Oppression is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship and conscious disregards of that person’s rights.”  (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).)

            Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to (a) cockroach infestation, (b) rodent infestation, (c) broken air conditioning, (d) broken electrical outlets, (e) no wheelchair ramps, (f) bedbug infestation, (g) fruit fly infestation, (h) inoperable windows, (i) broken smoke detectors, (j) inadequate water pressure, (k) uneven hallways, (l) broken mailboxes, (m) mold or mildew, (n) leaky faucets or fixtures, (o) clogged plumbing, (p) deteriorated paint, (q) termite infestation, (r) deteriorated cabinets, (s) deteriorated carpet, (t) leaking walls, (u) flea infestation, (v) defective toilet, (w) defective refrigerator, and (x) holes in walls or ceiling in bathroom.  (Complaint ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs allege that the defective conditions “threatened the physical and emotional health and well-being of Plaintiffs and posed a serious threat and danger to their health and safety.”  (Complaint ¶¶ 34, 58, 59.) Plaintiffs also allege these issues continued for months, sometimes years.  (Complaint ¶ 21.)

            Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s actions were “knowing, intentional and malicious.”  (Complaint ¶¶ 64, 74, 85.) A corporate employer is not liable for punitive damages unless “the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice [was] on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”  (Civil Code § 3294.)  Here, Plaintiffs allege that they made numerous complaints to “managers” Kep, Terry, Ariel, Isaiah, Josea, and to VIVA LA’s management.  (Complaint ¶¶ 23, 25-28, 35.)  Whether these managers qualify as managing agents (or officers or directors) of defendant is a factual question not amenable to demurrer. Because insufficiency of Defendant’s identified managers does not appear on the face of the complaint nor from any matter of which the court may take judicial notice, the “manager” allegation is sufficient. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437.)

            With these facts, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant’s failure to remedy the defective conditions in a timely manner after Plaintiffs’ complaints was willful and with conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights and safety. Therefore, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support punitive damages.

            Plaintiffs also request punitive damages under the second cause of action for Defendant’s interference with Plaintiffs’ right to quiet enjoyment and possession.  (Complaint ¶ 71.)  Plaintiffs do not, however, support their request with allegations of cruel and unjust hardship and conscious disregard as required for punitive damages for oppression.  (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).)

             Defendant does not address the statutory right to punitive damages under the fifth cause of action.

 

CONCLUSION

The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion to strike.  The court grants the motion to strike:

(1) page 16, paragraph 74: “Defendants’ actions and failures to act as alleged above… determined at trial.”

(2) page 20, line 28: “For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.”

The Court denies the remainder of the motion to strike.

            Defendant to give notice.