Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV13239, Date: 2024-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV13239 Hearing Date: December 6, 2024 Dept: 74
Atkinson et
al. v. Lari Gershwin, LLC et al.
Defendant Lari Gershwin LLC’s Motion
to Strike
BACKGROUND
This
motion arises from a habitability complaint.
On
July 29, 2024, Plaintiffs Charles Atkinson, Malika Stovall, Vatche Markarian,
Marlyn Owens, Ubaldo Luis Venegas, and David Gonzalez II filed the operative
Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against defendants Lari Gershwin, LLC and
Gershwin Ventures, LLC.
On
September 9, 2024, defendant Lari Gershwin, LLC (Defendant) filed this motion
to strike.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
A
court may strike any “¿irrelevant, false or improper matter¿inserted in any
pleading¿” or any part of a pleading “¿not drawn or filed in conformity with
the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿” (¿Code Civ.
Proc., § 436¿.) “¿The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face
of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to
take judicial notice.¿” (¿Code Civ. Proc., § 437¿.)
In
ruling on a motion to strike punitive-damages allegations, courts assume the
truth of the pleading allegations. (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 696, 699, fn.1.) “[J]udges read allegations of a pleading
subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context….” (Clauson
v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant
alleges that Plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts supporting the
statutory elements of fraud, oppression, or malice. Malice is defined as “conduct which is
intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code
§ 3294(c)(1).) Oppression is defined as
“despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship and
conscious disregards of that person’s rights.”
(Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).)
Plaintiffs
allege that they were subjected to (a) cockroach infestation, (b) rodent
infestation, (c) broken air conditioning, (d) broken electrical outlets, (e) no
wheelchair ramps, (f) bedbug infestation, (g) fruit fly infestation, (h)
inoperable windows, (i) broken smoke detectors, (j) inadequate water pressure,
(k) uneven hallways, (l) broken mailboxes, (m) mold or mildew, (n) leaky
faucets or fixtures, (o) clogged plumbing, (p) deteriorated paint, (q) termite
infestation, (r) deteriorated cabinets, (s) deteriorated carpet, (t) leaking
walls, (u) flea infestation, (v) defective toilet, (w) defective refrigerator,
and (x) holes in walls or ceiling in bathroom.
(Complaint ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs allege that the defective conditions
“threatened the physical and emotional health and well-being of Plaintiffs and
posed a serious threat and danger to their health and safety.” (Complaint ¶¶ 34, 58, 59.) Plaintiffs also
allege these issues continued for months, sometimes years. (Complaint ¶ 21.)
Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant’s actions were “knowing, intentional and malicious.” (Complaint ¶¶ 64, 74, 85.) A corporate
employer is not liable for punitive damages unless “the advance knowledge and
conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud,
or malice [was] on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation.” (Civil Code § 3294.) Here, Plaintiffs allege that they made
numerous complaints to “managers” Kep, Terry, Ariel, Isaiah, Josea, and to VIVA
LA’s management. (Complaint ¶¶ 23, 25-28,
35.) Whether these managers qualify as
managing agents (or officers or directors) of defendant is a factual question
not amenable to demurrer. Because insufficiency of Defendant’s identified
managers does not appear on the face of the complaint nor from any matter of
which the court may take judicial notice, the “manager” allegation is
sufficient. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437.)
With
these facts, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant’s failure to
remedy the defective conditions in a timely manner after Plaintiffs’ complaints
was willful and with conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights and safety.
Therefore, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support punitive damages.
Plaintiffs
also request punitive damages under the second cause of action for Defendant’s
interference with Plaintiffs’ right to quiet enjoyment and possession. (Complaint ¶ 71.) Plaintiffs do not, however, support their
request with allegations of cruel and unjust hardship and conscious disregard
as required for punitive damages for oppression. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).)
Defendant does not address the statutory right
to punitive damages under the fifth cause of action.
CONCLUSION
The
Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion to strike. The court grants the motion to strike:
(1) page 16, paragraph 74:
“Defendants’ actions and failures to act as alleged above… determined at
trial.”
(2) page 20, line 28: “For exemplary
and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.”
The Court denies the remainder of
the motion to strike.
Defendant
to give notice.