Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV17876, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV17876 Hearing Date: March 21, 2025 Dept: 74
Hookfin et al. v. General Motors, LLC
Plaintiffs Britton Hookfin and Victoria Hookfin’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
BACKGROUND
This motion arises from a Song Beverly Consumer Warranty action.
Plaintiffs Britton Hookfin and Victoria Hookfin (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against defendant General Motors (Defendant).
Parties agreed to a 998 Offer to Compromise on June 25, 2024. Based on the agreement, Plaintiff is the prevailing party.
Pursuant to the 998 Offer to Compromise, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees on February 5, 2025.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Song Beverley Consumer Warranty Act, if a buyer prevails in the action, the buyer is allowed to recover costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended. (Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d).)
A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) Counsel has the burden of providing the reasonable number of hours devoted to the litigation, through declarations, or redacted or unredacted timesheets or billing records. (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1325.) “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)
The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
DISCUSSION
Parties entered in a 998 offer which provided that Plaintiff was the prevailing party and that they were entitled to either $20,000 in attorney’s fee or the opportunity to file an attorney’s fees motion under California Civil Code section 1794 subsection d. About eight months after the parties entered into the agreement, Plaintiff filed the attorney’s fee motion.
Defendant alleges that the fee is untimely because a fee motion must be filed within 60 days after notice of entry of judgment, or 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. (Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.) Defendant alleges that since a settlement agreement is typically treated as a judgment, that Plaintiff had 180 days from the entry into the 998 Compromise to file the fee motion. (See DeSaulles v. Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, 1155.) Plaintiff argues that a 998 Offer is not a judgment because the 998 Offer entitled the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the compromise. The offer also required that the Plaintiff dismiss the matter with prejudice upon Defendant’s completion of payments. Reviewing the case law submitted by Defendants, a settlement and dismissal constitutes a judgment, but Defendants do not provide any case law stating that a settlement, pre-dismissal constitutes a judgment.
Here, Plaintiff filed the initial Notice of Settlement on June 25, 2024, and then filed an amended notice of settlement on February 3, 2025. Plaintiff has not yet filed for dismissal. Additionally, Plaintiff is not required to file a Request for Dismissal until they’ve received all payments, which includes payment of Plaintiffs’ fees and costs. (Baker Decl., Ex. 4.) Therefore, the 998 settlement is not yet a judgment under the law submitted by Defendant. Since a judgment has yet to be entered, the 60/180-day timeframe has not begun to run. Thus, the Court continues to review Defendant’s opposition to the attorney’s fees.
Plaintiff requests $81,942.78 in attorney’s fees. This amount includes $56,080.00 in attorney fees, a 1.35 multiplier enhancement, $2,234.78 in costs and expenses and an additional $4,000 in fees for preparing the attorney’s fees motion and reply. Defendant requests that the Court reduce the total fees for broad dependance on templates and requests the Court remove the multiplier. Defendants identify 10 categories of templated motions: (1) Complaint; (2) Discovery Requests and ESI Letter; (3) Discovery Responses; (4) Protective Order; (5) Notice of Deposition; (6) Motion to Compel Further; (7) In-Limine Motions; (8) Motion to Compel Compliance and Ex Parte Application; (9) Trial Preparation; (10) Attorney Fees Motion.
· Plaintiff requests 3.7 hours preparing the complaint. The Court finds this reasonable.
· Plaintiff requests 7.5 hours for discovery requests. The Court finds this reasonable.
· Plaintiff requests 7.1 hours for discovery responses. The Court finds this reasonable.
· Plaintiff requests 3.4 hours regarding the protective order. The Court finds this reasonable.
· Plaintiff requests 31.7 hours regarding the motion to compel further. The Court finds 31.7 hours total to prepare a motion to compel further in a Song Beverly case unreasonable. Therefore, the Court reduced the total by 15 hours at $595.00 per hour for a reduction of $8,925.00.
· Plaintiff requests 3.2 hours regarding the Motions in Limine, which is excessive. The Court reduces recovery for those improper boilerplate motions that either seek evidentiary rulings in a vacuum, raise issues properly addressed in jury instructions, or ask that the other side follow the law. The Court reduces the total by 3 hours at $595.00 per hour for a reduction of $1,785.
· Plaintiff requests 14.0 hours regarding the motion to compel compliance and ex parte application. The Court finds this reasonable.
· Plaintiff requests 14.8 hours regarding trial preparation. The Court finds this reasonable.
· Plaintiff requests 7.5 hours regarding this Motion for Attorney’s Fees. Plaintiff requests a total of $4,000 for this attorney’s fees motion. Plaintiff’s counsel’s reply declaration states that an additional 9 hours were spent preparing the reply for $345 an hour. Plaintiff requests $5,692.50. The Court finds this reasonable.
· Plaintiff requests 16.2 hours in other tasks and client communication. The Court finds this reasonable.
Plaintiffs’ counsel submits a declaration attesting that its rates are reasonable. (Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 9(a)-(p).) Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs’ counsels’ fees are unreasonable. Thus, Plaintiff’s counsels’ fees are reasonable. Therefore, the Court reduces the base award by $10,750. The Court increases the award for the attorney’s fee motion by $1,692.50. Therefore, the Court awards $45,370 in attorney’s base fees and $5,692.50 in attorney’s fees for this motion.
Defendants also request a reduction in the loadstar multiplier. The lodestar method may be adjusted based upon the specific considerations of an action so that the fee is calculated at the fair market value of legal services. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 386.) A fee may be adjusted based upon the following factors, “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.”¿(Id. at 384.) Given those factors, the Court finds the 1.35 multiplier excessive but awards a multiplier of 1.1 for a case that settled without litigating novel issues, requiring unusual skill, or presenting unusual risk. With the multiplier, the Court awards $49,907 in attorney’s base fees.
Defendant objects to the specificity of costs table. Plaintiffs’ counsel submits the costs table as part of its file for Hookfin, Britton v. General Motors LLC. (Shahian Decl., Ex. 26.) The Court finds this sufficient to establish that the costs were incurred in the court of this litigation. The Court awards $2,234.78 in costs and expenses.
CONCLUSION
The Court awards Plaintiff $57.834.28 for fees and costs.
Plaintiffs to give notice.