Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV18163, Date: 2023-09-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV18163 Hearing Date: November 15, 2023 Dept: 74
Anabi Oil Corporation v. Envision WC Toy
Re, LLC, et al.
Plaintiff Anabi Oil Corporation’s Demurrer
to Defendants Huoy Quoc Dang and D.S. Dang, LLC’s Cross-Complaint for Indemnity
and Damages
The court considered the moving papers, opposition,
and reply.
BACKGROUND
This
action arises from a contractual dispute.
On
November 29, 2022, Anabi Oil Corporation (Anabi) filed a first amended
complaint (FAC) against Huy Quoc Dang and D.S. Dang, LLC (Dang), in addition to
others. The FAC alleges breach of contract and tortious interference.
On
February 28, 2023, Dang answered the FAC.
On
July 11, 2023, Dang filed a cross-complaint against Anabi and others. The
cross-complaint includes a cause of action for declaratory relief.
On
August 3, 2023, Anabi filed a demurrer to the cross-complaint. Anabi seeks
dismissal of Dang’s cause of action for declaratory relief.
LEGAL STANDARD
A
demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the
pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially
noticeable. (¿¿Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318¿¿.) “¿To
survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a
cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the
plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.¿” (¿¿C.A. v. William S. Hart Union
High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872¿¿.) For the purpose of testing
the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all
material facts properly pleaded. (¿Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992)
2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967¿.) A demurrer “¿does not admit contentions, deductions
or conclusions of fact or law.¿” (¿¿Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67
Cal.2d 695, 713¿¿.)
DISCUSSION
Anabi
argues the court should sustain its demurrer for the tenth cause of action in
Dang’s cross-complaint. According to Anabi, Dang’s declaratory relief claim is
unnecessary because it duplicates issues raised in the operative complaint and
Dang’s answer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061 [court has discretion to refuse to
render a declaratory judgment when it would not be necessary under the circumstances].)
In Dang’s cross-complaint, Dang seeks an order declaring, in part, that “the [g]uaranty
was a void and unenforceable sham guaranty. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 131.) But
Dang’s sixty-second affirmative defense asserts the same. (Answer to FAC, ¶
62.) As Anabi notes, “[a] declaratory judgment is not a proper mode of
determining the sufficiency of legal defenses to a pending action.” (Sunset
Scavenger Corp. v. Oddou (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 92, 96.)
In
the cross-complaint, Dang further seeks an order that, “Dang is not personally
liable for the obligations under the RFDIP [a.k.a. the incentive agreement] pursuant
to the [g]uaranty.” (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 131.) But Anabi has already alleged
that Dang breached the incentive agreement in the operative complaint. (FAC, ¶¶
61, 66.) And Dang already denied that allegation in the answer. (Answer, ¶ 1.)
Consequently, the court’s resolution of Anabi’s breach of contract claim will
dispose of the issue of Dang’s liability under the incentive agreement. Thus,
Dang’s cause of action for declaratory relief is unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, the court sustains the demurrer to the 10th cause
of action for declaratory relief without leave to amend.
Anabi
Oil Corporation shall give notice.