Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV19506, Date: 2023-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV19506    Hearing Date: January 26, 2023    Dept: 74

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – CENTRAL District

Department 74

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Marqueece Harris-Dawson

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiffs Jabari Jumaane and the African Firefighters in Benevolent Association

Defendant Marqueece Harris-Dawson Special Motion to Strike Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16.

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiffs Jabari Jumaane (“Jumaane”) and the African Firefighters in Benevolent Association (“AFBA”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this defamation action on June 15, 2022 against Defendant Marqueece Harris-Dawson in his capacity as a member of Los Angeles City Council (“Defendant”). The complaint asserts the sole cause of action for defamation.   

Defendant now moves to strike the entirety of the complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”  (Evid. Code § 452 (c), (d), and (h).)

            Here, Defendant requests the court to take judicial notice of the following documents: (1) the complaint for unlawful detainer filed on September 16, 2019 in City of Los Angeles v. African Firefighters in Benevolent Association; Jabari S. Jumaane, Los Angeles County Sup. Ct. Case No. 19STUD08875 (“UD Action”); (2) amended answer filed in UD Action; (3) motion for summary judgment filed in the UD Action; (4) Declaration of Melody McCormick in support of the motion for summary judgment filed in the UD Action; (5) the opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed in the UD Action; (6) the minute order granting City of Los Angeles’s motion for summary judgment in the UD Action; (7) judgment entered in the UD Action; (8) the complaint filed on April 23, 2021 in African Firefighters in Benevolent Association, Jabari Jumaane v. Marqueece Harris-Dawson, City of Los Angeles, United States District Court for the Central District of California, Case No. 2:21-cv-03507-PA-PD (“Federal Action”); (9) the order dismissing the complaint filed in the Federal Action; (10) Los Angeles Administrative Code § 22.810.1; and (11) the Webpage “About Neighborhood Councils”, available at

https://empowerla.org/about-neighborhood-councils/.

With regard to items 1 through 5 and item 8, the court takes judicial notice of the existence of these documents but refrains from accepting the truth of their contents.  (See Evid. Code § 452(d); see also Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97 (internal quotes omitted) [“Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning”];  6 Witkin, California Procedure, 4th Edition, 2000, Proceedings Without Trial, § 210, p.622 [“A Court may take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, but can only take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in such documents as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments”].) As for items 6, 7, and 9, the court takes judicial notice of the documents’ existence and the truth of the matter asserted therein. (Id.) The court takes judicial notice of items 10-11 pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(b) and (h), respectively.

LEGAL STANDARD

The anti-SLAPP statute is “a mechanism through which complaints that arise from the exercise of free speech rights can be evaluated at an early stage of the litigation process and resolved expeditiously.” (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 [internal quotations omitted].) Courts use a two-step process for determining whether an action is a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or a SLAPP. First, the court determines whether the defendant has established that the challenged claim arises from protected speech. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) If such a showing has been made, the court “determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Ibid.) 

DISCUSSION

A.    Prong One: Protected Activity

“[T]he only thing the defendant needs to establish to invoke the protection of the SLAPP statute is that the challenged lawsuit arose from an act on the part of the defendant in furtherance of her right of petition or free speech.” (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 307.)

An act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech includes the following:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

In determining whether a cause of action arises from protected conduct, the court focuses on “the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct that provides the foundation for the claims.” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 490-491.)  “[T]he critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89  [emphasis in original].) In making this determination, the Court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Ibid.) 

As alleged in the Complaint, AFBA is a non-profit unincorporated association that promoted the advancement of African-American firefighters as well as addressed the economic and social challenges of the African-American community at large. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Eventually, AFBA obtained a license from the City of Los Angeles to occupy Fire Station 54 on Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles for the benefit of the local community. (Compl. ¶ 9.) In recent years, Plaintiffs allege that that have been harmed by Defendant who holds personal animus towards Jumaane, the President of AFBA, and this conduct includes the revocation of the license held by AFBA, the eviction of AFBA from Fire Station 54, and the defamation of the Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-12.)

It is alleged that this animus stemmed from Plaintiffs’ criticism of Defendant’s economic development planned titled “Destination Crenshaw;” Plaintiffs believed that the plan was tone-deaf to the community’s actual needs and would negatively impact AFBA’s outreach abilities. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-34.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendant made “intentional misrepresentations, falsehoods, and misinformation” about Plaintiffs in order to evict Plaintiffs from Fire Station 54. (Compl. ¶ 12.) This includes statements made to a local newspaper and a local radio show in September 2019 regarding Defendant’s characterization about the negotiations between Plaintiffs and the City of Los Angeles to renew the license, the impact “Destination Crenshaw” would have on AFBA, and the eviction proceedings. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 40-46.) It is further alleged that Defendant made statements at a City Council meeting on September 18, 2019 that the license was assigned to Jumanne, not AFBA. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Also, during the eviction proceedings, Defendant promoted pretext as the basis for eviction. (Compl. ¶¶ 35-36.) Lastly, at a meeting of the South Los Angeles Alliance of Neighborhood Councils (“SLAAC”) on September 16, 2021, Defendant allegedly made false statements about: (1) Plaintiff’s failure to obtain insurance or to maintain the building, (2) Jumaane’s personal character, (3) the fact Plaintiffs never ran a farmer’s market on the premises, and (4) the extent in which Defendant tried to negotiate with AFBA. (Comp. ¶ 47.)

            Here, Defendant contends that the complaint arises out of protected activity under all four categories proscribed by the anti-SLAPP statute because Plaintiffs claim that Defendant made defamatory statements against them in furtherance of his goal of evicting them from city property for their opposition to Defendant’s community development plan for the Crenshaw neighborhood. (Motion at pg. 4; Compl. at ¶¶ 12-13, 18-34.) Thus, Defendant reasons that such alleged defamatory statements were made by an elected official on a matter concerning public interest “before or related to judicial proceedings, legislative proceedings, official proceedings, or in a public forum.” (Motion at pg. 5.) As alleged, “the Councilman represented the following basis for the Notice of Revocation” in connection to the eviction proceedings, and “[t]he Councilman made the defamatory statements described above to the general public through the news media, including print and radio, and through City hearings.” (Compl.  ¶¶ 35, 49.)  For this reason, Defendant argues that all four categories of activity protected under the anti-SLAPP applies to the alleged conduct. (Motion at pg. 5.)

            It is noted that Plaintiffs’ opposition effectively concedes that their sole claim for defamation arises out of a protected activity because they do no attempt to raise any argument to the contrary. (See Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 90.) Consequently, the court finds that Defendant has met his burden of showing that Plaintiffs’ claim for defamation arises out of protected activity. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e); Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621; City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2017) 1 Cal.5th 409, 422-423 [“The council members’ participation in the meeting that preceded the vote was constitutionally protected activity.”]; Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Protection & Community Services Dist. Bd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1355 [reasoning that the anti-SLAPP statute applies where defendants were sued “based on how they voted and expressed themselves at the Board meeting.”]; Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1062-1064 [applying the anti-SLAPP statute to statements made during a radio show].)

            Accordingly, the first prong has been met.

B.     Prong Two: Probability of Prevailing

To establish the likelihood of prevailing, a “plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 476 [internal quotations omitted].) In making the prong two determination, “the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) “The court does not, however, weigh [defendant’s] evidence against the plaintiff’s, in terms of either credibility or persuasiveness. Rather, the defendant’s evidence is considered with a view toward whether it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a matter of law, such as by establishing a defense or the absence of a necessary element.” (1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568, 585.) 
Here, Defendant raises the following arguments as to why Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their defamation claim: (1) many of the alleged defamatory statements relied upon fall beyond the one-year statute of limitations; (2) the alleged defamatory statements are privileged; (3) Defendant is immune pursuant to Government Code § 822.2; and (4) Plaintiffs are unable to establish a prima facie case for defamation. (Motion at pp. 6-9.) The court shall address each in turn.

                                            i.            Untimely

First, Defendant argues that many of the alleged defamatory statements, except for the ones asserted in Paragraph 47, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Motion at pg. 6.) Thus, to the extent that Complaint relies on statements before June 15, 2021, Defendant argues that they should be stricken because those statements are time-barred. (Id.) 

“A cause of action for defamation must be filed within one year of when the cause of action accrues.”  (Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.4th 939, 950.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs fail to raise any argument rebutting the contention that some of the alleged defamatory statements are untimely. Rather, Plaintiffs’ opposition focuses solely on the alleged statements asserted in Paragraph 47 of the Complaint, and Plaintiffs state that any pre-June 15, 2021 conduct is alleged to establish a “pattern of ill will and malice exhibited by Defendant towards Plaintiffs.” (Opposition at pg. 3.) Based on the lack of argument, the court finds that Plaintiff effectively concedes that only the statements made on September 16, 2021, at the SLAAC meeting could have any merit in supporting a prima facie claim of defamation. (See Rudick, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 90.)

Accordingly, the court strikes these untimely pre-June 15, 2021 claims of defamation. (See Compl. ¶¶ 13-14, 35, 40-46.)

                                          ii.            Privilege

Even assuming that all of the alleged instances of defamation were timely brought, Defendant argues that the alleged statements are privileged. (Motion at pp. 6-7.)

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) states: “[a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . [i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2.” (See Begier v. Strom (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 881-882 [determining that Section 47(b) confers an unqualified privilege].) The litigation privilege applies to statements made prior to legal proceedings, or afterwards, if the statements are made in furtherance of the objects of the proceedings. (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1272.) In other words, the statements must “be connected with, or have some logical relation to, the [proceeding].” (Ibid., citing Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 283.) 

Here, Defendant argues that alleged statements are absolutely privileged because they were made before a legislative proceeding, judicial proceeding, or an official proceeding authorized by law. (Motion at pg. 6, relying on Civ. Code § 47(b).) Additionally, Defendant contends that many of the statements would be covered under the litigation privilege because there were made in anticipation of and during eviction proceedings. (Motion at pg. 6, relying on Jacob B. v. Cnty. of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 955 and Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1058.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that remarks made at the SLAANC meeting on September 16, 2021, are not absolutely privileged because the meeting does not qualify as a legislative, judicial, or other official proceeding. (Opposition at pg. 3, relying on Tiedemann v. Superior Court (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 918, 924.) However, this argument is not taken well. As Defendants point out in their motion, neighborhood councils, such as SLAANC, were created by the L.A. City Charter to provide an advisory role in the Los Angeles municipal government, and these councils are subject to federal, state, and local laws, including the Brown Act, the Public Records Act, and the L.A. City Charter. (Motion at pp. 2-3; RJN Exhs. 10-11.) Plaintiffs have not presented any admissible evidence to suggest that meetings held by SLAANC is not a “legislative proceeding” or an “other official proceeding.” (Laker v. Bd. of Trustees of Cal. State Univ. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 768 [“The plaintiff must demonstrate this probability of success with admissible evidence.”] Similarly, even if the alleged statements made to the newspaper report and on the radio show were timely brought, the qualified privilege would apply because Plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence to suggest that Defendant acted with actual malice. (Civ. Code § 47(c).) Instead, Plaintiff merely relies on the allegations raised in the Complaint, which are insufficient. (Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 480 [“[A] plaintiff cannot simply rely on his or her pleadings, even if verified. Rather, the plaintiff must adduce competent, admissible evidence.”])

            Accordingly, because the alleged statements are privileged, the court grants Defendant’s special motion to strike on this ground.

                                        iii.            Immunity Pursuant to Gov. Code § 822.2

Defendant also argues that the alleged statements were made in connection to his position as a city councilmember, and thus, he is immune from liability pursuant to Government Code § 822.2. (Motion at pp. 7-8.)

“A public employee acting in the scope of his employment is not liable for an injury caused by his misrepresentation, whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional, unless he is guilty of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.” (Gov. Code § 822.2.) Actual malice is defined as meaning “that the publication was motivated by hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or by a showing that the defendant lacked reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.’” (Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 413.)  

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Government Code § 822.2 is inapplicable in this case because it only applies to “interferences with financial or commercial interests.” (Opposition at pg. 4, relying on Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 870 and Bastian v. County of San Luis Obispo (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 520, 533.) Plaintiffs assert that there was no commercial interest at play because Defendant’s alleged statements at the SLAANC meeting were made long after Plaintiffs were ordered to vacate Fire Station 54 and AFBA is a non-profit organization. (Opposition at pp. 4-5.)

In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s interpretation of Government Code § 822.2 is too narrow. (Reply at pg. 4.) Defendant states that the cases upon which Plaintiffs rely, Michael J. and Bastian, rest on the California Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. State (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782. There, the California Supreme Court interpreted the term “misrepresentation” used in Section 818.8, not Section 822.2, “as a tort distinct from the general milieu of negligent and intentional wrongs, appl[ying] to interferences with financial or commercial interest.” (Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.3d at 800.) Defendant acknowledges that there is a split in authority among the courts of appeal about the scope of Johnson’s holding. (Reply at pg. 4.) For instance, the Sixth District Court of Appeal and the Second District Court of Appeal narrowly apply any exceptions to the immunity proscribed under these statutes. (See Burden v. Cnty. of Santa Clara (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 244, 250 [“Unlike Johnson and Michael J., Burden’s claim does not involve child placement or the narrow context of the social service area.”]; see also Tokeshi v. State (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 999, 1007-1008.) The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in contrast, adopted a broad view of the exception. (City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Investments, LLC (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 383 [“Tort causes of action based on reputational harm (slander, trade libel, and intentional interference based on false statements to third parties) are not included within the ‘deceit’ rubric identified by our Supreme Court when it interpreted Government Code sections 818.8 and 822.2.”].)

Under these circumstances, the court finds that the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s broad interpretation of the exception to immunity under Section 822.2 espoused does not apply. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Santa Clara Cnty. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 [determining that a court may “make a choice between the conflicting decisions.”]) While Government Code §§ 818.8 and 822.2 are similar, they are not identical. Specifically, Section 822.2, immunizes a public employee for negligent or intentional misrepresentation, unless the public employee is “guilty of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.) (Gov. Code § 822.2.) Thus, because the term of “actual malice” is a hallmark of defamation jurisprudence, it is implied that Section 822.2 would apply to defamation claims. (See generally Saroyan v. Burkett (1962) 57 Cal.2d 706.) As noted above, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of actual malice to suggest that the immunity bestowed under Section 822.2 would not apply.

Accordingly, because Defendant is immune from liability pursuant to Government Code § 822.2, the court grants Defendant’s special motion to strike on this ground as well.

                                        iv.            Prima Facie Defamation

Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot state a prima facie case for defamation because issue preclusion bars Plaintiffs’ claims: the alleged statements are mere opinions; and, the alleged statements did not cause reputational harm to the Plaintiffs. (Motion at pp. 8-9.) As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs concede that the alleged states that “Jumaane had been a difficult person to deal with” is a nonactionable statement of opinion. (Opposition at pg. 6; Compl. ¶ 47(e).)

To support a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish “‘(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720; Civ. Code, §§ 44, 45, 45a.) “Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) “Because [a defamatory] statement must contain a provable falsehood, courts distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion for purposes of defamation liability. Although statements of fact may be actionable… …statements of opinion are constitutionally protected.’” (Summit Bank v. Rogers (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 669, 695–696, internal citations omitted.)

“(N)ot every word of an allegedly defamatory publication has to be false and defamatory to sustain a libel action. . . . ‘(T)he test of libel is not quantitative; a single sentence may be the basis for an action in libel even though buried in a much longer text....’ [Citation.]”) (Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1338.)

The court shall address Defendant’s arguments in turn.

a.  Issue Preclusion

First, Defendant argues that the alleged statements go to why Plaintiffs were evicted from Fire Station 54, and because the eviction proceeding resulted in summary judgment against Plaintiff, they are barred from re-challenging the grounds for the eviction. (Motion at pg. 8; RJN Exh. 9 [finding that issue preclusion barred the Federal Action.)

Under issue preclusion, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude the re-litigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case. (San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco (2005) 545 U.S. 323, 336.) Collateral estoppel prevents re-litigation when the following factors are met: (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Gabriel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 547, 556.) To avoid piecemeal litigation, a judgment is conclusive not only as to the issues actually decided, but those that might have been raised as well. (Thibodeau v. Crum (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 749, 754; Sych v. Insurance Co. of North America (1985) 173 Ca1.App.3d 330.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of issue preclusion does not apply because “no court has determined the truth or falsity of any of the allegedly defamatory statements identified in Paragraph 47.” (Opposition at pg. 6.) However, this argument is not persuasive because it was alleged in the Federal Action that false allegations were directed at Plaintiffs to justify revoking the license, and it has been previously determined that these allegations formed the basis for Plaintiff’s retaliation affirmative defenses in the eviction proceedings, which were rejected. (See RJN Exh. 8 at pp. 16, 27; RJN Exh. 9 pp. 3-7.) Even though Plaintiffs raise an entirely new cause of action, it rests on the same allegations that have already been adjudicated. (Comp. ¶ 47.)

Accordingly, the doctrine of issue preclusion applies, and as a result, the court finds that Plaintiffs cannot state a prima facie case for defamation.

b. Non-Actionable Opinion

Additionally, Defendant argues that the alleged statements are merely statements of opinion and are not actionable. (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1261.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs claim that statements that AFBA “failed to obtain insurance,” and that “the building had not been maintained,” are issues of fact. (Opposition at pg. 6.) Also, Plaintiffs reason that the statement that “Jumanne had been obstinate by flying in the face of the law” is arguably a factual issue. (Opposition at pg. 7.) As a practical matter, a claim that someone is stubborn is a matter of opinion, and it would not be actionable. However, statements concerning factual matters, such as obtaining insurance and maintaining a building, could be actionable.

Accordingly, the court grants Defendants’ special motion to strike the allegations asserted in Paragraph 47(e), (f) of the Complaint as non-actionable opinion.

c.  Lack of Reputational Harm

Lastly, Defendant argues that, even if the statements were false, they did not cause harm to the Plaintiffs. (Motion at pg. 9.) In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that they were harmed by Defendant’s false statements because it prevented them from leasing an alternative location for AFBA to conduct its activities and that Jumaane’s reputation has suffered. (Opposition at pg. 7; Jumaane Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.)

In consideration of Jumaane’s declaration, the court finds that it is insufficient for Plaintiffs to meet their burden. The claimed harm is speculative and conclusory. The declaration fails to articulate Plaintiffs’ efforts in securing a new lease or that the landlords of those properties chose not to lease their properties to Plaintiffs due to Defendant’s alleged statements. Absent a necessary element of a cause of action for defamation, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on their defamation claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court grants Defendant’s special motion to strike in its entirety.

Defendant may as a prevailing party file a noticed motion for attorney’s fees.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  January 26, 2023

_____________________________

Colin Leis

Judge of the Superior Court