Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV20624, Date: 2023-01-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV20624 Hearing Date: January 26, 2023 Dept: 74
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – CENTRAL District
Department
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22STCV20624 |
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Hearing
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January
26, 2023 |
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[Tentative]
Order RE: motion TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND
COMPLAINT |
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MOVING PARTY: Defendants Robert Evans and Elisa
Evans
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs
Laurie Gorham, Dana Trenter, and Darren Kaplan, as Co-Trustees of the Steven L.
Kaplan Trust
Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint
The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply papers
filed in connection with this motion.
BACKGROUND
On July 23, 2022, Plaintiffs Laurie Gorham, Dana Trenter, and Darren
Kaplan, as Co-Trustees of the Steven L. Kaplan Trust (“Plaintiffs”) filed a
complaint against Defendants Yuchu Chiang Kaplan (“Yuchu”), Lee Evans, Sharon
Teano Evans, Robert Evans (“Robert”), and Elisa Evans (“Elisa”), asserting
causes of action for (1) financial abuse of an elder; (2) neglect and physical
abuse of an elder; (3) conversion; (4) accounting; (5) restitution; (6) breach
of contract; and (7) declaratory relief.
Yuchu is the surviving wife of Steven Kaplan, and the remaining
Defendants are her adult children and children-in-law. Plaintiffs are Steven
Kaplan’s biological children. Plaintiffs allege Defendants stole funds from the
Steven L. Kaplan Trust (“Steven Kaplan Trust” or “Trust”).
On September 1, 2022, Defendants Robert and Elisa filed this motion to
quash service of summons and complaint. On January 12, 2023, Plaintiffs filed
an opposition. On January 23, 2023, Robert and Elisa filed a reply.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A defendant, on or
before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that
the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for
one or more of the following purposes:
(1) To quash service of summons on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (Code
Civ. Proc. § 418.10(a).)
“When a defendant moves to
quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the
initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the existence of
jurisdiction.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 434, 449.) Plaintiffs must satisfy this burden by a preponderance of
evidence. (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I and II (2005) 135
Cal.App.4th 100, 110.)
DISCUSSION
Defendants
Robert and Elisa bring this motion on grounds that the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over them. Robert and Elisa point out they live in Texas and were
served with summons in Texas—thus the court lacks general jurisdiction. In
addition, Robert and Elisa argue they have not directed any activity towards
California—thus the court also lacks specific jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs
concede for the purposes of opposing this motion that the court lacks general
jurisdiction over Robert and Elisa. Plaintiffs, however, disagree that the
court lacks specific jurisdiction. According to Plaintiffs, their claims
against Robert and Elisa are related to Robert and Elisa’s purposeful availment
of California benefits—specifically, residing within, and claiming ownership
over, a Texas residence that Steven Kaplan’s California trust bought with
California assets. Moreover, Robert and Elisa cannot prove that the exercise of
jurisdiction over them would be unreasonable.
A. The
Court Does Not Have General Jurisdiction Over Robert and Elisa
“General jurisdiction exists
when a defendant is domiciled in the forum state or his activities there are substantial,
continuous, and systematic.” (F. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.
(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 796.)
Plaintiffs do not offer
evidence that Robert and Elisa are domiciled in California or have activities
in California that are substantial, continuous, and systematic. Indeed,
Plaintiffs acknowledge that their opposition to this motion is focused on
establishing specific jurisdiction—not general jurisdiction. (Opposition p. 8,
fn. 3.) The court finds Plaintiffs have not established by a preponderance of
the evidence that the court has general jurisdiction over Robert and Elisa.
B. The
Court Has Specific Jurisdiction Over Robert and Elisa
Because
the court does not have general jurisdiction over Robert and Elisa, the court must
next determine whether it has specific jurisdiction. In the absence of
general jurisdiction, a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction where
a nonresident defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state, i.e.: (1) the
nonresident defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the
forum state; (2) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or is related to
defendant’s contacts with the forum state; and (3) exercise of personal
jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice” (i.e., is
reasonable under the circumstances). (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
(1985) 471 U.S. 462, 477-78.)
i.
Robert
and Elisa Purposely Availed Themselves of the Benefits of a California Trust
As it relates to the first
prong, for causes of action arising in tort, courts employ a variation of the “Calder
Effects Test" to determine whether specific personal jurisdiction can be
established. The Calder Effects Test, derived from Calder v. Jones,
(1984) 465 U.S. 783, "requires intentional conduct expressly aimed at
or targeting the forum state in addition to the defendant's knowledge that
his intentional conduct would cause harm in the forum.” (Pavlovich v.
Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 270.) "The purposeful
availment inquiry...focuses on the defendant's intentionality. This prong is
only satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his
activities toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit
he receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on his contacts
with the forum." (Id. at 269, internal quotes and citations
omitted.)
Here, Plaintiffs offer evidence
that Robert and Elisa directed their activities towards a California trust and
should reasonably expect to be subject to California’s jurisdiction based on
the benefits they allegedly converted from that trust. The evidence shows the
Steven Kaplan Trust likely paid for Robert and Elisa’s Texas residence. (Gorham
Decl., ¶ 20, Ex. 3.) In addition, Laurie Gorham states that neither Steven or
the Trust intended to gift the residence to Robert and Elisa, yet Robert and
Elisa maintain the residence is their property to the exclusion of the Trust. (Id.
¶ 22.) Robert and Elisa should reasonably know that their conduct would cause
harm to the Steven Kaplan Trust, and thus California as a forum state.
Robert and Elisa argue that any
alleged wrongdoing on their part would have occurred in Texas, not California,
and therefore there is no evidence to show that they directed any conduct in
such a way that any foreseeable injury would be acutely felt, amplified, or
caused by their contacts with California. The court disagrees. Jurisdiction
may not be avoided merely because a defendant did
not physically enter the forum State. (Burger King Corp.,
supra, 471 U.S. at 476.) More importantly, the foreseeable injury—in
this case loss of Trust funds—was acutely felt by a California trust, and the
foreseeable injury was caused by Robert and Elisa’s intentional contact with
California’s administration and regulation of the Trust.
Put simply, Robert and Elisa
have availed themselves of the benefits of California’s laws and protections by
knowingly receiving—and insisting on the ownership of—California trust funds.[1]
ii.
Plaintiffs’
Causes of Action Relate to Robert and Elisa’s Contacts with California
Robert and Elisa argue that Plaintiffs’ causes of action do not relate to
their contacts with California because the acts they purportedly
committed are limited to Texas. Robert and Elisa point out that the residence
in dispute is in Texas, it was purchased and recorded in Texas, and Texas is
where they now reside. Moreover, any alleged funds used to pay for repairs,
home inspections, state property taxes, or computer equipment were received
while they were living in Texas, and were therefore directed at Texas.
The argument is not
persuasive. As noted, jurisdiction may not be avoided merely because a defendant did
not physically enter the forum State. (Burger King Corp.,
supra, 471 U.S. at 476.) Furthermore, “[t]he plaintiff does not have
to prove the truth of the allegations constituting the causes of action in
order to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident parties.” (Magnecomp
Corp. v. Athene Co. (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 526, 533.) Plaintiffs’ causes
of action include abuse of an elderly person living in California, and
conversion from a California trust. Both are intentional torts—meaning both
causes of action arise from intentional conduct aimed at a California resident
and a California trust. Plaintiffs have
yet to prove their claims. But Plaintiffs’ allegations and causes of action
relate to Robert and Elisa’s purposeful contacts with California.
iii.
The
Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over Robert and Elisa Comports with Fair Play
and Substantial Justice
“Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in
light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal
jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ [Citing International
Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 320.] Thus courts in ‘appropriate
case[s]’ may evaluate ‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the forum State's
interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,’ and the ‘shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.’ [Citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444
U.S. 286, 292.] These considerations sometimes serve to establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than
would otherwise be required.” (Burger King Corp., supra, 471 U.S. at 476–477.)
Here, the court must weigh the burden on Robert and Elisa from having to
litigate in California, versus California’s interest in adjudicating this
dispute and Plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.
The court acknowledges that Robert and Elisa reside in Texas, and thus there is
a burden to having to litigate in California. However, Robert and Elisa used to
reside in California (Gorham Decl., ¶ 11), and both Robert and Elisa admit they
regularly visit Defendants Yuchu and Lee in California (Robert Decl., ¶ 6;
Elisa Decl., ¶ 6.) Thus, the burden to Robert and Elisa from having to litigate
here is less than it otherwise would be. On the other hand, California has a
substantial interest in adjudicating this dispute to ensure the integrity of
its laws and the integrity of trusts established under its laws. Finally,
Plaintiffs will obtain the most convenient and effective relief in California,
as the Steven Kaplan Trust was established under California law and thus California
courts are best suited to fairly and effectively adjudicate this dispute.
Weighing the factors, the court finds that the exercise of jurisdiction
over Robert and Elisa comports with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Robert and Elisa have availed themselves of California’s
jurisdiction by purposely benefiting from a trust established under the laws of
this state. Robert and Elisa’s motion to quash service of summons and complaint
on grounds that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over them is therefore
denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants
Robert Evans and Elisa Evans’s motion
to quash service of summons and complaint is denied.
Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Colin Leis
Judge of the Superior Court
[1] In
their reply papers, Robert and Elisa argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations “center
around the actions and activities of third parties.” (Reply p. 4.) Robert and Elisa are ostensibly arguing that they
are merely the passive receivers of funds from the Steven Kaplan Trust and thus
cannot be subject to California’s jurisdiction. However, Robert and Elisa
reasonably should have known where the funds were coming from. Because Robert
and Elisa continue to insist on ownership of Trust funds, while the Trust is
being administered, they are purposefully availing themselves of California’s
laws and protections.