Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 22STCV40073, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV40073    Hearing Date: January 30, 2024    Dept: 74

David M. Wolf v. Elias Aziz-Lavi, et al.

Plaintiff David M. Wolf’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One) from Defendant Elias Aziz-Lavi and Request for Sanctions.

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply. The court did not consider Defendant’s surreply.

BACKGROUND

            This action involves a creditor’s suit.

            On December 23, 2022, Plaintiff David M. Wolf (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant Elias Aziz-Lavi (Defendant) and others.

            On March 15, 2023, the court entered Defendant’s default.

            On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff served on Defendant the form interrogatories (set one).

            On May 12, 2023, Defendant responded with objections to each request. One objection noted that Defendant could not respond to the interrogatories because he was in default.

            From May 23, 2023, until June 9, 2023, the parties met and conferred to no avail.

            On July 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed this motion to compel further responses to the form interrogatories.

            On July 28, 2023, the court vacated the default entered against Defendant.

LEGAL STANDARD 

            ¿¿A propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response to interrogatories if the propounding party deems that an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, or that an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) Such a motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (b).)

DISCUSSION

            Plaintiff seeks further response to Form Interrogatory Nos. 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 4.1, 4.2, 12.1, 12.3, 12.4, 12.6, and 15.1. However, Defendant argues that he was in default when Plaintiff propounded the interrogatories. (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 343 [holding a party who is in default is barred from further participating in the proceedings, unless that party appeals the resulting default judgment or seeks a new trial]; Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386 [“A defendant against whom a default has been entered is out of court and is not entitled to take any further steps in the cause affecting plaintiff's right of action […].”].) Because Defendant was still in default when Plaintiff propounded the interrogatories, throughout the meet-and-confer process, and even when Plaintiff filed this motion, Defendant was not required to respond to the discovery. The court notes that Defendant addressed this issue in his general objections to the form interrogatories.

            Plaintiff contends that entry of default in no way limits Defendant’s obligation to respond to discovery. (Wolf Decl., ¶ 5; Ex. 5.) But Plaintiff’s reliance on Armstrong v. Gates (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 952 is misplaced. There, the court held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the plaintiff’s right to take a deposition in support of its opposition to the defendant’s motion to set aside the entry of default and default judgment. (Armstrong v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at pp. 957, 959-960.) Plaintiff does not demonstrate how any of the interrogatories would have supported his opposition to Defendant’s motion to set aside the default, which the court heard on July 28, 2023. Nor has Plaintiff persuaded the court (with applicable authority) that Defendant’s agreement to provide supplemental responses, while still in default, obligated Defendant to further respond. (Wolf Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7; Ex. 6; Ex. 7.) Thus, the court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses and request for sanctions.

CONCLUSION

                The court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one). The court denies Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.

                 Plaintiff shall give notice.

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David M. Wolf v. Elias Aziz-Lavi, et al.

Plaintiff David M. Wolf’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) from Defendant Elias Aziz-Lavi and Request for Sanctions.

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply. The court did not consider Defendant’s surreply.

BACKGROUND

            This action involves a creditor’s suit.

            On December 23, 2022, Plaintiff David M. Wolf (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant Elias Aziz-Lavi (Defendant) and others.

            On March 15, 2023, the court entered Defendant’s default.

            On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff served on Defendant requests for production of documents (set one) (RFPs).

            On May 12, 2023, Defendant responded with objections to each request. One objection noted that Defendant could not respond to the RFPs because he was in default.

            From May 23, 2023, until June 9, 2023, the parties met and conferred to no avail.

            On July 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed this motion to compel further responses to the RFPs.

            On July 28, 2023, the court vacated the default entered against Defendant.

LEGAL STANDARD 

            ¿¿A propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response to interrogatories if the propounding party deems that an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, or that an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) Such a motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (b).)

DISCUSSION

            Plaintiff seeks further response to RFP Nos. 1-26. However, Defendant argues that he was in default when Plaintiff propounded the RFPs. (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 343 [holding a party who is in default is barred from further participating in the proceedings, unless that party appeals the resulting default judgment or seeks a new trial]; Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386 [“A defendant against whom a default has been entered is out of court and is not entitled to take any further steps in the cause affecting plaintiff's right of action […].”].) Because Defendant was still in default when Plaintiff propounded the RFPs, throughout the meet-and-confer process, and even when Plaintiff filed this motion, Defendant was not required to respond to the discovery at issue. The court notes that Defendant addressed this issue in his general objections to the RFPs.

            Plaintiff contends that entry of default in no way limits Defendant’s obligation to respond to discovery. (Wolf Decl., ¶ 5; Ex. 5.) But Plaintiff’s reliance on Armstrong v. Gates (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 952 is misplaced. There, the court held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the plaintiff’s right to take a deposition in support of its opposition to the defendant’s motion to set aside the entry of default and default judgment. (Armstrong v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at pp. 957, 959-960.) Plaintiff does not demonstrate how any of the documents sought would have supported his opposition to Defendant’s motion to set aside the default, which the court heard on July 28, 2023. Nor has Plaintiff persuaded the court (with applicable authority) that Defendant’s agreement to provide supplemental responses, while still in default, obligated Defendant to further respond. (Wolf Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7; Ex. 6; Ex. 7.) Thus, the court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses and request for sanctions.

CONCLUSION

                The court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents (set one). The court denies Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.

                 Plaintiff shall give notice.