Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 23STCP04254, Date: 2024-10-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCP04254 Hearing Date: October 30, 2024 Dept: 74
In Re: Paul William Pilger
Defendants Monica Potter, Sabrina Coryell and Kevin Dwight’s Demurrer.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Paul William Pilger (Plaintiff) sues defendants Monica Potter, Sabrina Coryell and Kevin Dwight (Defendants) for intentional and/or negligent interference with a prospective economic advantage.
JUDICAL NOTICE
The court denies the moving parties’ request for judicial notice of the Settlement Agreement and Separation and Release Agreement because plaintiff alleges he signed the agreements “under pressure” (2nd Amend. Pet. ¶ 26) – implying duress or coercion if, as one must, reads the petition’s allegations liberally – which is a factual allegation that is not amenable to resolution by demurrer, thereby rendering the authorities the moving parties cite distinguishable.
The court grants the requests for judicial notice of Exhibits “C”- “I”.
DISCUSSION
Defendants demur to the petition on the grounds that (1) the settlement bars Plaintiff’s claim; (2) Plaintiff cannot properly plead third-party interference; and (3) the claim against defendant attorney Kevin Dwight is time-barred.
The Settlement Agreements and Release
A demurrer considers the four corners of the complaint and any documents that can be judicially noticed. Here, the two agreements are not subject to judicial notice. Therefore, the court declines to find by demurrer that the settlement agreements bar the claims.
Intentional Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage
The elements of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage are “(1) a relationship between the plaintiff and some third party with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) a wrongful act, apart from the interference itself, by the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.” (Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.)
Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot plead (1) defendants are third parties and (2) an independent wrongful act.
Third Parties
Plaintiff alleges that an economic relationship arose from Robert and Gywnneth Weiss’s long-term employment of Plaintiff. From that relationship, Plaintiff alleges the Weisses asked Plaintiff to manage mineral interests in perpetuity. (SAC, ¶ 11.) Later, Gywnneth Weiss also promised Plaintiff a condominium. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff thus sufficiently alleges his economic relationship with the Weisses and their estate, for which Defendants in their personal capacity are third-parties.
Defendants contend they are not third parties because plaintiff merely substituted the trustees of the estate for Mr. and Ms. Weiss, and agents of the estate cannot be considered “third parties” in that capacity. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Monica Porter and Kevin Dwight were acting as trustee and legal counsel, respectively, for the Wiess estate. (SAC, ¶ 22.) Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Sabrina Coryell-Weiss was acting in her personal capacity. (SAC, ¶ 23.) Defendants cite Nevada law to support that agents of the estate are not third parties to the economic relationship, but only cite California authorities that support that a party to a contract is not a third party to that contract. Defendants’ contention thus fails.
Independently Wrongful Act
Plaintiff must plead that Defendants committed an independent wrongful act in addition to interference. (Salma, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at 1290.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Kevin Dwight concealed documents. This is sufficient to plead an independent wrongful act against defendant Kevin Dwight. The court discerns, however, no alleged wrongful act by defendants Monica Potter and Sabrina Coryell apart from their alleged interference. Thus, plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against Monica Potter and Sabrina Coryell.
Time barred Complaint
Although plaintiff alleges defendant Dwight engaged in the wrongful act of concealment, the statute of limitations for actions against an attorney “other than for actual fraud” for professional services is one year after the Plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the wrongful act. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6.) Here, the petition against Defendant Kevin Dwight is time-barred because Plaintiff alleges he knew defendant Dwight was concealing documents in 2018.
CONCLUSION
The Court sustains without leave to amend the demurrer in its entirety.
Defendants shall give notice.