Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 23STCV04913, Date: 2023-11-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV04913 Hearing Date: November 17, 2023 Dept: 74
Omar Noorzai v. The Regents of the
University of California, et al.
Defendants Deloitte Consulting LLP and Roy
Mathew’s Demurrer
The court considered the moving papers, opposition,
and reply.
BACKGROUND
This
action arises from an employment dispute.
On
March 6, 2023, Plaintiff Omar Noorzai filed a complaint against Deloitte
Consulting, LLP and Roy Mathew (Deloitte Defendants), in addition to The
Regents of the University of California, Lucy Avetisyan, and Michael Beck (UCLA
Defendants). The complaint alleges causes of action for violation of California
Whistleblower Retaliation Act and retaliation in violation of Labor Code
section 1102.5.
On
May 9, 2023, Deloitte Defendants filed this demurrer.
LEGAL STANDARD
A
demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the
pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially
noticeable. (¿¿Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318¿¿.) “¿To
survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a
cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the
plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.¿” (¿¿C.A. v. William S. Hart Union
High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872¿¿.) For the purpose of testing
the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all
material facts properly pleaded. (¿Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992)
2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967¿.) A demurrer “¿does not admit contentions, deductions
or conclusions of fact or law.¿” (¿¿Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67
Cal.2d 695, 713¿¿.)
DISCUSSION
First Cause of Action – Violation of
California Whistleblower Act (Gov. Code, § 8547 et seq.)
Deloitte
Defendants argue the court should sustain their demurrer for this cause of
action because they were not Plaintiff’s employer during the relevant timeframe.
Rather, only UCLA Defendants employed Plaintiff. Under Government Code section 8547.10,
subdivision (c), though, “[A]ny person who intentionally engages in acts of
reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a university
employee . . . for having made a protected disclosure shall be liable in an
action for damages brought against him or her by the injured party.” A plain
reading indicates that this statute applies to any person who engages in
retaliatory acts, not just the employer. If the legislature had intended to
limit the reach of this statute to employers, it would have expressly done so,
as in Labor Code section 1102.5. Additionally, the court is not persuaded that
Government Code section 8547.2, subdivision (d), limits the definition of “person”
in the way Deloitte urges. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Deloitte Defendants
recommended to UCLA Defendants that Plaintiff’s department be eliminated.
(Complaint, ¶ 34). Plaintiff further alleges that Deloitte Defendants made this
recommendation because Plaintiff reported improper activity by all Defendants. (Complaint,
¶¶ 32, 34.) The trier of fact could construe the recommendation as a reprisal
for the purposes of Government Code section 8547.10, subdivision (c). Thus, the
court overrules Deloitte Defendants’ demurer for this cause of action.
Second Cause of Action –
Whistleblower Retaliation (Labor Code, § 1102.5, subd (b).)
Likewise, Deloitte Defendants argue
the court should sustain their demurrer for this cause of action because they
were never Plaintiff’s employer. Under Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision
(b), “An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not
retaliate against an employee for disclosing information . . . to a government
or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee or
another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the
violation or noncompliance . . .” Plaintiff in turn contends Deloitte
Defendants count as persons acting on behalf of UCLA Defendants. But the
statute’s legislative history suggests that persons acting on behalf of the
employer would be employees in this context. (S.B. 666, 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv.
Ch. 577 (2013).) Plaintiff also invokes Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical
Group (2023) 15 Cal.5th 268, 273 (Raines) for the proposition that
an employer’s business entity agents can be held directly liable under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for employment discrimination in certain
circumstances. But the holding in Raines does not apply to violations of
Labor Code section 1102.5.
In
addition, Plaintiff argues Deloitte Defendants could be liable under the theory
of aiding and abetting. “Liability may . . . be imposed on one who aids and
abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person . . . knows the other’s
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other to so act . . .” (Saunders v. Superior Court (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 832, 846.) To that end, Plaintiff refers the court to paragraph
11 of the complaint. There, Plaintiff alleges Deloitte Defendants knew UCLA
Defendants were engaging in conduct that constituted a breach of duty to
Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also alleges Deloitte Defendants
substantially assisted and encouraged UCLA Defendants to so act. (Complaint, ¶
11.) While these allegations may be general, less specificity is required in
pleading matters of which the Defendants have superior knowledge. (Foster v.
Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5ht 998, 1028.) Here, Deloitte Defendants are in a
better position to know the extent to which they assisted or encouraged UCLA
Defendants to retaliate against Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff has alleged facts
sufficient to support a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure, section
1102.5 via the theory of aiding and abetting. The court overrules Deloitte
Defendants’ demurrer for this cause of action.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, the court overrules the demurrer.
Deloitte
Defendants shall file and serve their answer within 20 days.
Deloitte
Defendants shall give notice.