Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 23STCV07405, Date: 2024-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV07405    Hearing Date: February 15, 2024    Dept: 74

Santee Fashion Mart, LLC v. Anders Wahlquist dba B-Reel Creative Agency, Inc.

Defendant Anders Wahlquist’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons

The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

            This action arises from a dispute between a landlord and tenant.

            On April 4, 2023, Plaintiff Santee Fashion Mart, LLC (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant Anders Wahlquist, doing business as B-Reel Creative Agency, Inc. (Defendant). The complaint alleges one cause of action for breach of lease.

            On July 10, 2023, Defendant filed this motion to quash service of summons.

LEGAL STANDARD

            “A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, sudd. (a).)

DISCUSSION

            Defendant aims to quash service of summons because Plaintiff did not comply with the prerequisites and procedural requirements for substituted service. If a plaintiff cannot with reasonable diligence personally serve a non-entity defendant with the summons and complaint, the plaintiff may leave a copy of the summons and complaint at the plaintiff’s home, usual place of business, or usual mailing address with a competent member of household or an individual apparently in charge of the office. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b).) The plaintiff must then mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the place where he or she left the summons and complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b).) Two or three attempts to personally serve the defendant at a proper place qualifies as ‘reasonable diligence.’ (Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.) Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated reasonable diligence. The proof of service indicates Plaintiff attempted to personally serve Defendant on April 20, 2023, and May 10, 2023, at the following address: 1212 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1120, Los Angeles, CA 90025. (Hashemi Decl., ¶ 3; Ex 1.) But Defendant has never visited or conducted business at that location. (Wahlquist Decl., ¶ 9.) Nor has Defendant ever used the location as a mailing address. (Wahlquist Decl., ¶ 9.) Moreover, on May 16, 2023, Plaintiff ultimately left the summons and complaint at the address with which Defendant is unaffiliated. (Hashemi Decl., ¶ 3; Ex 1.)

            However, Defendant acknowledges Code of Civil Procedure section 416.90: “A summons may be served on a person […] by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to […] a person authorized by him to receive service of process.” When Plaintiff attempted service on May 16, 2023, it delivered the summons and complaint to Katie Goldin of eResidentAgent, Inc (eResidentAgent), which is authorized to accept service on behalf of B-Reel Creative Agency, Inc. (B-Reel). (Unger Decl., ¶¶ 2-7.) Even so, Defendant contends eResidentAgent is not the agent for service of process on B-Reel’s employees or officers, including Defendant. (Unger Decl., ¶ 5.)

            In its opposition, Plaintiff points out that Defendant signed one of the parties’ leases and an addendum as Anders Wahlquist doing business as B-Reel Creative Agency, Inc. (Shogi Decl., ¶ 6; Ex. 2; Ex. 3.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant thereby created the impression that he was one and the same as B-Reel. As a further consequence, Defendant ostensibly authorized service on himself through B-Reel’s agent for service of process. (See Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Golden West Music Sales (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1018.) The court disagrees.

            As Defendant notes, he signed the leases merely as a representative of B-Reel. (Rossman Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. 4, p. 20:11-18.) To that end, Defendant rejected prior drafts of the lease that would have made him a personal guarantor in case of default. (Wahlquist Decl., ¶ 4; Hashemi Supp. Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. 2, § 1.11.) Defendant also never submitted a fictious business name statement for B-Reel. (Rossman Decl., ¶ 7; Ex.7, p. 27:1-14.) Moreover, Defendant did not draft the d.b.a. language. Rather, Plaintiff added the language so that the owner of B-Reel, in addition to B-Reel itself, would be liable for any breach of the leases without a personal guaranty. (Shogi Decl., ¶ 4.) But a corporation is a legal entity that is separate and distinct from its officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations. (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538.) Thus, Defendant did not identify himself as one and same as B-Reel. Nor did Defendant agree in the leases and addendum that service on B-Reel’s agent would constitute service on himself. (Rossman Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. 1; Ex. 2; Ex. 3.) Last, Plaintiff has not shown that, outside the leases and addendum, Defendant ever represented that he was amenable to such method of service.

CONCLUSION

                Based on the foregoing, the court grants Defendant’s motion to quash.

            Plaintiff shall give notice.