Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 23STCV09516, Date: 2025-01-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV09516    Hearing Date: January 7, 2025    Dept: 74

Tovar v. General Motors, LLC

Plaintiff Mario Tovar’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

BACKGROUND 

            This motion arises from a Beverly-Song product warranty complaint.

            Plaintiff Mario Tovar (Plaintiff) filed suit against defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant). 

On August 14, 2024, Defendant served a California Code of Civil Procedure section 998 Offer to Compromise.

Plaintiff accepted and returned it to the Defendant on September 13, 2024.  Plaintiff accepted the offer but opted to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil code section 1794(d).

Plaintiff filed this Motion for Attorney Fees.

LEGAL STANDARD

Attorney’s fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).)  In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) 

Section 1794 provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794.) 

Thus, the statute includes a “reasonable attorney’s fees” standard.  The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.) 

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) The Court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395.) 

In determining a reasonable attorney fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These factors include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.) 

DISCUSSION

            Plaintiff’s counsel, Joshua Valero (Valero), has provided a declaration, including an hourly rate, a previously approved billing rate, timesheet and memorandum of costs.  Plaintiff has provided prima facie evidence of the validity of the attorney’s fees.  Plaintiff requests $23,718.39 in attorney’s fees for 43.1 hours in litigating the case, an anticipatory 3 hours for this motion and $668.39 in costs.  Valero’s hourly rate is $500 per hour. Defendant requests that Valero’s hourly rate be reduced to $450 but provides no evidence that the hourly rate is unreasonable.  The Court finds Valero’s hourly rate reasonable.

            Valero’s counsel also requests 43.1 in attorney’s fees.  Defendant challenges Valero’s hours for (1) Research and Communication before Case was Filed; (2) Draft and Prepare Complaint; (3) Clerical and Administrative Tasks; (4) Discovery Requests; (5) Discovery Responses; (5) Attorney’s Fee motion; and (6) Costs.

            Defendant alleges that Valero’s time spent researching and communicating with Plaintiff before the case was filed should be stricken entirely because Valero “performed no compensable work.”  Defendant provides no authority for why research in preparation of drafting a complaint is inappropriate.  The Court declines to strike fees for preparation before the draft is filed. 

            Defendant also requests that the Court substantially strike Valero’s time for drafting and preparing complaint because Defendant alleges it is largely based on templates.  Plaintiff responds that the 3.1 hours were reasonably spent determining venue, drafting the summons, preparing the civil case cover sheet and addendum, and contemplating the proper causes of action.  The Court finds this justification for 3.1 hours reasonable and declines to strike fees for the preparation of the Complaint.

            Defendant requests that Plaintiff’s request for time spent on Clerical and Administrative Tasks be stricken in its entirety.  Valero is the sole shareholder of Valero Law.  (Valero Decl., ¶ 1.)  The Court strikes 1.4 hours for non-legal administrative tasks. 

            Defendant requests that the Court strike hours from Plaintiff’s discovery requests and review of discovery responses.  Plaintiff provides additional details regarding the tailoring and drafting of discovery responses and review supporting their timesheets.  Therefore, the Court declines to strike fees for discovery.

            Defendant also requests that the Court strikes a majority of the costs demanded for the fee motion.  Defendant alleges that the motion should only take an hour.  Plaintiff provides evidence of several attempts to settle attorney’s fees without need for motion work.  (Valero Decl., Ex. “G”; Ex. “I.”)  The Court does not find the hours requested unreasonable and declines to strike fees.

            Finally, Defendant challenges the costs requested for filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Defendant alleges that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was frivolous because it was only filed due to GM’s “inadvertent error” in timely responding to discovery and was never heard by the Court.  A frivolous motion is one that is “totally and completely without merit.”  (Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 469.)  GM does not provide an authority or support for why the motion was frivolous given its failure to timely respond to discovery.  The Court declines to strike costs for the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

CONCLUSION

            The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fee and awards $23,018.39 in fees and costs payable within 30 days.

            Plaintiff to give notice.