Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 23STCV09589, Date: 2025-01-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV09589    Hearing Date: January 21, 2025    Dept: 74

Flores v. Walters Residence Homes Inc. et al.

Defendants Walters Residence Homes, Inc. and SouthEast Employee Leasing Services, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.

 

BACKGROUND 

            This complaint arises from a wrongful termination cause of action.

            Plaintiff Yolanda Flores (Plaintiff) alleges that defendants Walters Residence Homes, Inc. and SouthEast Employee Leasing Services, Inc. (Defendants) wrongfully terminated and discriminated against Plaintiff.

            Defendants filed this motion to compel arbitration.

            Parties have agreed to stay the case until the motion to compel arbitration is decided.

 

DISCUSSION

            Defendants presented evidence of the arbitration agreement.  The agreement was entered into by the parties on September 21, 2016.  The agreement states, in pertinent part:

“I agree and acknowledge that SouthEast Personnel Leasing, Inc. and SouthEast Employee Leasing Services, Inc. (collectively “SPLI”), . . . and Walters Residence Homes Inc. (my “Worksite Employer”), and I will utilize binding arbitration to resolve all disputes that may arise out of the employment context.

 

My Worksite Employer . . . SPLI and I agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either I may have against my Worksite Employer . . . or SPLI (or their respective owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents, subsidiaries, and parties affiliated with their employee benefit and health plans) or that my Worksite Employer . . . or SPLI may have against me, arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my seeking employment with, employment by, or any other association with my Worksite Employer . . . or SPLI shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq.) in conformity with the procedures of the California Arbitration Act (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1280 et. seq., including § 1283.05 and all of the Act’s other mandatory and permissive rights to discovery). Included within the scope of this Agreement are all disputes, whether based on tort, contract, statute (including, but not limited to, any claims of discrimination and harassment, whether they be based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or any other similar state, local, or federal law or regulation), equitable law, or otherwise.

 

I understand and agree to this binding arbitration provision and that I, my Worksite Employer . . . and SPLI give up our respective rights to trial by jury of any claim that I may have against my Worksite Employer . . . or SPLI, or that my Worksite Employer . . . or SPLI may have against me.”

 

(Clark Decl., ¶ 7 Ex. 4.)  Defendants allege that the Arbitration Agreement encompasses all claims made in the Complaint.

            Defendants have met their burden in establishing that an arbitration agreement exists.

            Plaintiff contends that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. 

Unconscionability

For an arbitration agreement to be unenforceable as unconscionable, there must be both procedural and substantive unconscionability.  (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (Armendariz) (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.) 

            Procedural Unconscionability

Procedural unconscionability includes oppression arising from unequal bargaining power causing an absence of meaningful choice and real negotiating, and surprise due to hidden terms drafted by the party seeking to enforce the provisions.  (Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 581.)

            Plaintiff alleges that the contract was offered in a take-it-or-leave it manner, where Plaintiff was not given an option not to sign, and Defendant did not include an opt-out form. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the terms of the contract were “full of surprise.” 

            Plaintiff alleges that (1) she was never informed that there was an arbitration agreement within the documents, (2) the she felt pressured to quickly review, fill out, and return the documents to keep her job, (3) she was not provided with an opt-out form, and (4) that she was never provided a copy of the employment documents nor given an opportunity to discuss the documents.  (Flores Decl., ¶¶ 5-7, 9.)  The Arbitration agreement was included within the employment documents but was clearly marked as a “Binding Arbitration Agreement”, in a regular font and size. The agreement also includes a bolded, all caps section stating, “IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS AGREEMENT, PLEASE ASK A SPLI, A WORKSITE EMPLOYER, OR TEMPORARY STAFFING EMPLOYER (IF ANY) REPRESENTATIVE BEFORE SIGNING.”  (Clark Decl., Ex. 3.)  Additionally, the Agreement included the opportunity to submit an opt-out form within 30-days of signing the arbitration agreement.  (Clark Decl., Ex. 3.) 

            When determining if oppression is present, the Court considers “(1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract: (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party’s review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.”  (OTO, LLC v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-27 [citing Grand Prospect Partners, LP v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1348].) 

            Here, the Arbitration Agreement was not oppressive. The party may have been rushed to complete the forms but does not allege that any specific pressure was put on Plaintiff regarding the Arbitration agreement.  Plaintiff was also offered the opportunity to opt-out of the agreement within 30-days of signing.  The contract is only 2-pages, without any particularly complex provisions, in a regular font size, and providing for an opportunity to ask a supervisor to explain any provisions.  The review was not aided by an attorney, but even without attorney review, there is no meaningful oppression in the signing of the Arbitration Agreement.

            The opposing party must show both procedural and substantive unconscionability.  Plaintiff has failed to show any procedural unconscionability.  Therefore, the Court grants the Motion to Compel Arbitration.

 

CONCLUSION

            The court grants Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.

            Defendants to give notice.