Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 24STCV09694, Date: 2025-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV09694    Hearing Date: April 4, 2025    Dept: 74

Jarquin et al. v. Wong et al.

Defendants Charles Wong, Tina Wong and 9540 Valley LLC’s Demurrer with Motion to Strike

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiffs Javier Jarquin and Patricia De La O-Pinon (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against defendants Charles Wong, Tina Wong, and 9540 Valley LLC (Defendants).  Plaintiffs allege twelve causes of action: (1) Violation of California Civil Code § 1942.4; (2) Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability; (3) Private Nuisance; (4) Business and Professions Code § 17200; (5) Negligence; (6) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (8) Negligence Per Se; (9) Violations of Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (10) Trespassing; (11) Unpermitted/Illegal Unit in Violation of Common Law; and (12) Violation of Los Angeles County Retaliatory Eviction and Anti-Harassment Ordinance. 

Defendants demur to the seventh, eight, ninth, tenth and twelfth causes of action and move to strike portions of the complaint.

DISCUSSION

Demurrer

Uncertainty

Defendants demur to the seventh, eight, ninth, tenth, and twelfth causes of action on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain. A cause of action is uncertain only when the defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues or claims are stated.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Plaintiffs’ causes of action are not uncertain.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

            The elements of intention infliction of emotional distress are (1) outrageous conduct by defendant; (2) intentional or reckless causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional distress; and (4) causation.  (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.)   Defendants demur to the Seventh cause of action on the grounds that it lumps the conduct of all defendants together.  Unlike a Fraud cause of action, Plaintiffs are not required to plead with specificity which defendant specifically undertook which action Plaintiffs allege to be outrageous.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were the managers and owners of the property.  (Complaint ¶ 4.)  Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants failed to make repairs, lied to Plaintiffs about repairs, maintained the Property in substandard conditions, and forced the Plaintiffs to pay for fraudulent and unnecessary repairs.  (Complaint ¶ 148.)  Therefore, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded the Seventh Cause of Action.  The Court overrules Defendants’ demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action.

Negligence Per Se

            The elements of negligence per se are (1) defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) that violation caused an injury or death; (3) death or injury resulted from occurrence which the law was designated to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the injury or death was one of the class of persons for whose protection the law was adopted.  (Urhausen v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 254, 267.)  Defendants demur to the Eight Cause of Action on the grounds that it is duplicative of the negligence cause of action.  The Negligence Per Se cause of action is an alternative theory of liability.  Plaintiffs successfully allege the elements of negligence per se; therefore, the demurrer to the Eighth Cause of Action is overruled.

Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act

            The elements of a violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) are (1) a consumer; (2) who suffers any damage; (3) as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by Civil Code section 1170.  (Civ. Code, § 1780, subd. (a).)  Defendants demur to the Ninth Cause of Action on the grounds that the CLRA only applies to “goods and services” and real property is not a “good” under the CLRA. Plaintiff counters that the lease of property is a service under the CLRA and identifies Defendants’ action of placing the Property on the rental market, then proceeding to rent the property to Plaintiffs, as the unlawful practice.  (Complaint ¶¶ 169-171.)  A service under the CLRA includes “work, labor, and services other than a commercial or business use.”  (Civ. Code § 1761, subd. (b).) A property lease is not a good or service under the CLRA. (Accord McKell v. Washington Mutual Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4 1457, 1488 [CLRA does not apply to real property transaction because sale of property is not a “good or service”].) Thus, the Court sustains the demurrer to the Ninth Cause of Action.     

Trespassing

            The elements of trespass are (1) plaintiff’s ownership, or control, of the property; (2) defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto property; (3) lack of permission for entry, or actions in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the actions were a substantial factor in causing harm.  (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262.)  Defendants demur to the Tenth Cause of Action for trespass on the grounds that it states no claims against Defendants.  Plaintiffs respond that the trespass cause of action is relevant to Does 1-100, not Defendants.  Thus, the Court sustains demurrer to the Tenth Cause of Action as to Defendants. 

Violation of Los Angeles County Retaliation and Anti-Harassment Ordinance

            Defendants demur to the Twelfth Cause of Action on the grounds that the subject property is not subject to the Los Angeles County Retaliation and Anti-Harassment Ordinance (RSO).  Defendants allege that the RSO does not apply to the property because the property is located in incorporated Los Angeles County, and Rosemead Municipal Code does not incorporate the RSO. 

            The Complaint states that on information and belief, the Property is subjected to the RSO.  (Complaint ¶ 2.)  Defendants do not request judicial notice of either the incorporated status of the property, nor the municipal code.  Therefore, Defendants do not assert any relevant contradictory evidence or assertions.  The demurrer is overruled to the Twelfth Cause of Action.

Amending

            The Court sustains the demurrer to the Ninth Cause of Action without leave to amend.  Plaintiffs do not seek leave to amend to add Doe defendants to the Tenth Cause of Action for trespass, thus the Court also sustains that demurrer without leave to amend.

Strike

            Defendants seek to strike Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages.  Malice is defined as “conduct which is intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).)  Oppression is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship and conscious disregards of that person’s rights.”  (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).)

            Plaintiffs allege that the Property suffered from (1) a cockroach infestation, (2) rodent infestation, (3) mold growth, (4) dysfunctional plumbing, (5) electrical safety concerns, (6) inoperable heating and cooling, (7) improper weatherproofing, (8) deteriorated walls and ceilings, (9) lack of smoke detectors, (10) lack of ventilation, (11) decaying carpets, (12) security and safety concerns, (13) lack of waste disposal and (14) Defendants’ harassment and intimidation.  (Complaint ¶¶ 26-41.)  Plaintiffs do not indicate in the complaint when all of these problems arose but do indicate that the mold growth manifested in 2018 in the laundry and bedrooms, the plumbing issues began in 2014, and electrical issues began in 2023 (Complaint ¶¶ 29, 20, 31.)  Plaintiffs allege that that Defendants knew about these issues and failed to address them in knowing and conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ health and safety.  (Complaint ¶ 26-41.)  The Court finds these allegations sufficient to support Plaintiffs’ punitive damages under malice.   

            Defendants also move to strike Plaintiffs’ claim to attorney’s fees.  Plaintiffs claim attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1021.5 and section 3304.  Civil Code section 1021.5 provides for attorney’s fees when the action (1) confers a significant benefit to the general public or a large class of persons, (2) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement is such as to make the award appropriate, and (3) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.  In general, an action is the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if the “cost of the claimant’s legal victory transcends his personal interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.”  (In re Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1215.)  Here, access to safe and habitable rental properties is an important right but Plaintiffs do not claim to vindicate rights beyond their personal interests.  The Court finds that Civil Code section 1021.5 therefore does not apply.

            Civil Code section 3304 provides that a tenant may sue for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and may recover “any expenses properly incurred by the covenantee in defending his possession.”  (Civ. Code § 3304.)  This includes attorneys’ fees related to defending the possession.  (McCormick v. Marcy (1913) 165 Cal. 386, 393.)  Defendants cite Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005), which does not reference attorney’s fees because the lease at issue in Andrews contained an attorney’s fee provision.  (125 Cal.App.4th 578, 583 fn. 2.)  Thus, Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees regarding possession of the property is statutorily appropriate. 

CONCLUSION

            The Court sustains in part and overrules in part Defendants’ demurrer.  The Court sustains the demurrer to the Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action as to Defendants.  The Court overrules the demurrer as to the Seventh, Eighth and Twelfth Causes of Action.

            The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion to Strike. The Court strikes “California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5” (pp. 70:14.) 

            Defendants to give notice.